

DOI <https://doi.org/10.30525/2592-8813-2023-4-10>

## FEATURES OF RUSSIA'S SOFT IMPACT ON UKRAINE (UNTIL 2014)

*Yurii Mateleshko,*

*PhD in History, Associate Professor, Associate Professor at the Department of International Studies and Human Communication, Uzhhorod National University (Uzhhorod, Ukraine)*

*ORCID ID: 0000-0001-5327-8354*

*yurii.mateleshko@uzhnu.edu.ua*

**Abstract.** The article considers the main features of Russia's soft impact on Ukraine. The study is based on the application of the soft power concept of the American scientist J. Nye. The term soft power means to the ability of one actor to influence others using attraction (of one's values, culture, politics, etc.), persuasion and involvement, as opposed to hard coercion and bribery (hard power). The Russian Federation's soft impact on Ukraine, despite certain achievements, was generally inefficient, inconsistent and unsystematic. The reasons for this were: 1) stereotyped attitudes towards Ukraine as a constantly loyal and close country; 2) the predominance of the pro-Western national project in Ukraine, which is based on the opposition of Russian and Ukrainian development models; 3) the Russian Federation has not had a sufficiently attractive image for Ukrainians, taking into account the specifics of its political (authoritarianism) and economic (raw materials) systems; 4) insufficient institutional support for the soft influence policy, which is especially noticeable against the background of the Western non-governmental organizations' activity in Ukraine; 5) the delay in implementing a targeted soft power policy at the state level. At the same time, it is worth noting certain successes in this direction of Russian policy related to the church, educational, cultural, information and economic areas. However, these achievements, mostly related to the previous common historical experience of the two countries, were often accumulated inertially, without the systematic and conscious use of soft impact's tools. Russia's use of hard power against Ukraine since 2014 has reversed all these gains.

**Key words:** soft power, Russia, Ukraine, bilateral relations, politics.

**Introduction.** In the modern world, soft power is an important tool and an integral component of many countries' foreign policy practice. A number of states have included the concept of soft influence in their foreign policy strategy. Russia, which for a long time occupied leading positions in global soft power rankings, is no exception. The events of the last decade related to Ukraine and Syria have once again proven that Russia's hard power in modern conditions cannot effectively ensure the realization of its national interests in the long term. For this, other, soft methods are needed that make it possible to use the available state resources more efficiently.

The relevance of the topic of Russia's soft impact on Ukraine is explained by the long-term strategic partnership between the two states, which was based on historical, cultural and economic foundations, as well as by insufficient coverage of this issue in the scientific literature. This topic attracted the attention of Ukrainian (A. Bogomolov and O. Lytvynenko, Yu. Sedliar and M. Lymar, Yu. Mateleshko), Russian (V. Ivanchenko, A. Vershinin), as well as Western (D. Sherr, V. Hudson, V. Feklyunina, A. Cheskin) researchers.

**The purpose** of this work is to find out the main features of Russia's soft influence on Ukraine, as well as the reasons for its lack of effectiveness. The study is based on primary sources, as well as the scientific achievements of the mentioned researchers. The chronological framework of the article covers the period 1991–2013. Since 2014, a qualitatively new stage of Russian-Ukrainian relations began, which is characterized by the predominance of hard power methods in bilateral relations.

**Results of the study.** For a long time, the implementation of an active policy of soft influence was hampered by the stereotypical image of Ukraine, widespread in the Russian mass consciousness (including among Russian politicians). As A. Vershinin notes, minimal cultural differences, the expe-

rience of centuries-old unified statehood, deep interpenetration of economies and millions of personal connections create the image of a country that is close to Russia by default (Vershinin, 2016: 41–42). As a result of this, there is no awareness that in order to keep this territory in Moscow's sphere of influence, it is necessary to make efforts and develop a special foreign policy course. In the 1990s, according to Vershinin, Russian-Ukrainian relations at the highest level were strongly influenced by precisely this inertia, which was manifested even in official rhetoric. According to V. Ivanchenko, the approach to Ukraine as a fraternal country, which, under any conditions, will maintain strong friendly ties with Russia, or the exclusively pragmatic approach that ignores the historical and cultural Russian factor in the Southeast, led to a lack of strategy and tactics of interaction with Ukrainian civil society (Ivanchenko, 2015).

Difficulties in implementing Russian soft power are also related to the pro-Western foreign policy course that was chosen by Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR. Due to the specificity of its historical development, Ukraine implemented elements of the Western model in the construction of its national state. As a result, Western soft power, which is associated with the formation of democratic processes and institutions, turned out to be inextricably linked with the implementation of the Ukrainian national project. This project, as A. Vershinin notes, was based on contrasting Ukraine with Russia (Vershinin, 2016: 42). The young Ukrainian state rejected Russian historical and cultural experience was building its own identity, so any, even soft, influence of the Russian Federation was often considered by Kiev as a threat.

It should also be noted the successful and effective soft influence of Western countries on Ukraine. Western, European or Euro-Atlantic, ideas were spreading in Ukrainian society through various instruments (educational programs, round tables and conferences, representative centers, grant systems, etc.). The vacuum that existed in Ukraine for some time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as V. Ivanchenko notes, was freely filling with Western narratives, which were positively perceived by the Ukrainian public (Ivanchenko, 2015). While Russia tried to build business relationships with influential politicians or businessmen, Western countries successfully worked with target groups of Ukrainian society.

A necessary condition for a successful soft power policy is the creation of an image that will be attractive to the object of influence. The formed image of the developed West and the European Ukraine associated with it provided a significant resource for implementing of a soft power policy. The question of what Russia's own development project is remained unanswered for a long time. It was extremely problematic to show the attractiveness of the Russian project of Eurasian economic integration in comparison with the Western one. Especially in the case of Ukraine, which has close economic ties with Europe and a pro-Western elite. In addition, according to some scientists, the Eurasian project did not have any other value content that would allow Russian soft power to act in many areas (Vershinin, 2016: 53). Thus, for a long time the Russian Federation could not propose its own development project included political, socio-economic, cultural, etc. components that would allow it to successfully implement its own soft impact's policy.

The beginning of the formation of its own development project (at least at the official level), which is an alternative to the Western model, dates back to the early 2010s, when Russia was positioned as a state-civilization in V. Putin's election articles (Vladimir Putin..., 2012). The advantage of this project – it did not pretend to be global and did not involve Russia into a struggle with the Western model of development. However, it was openly positioned as an alternative within the territory that is historically close to Russia.

Since the beginning of the 2010s the term soft power began to constantly appear in Russian policy documents. In 2013, it was included in the text of the Foreign Policy's Concept of Russian Federation. The document states that soft power is a complex toolkit for solving foreign policy tasks based on the capabilities of civil society, information and communication, humanitarian and other methods and

technologies alternative to classical diplomacy. At the same time, the Concept also contains a negative interpretation of soft power, which can be used «for the purpose of exerting political pressure on sovereign states, interfering in their internal affairs, destabilizing the situation, manipulating public opinion and consciousness, in particular within the framework of financing humanitarian projects and projects related to the protection of human rights abroad» (Konceptsiya vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj Federacii, 2013). One of the tasks defined by this Concept was to create a positive image of Russia matched to the authority of its culture, education, science, sports, the level of development of civil society, as well as participation in aid programs for developing countries. The document also states that the state should create influence's instruments on the formation of its image in the world, improve the system of using soft power, look for optimal forms of activity in this direction, which count both international experience and national specificity and rely on mechanisms of interaction with civil society and experts.

In accordance with presidential orders and decrees, a number of coordinating bodies directly engaged in the implementation of soft power policy were created in Russia at the turn of the 2000s – 2010s. These are, in particular, the Russkiy Mir Foundation (2007), the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) (2008) and the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund (2010). If the mentioned foundations are non-governmental institutions (but acting in the interests of Russian foreign policy), then Rossotrudnichestvo, being a subordinate body of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, carries out the general function of coordinating activities within the formation and the implementation of Russia's soft power policy. This institution annually prepares a report, recording the results of its activities in it, and also forms a Declaration of goals and objectives for the current year at the beginning of each year. (Vorochkov, 2016: 265).

Until 2014, there were only three representative offices of Rossotrudnichestvo in Ukraine: two Russian centers of science and culture – in Kyiv and Simferopol, as well as a representative office in Odessa operating under the auspices of the Russian Consulate General. The main tasks of these representative offices: 1) promoting the preservation of the Russian language and its study in the national education system of Ukraine; 2) organization of Russian language courses; 3) holding scientific and practical conferences, seminars, competitions and olympiads on Russian culture and language; 4) promoting the education of Ukrainian citizens in the Russian Federation (Yablonskyi, & Zdioruk, 2014: 40; Federal'noe agentstvo...). Due to the narrow network of representative offices operating in several large cities, this institution objectively could not largely cope with the tasks assigned to it. As a result, Russian events, even in the southeast of Ukraine, took place quite rarely and went unnoticed, at least among young people (Ivanchenko, 2015). At the same time, branches of the Goethe Institute, the British Council, the French Institute, and other Western institutions, which quantitatively and qualitatively dominated Russian ones, quite often held mass thematic events, conferences, cultural weeks of European countries, etc.

The Russkiy Mir Foundation was created as a non-governmental center for the support and popularization of the Russian language and culture. Its co-founders are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. The tasks of the Foundation are in many ways similar to those of Rossotrudnichestvo: popularization of the Russian language and culture, support for Russian language study programs abroad, etc. (Informacionnyj portal fonda «Russkij mir»). There were 12 Russian centers (mostly at libraries and universities) and 9 offices (at schools, libraries, public organizations) of «Russian World» in Ukraine (Yablonskyi, & Zdioruk, 2014: 41–42).

Unlike the Russkiy Mir Foundation or Rossotrudnichestvo, the Gorchakov Fund did not have an extensive network of representative offices abroad, which might be hindered by its limited budget and activities type, which are mainly centred around the grant distribution. The only Information

Centre of the Gorchakov Fund operated in Ukraine (Kyiv) from 2013 at the Institute of International Relations of the National Aviation University. In February 2015, the Security Service of Ukraine closed the Centre after a request from students who complained that it was conducting subversive activities. (Tereschenko, & Koval, 2022: 27).

A strong political, economic and cultural foundation is necessary for the successful implementation of a soft power policy. Both before and after 2014, Russia was viewed as an authoritarian country with an unattractive political culture whose values cannot compete with Western ones. In addition, its foreign policy does not have a stable legal and moral basis, as evidenced by the conflicts, including military ones, started by Russian Federation. Therefore, lacking the appropriate political resources, Russia is forced to use mainly cultural, educational and partly economic components implementing its policy of soft influence.

Economic attractiveness is considered one of the components of the state's soft power. Despite the raw materials economy, for a long time for many Ukrainians Russia personified a relatively stable state, which is the main supplier of energy resources to the Ukrainian market, as well as a consumer of a significant number of Ukrainian goods (including those with high added value).

Even after the Orange Revolution 2004, despite the political contradictions in relations between Moscow and Kyiv, mutual trade between the countries was constantly growing. As of 2012, 38% of Russian direct investments in the CIS countries were in Ukraine (Vershinin, 2016: 47–48). In this, Kyiv was significantly ahead of even Moscow's partners in the Customs Union.

Ukrainian scientists note that a significant resource in Russia's arsenal of soft power is a visa-free regime for citizens of CIS countries and the possibility of unhindered employment (Sedliar, & Lymar, 2012: 67). The majority of labor migrants from Ukraine, at least until 2014, worked in Russia (with the exception of people from the western regions, who traditionally preferred employment in the European Union's countries). In 2010–2012, the largest recipient countries of Ukrainian labor were the Russian Federation (43.2%), Poland (14.3%), Italy (13.2%) and the Czech Republic (12.9%) (Mihratsiinyi profil Ukrainy, 2016: 43).

The attractiveness of the eastern project of economic integration among Ukrainians is evidenced by the data of the September 2013 opinion poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. So, if a referendum on Ukraine's accession to the European Union or the Customs Union were held in the near future, then about 41% of respondents would vote for the EU, and 35% for the CU. At the same time, as sociologists note, if a separate referendum on Ukraine's accession to the Customs Union were held, it would receive the support of a relative majority of citizens (40% for, 33% against). Support for European integration in a separate referendum would be somewhat higher – 43% for, 30% against. (Za vstup Ukrainy..., 2013).

According to D. Sherr, the Moscow Patriarchate is the most effective instrument of Russia's soft power in the «near abroad» (Sherr, 2013: 89). After the election of Patriarch Kirill (2009), who took 6th place in the ranking of 100 top politicians according to *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* three years later, the Russian Orthodox Church began to actively raise the issue of «Triune Orthodox Rus'». This idea was also supported by the secular leadership of the state, which put forward the idea of an inseparable cultural space, of which Ukraine was an important part. Thus, in his speech on the occasion of the Baptism's 1020th anniversary of Rus', V. Putin noted that Orthodoxy inextricably had linked the peoples' destinies of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and other countries. «We have common values and the only spiritual path, which began in the Dnieper font», said Prime Minister of the Russian Federation (Vystuplenie V. V. Putina..., 2008).

The Russian Orthodox Church became the main guide of the course for the spiritual unity of the «fraternal nations». Patriarch Kirill made strengthening religious and cultural ties with Ukraine one of his main goals. The patriarch's regular visits to Ukraine (his predecessor Alexy II visited Ukraine only three times in 18 years), his statements about his desire to learn the Ukrainian language, frequent

rumors about the possibility of moving the patriarchal throne to Kyiv (Vershinin, 2016: 55) – all this was aimed at preserving Ukraine as a sphere of spiritual and cultural influence of Russia. During a visit to Gorlovka in 2009, Patriarch Kirill said: «Here, on the sacred land of Donbass, I cannot but talk about the relations between Russia and Ukraine. This is the single space of Holy Rus', like Belarus, like many other countries. We are one people who emerged from the font of Kyiv baptism. There are differences in languages, in customs, in temperament, but we live by the same values. And as long as there are the same values, there is also this spiritual community.» (Slovo Svyatejshego Patriarha Kirilla, 2009).

The main support of the Russian Orthodox Church was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which at the end of 2010, according to the Razumkov Center, made up 35% of the total number of religious communities in the country (for comparison: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate – 13%, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church – 3.5%). The share of believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate among the Ukraine's adult population was almost 24% at that time, while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate was 15%, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was 0.9%. (Istoriia i suchasnist ukrainskoho pravoslavia, 2013).

Among the instruments of soft influence, the field of education and, in particular, international educational exchange programs are very important. A sponsoring state can use the intellectual resource of foreign countries (for example, potential representatives of the future elite) in its own interests.

Until 2014, Russia was one of the leaders in the number of Ukrainian students studying abroad, significantly ahead of countries such as Czech Republic, Italy, the USA, Spain and France. In the 2010/2011 academic year, 6.2% of all foreign citizens educated at Russian universities were Ukrainians. According to this indicator, Ukraine as a «supplier» of students in the Russian Federation ranked 4th, behind Kazakhstan (16.4%), Belarus (14.5%) and China (9%) (Aref'ev, 2013). Russia entered the top three in the number of Ukrainian students in the 2011/2012 academic year. At that time, 8,929 full-time students from Ukraine studied in Germany, 6,321 in Poland, and 4,644 in Russia (U 2013 rotsi..., 2014).

Moreover, in Ukraine itself, some students and pupils got education in Russian. Thus, according to the Ukraine's Ministry of Education and Science, the share of students studying at universities in Ukrainian and Russian was 82.1% and 17.7% in 2009. In the 2008/2009 academic year, 17.6% of school pupils got education in Russian. Most of them are residents of the country's southeastern regions. (Sedliar, & Lymar, 2012: 66).

Until 2014, several branches of Russian universities operated on the territory of Ukraine. For example, branches of the Moscow State University, the Moscow Academy of Labor and Social Relations, the Novorossiysk State Maritime Academy, the St.Petersburg Humanitarian University of Trade Unions and the Saratov State Socio-Economic University operated in Sevastopol (Yablonskyi, & Zdioruk, 2014: 37).

A powerful tool of soft power used to influence public opinion in another country is mass media (printed – press, books, posters, etc., as well as electronic – radio, television, Internet). Until 2014, Ukraine was covered by the Russian information space. The first place in total annual circulation in Ukraine in 2011 was taken by Russian-language periodicals: circulations of Russian-language newspapers and magazines were respectively 2.5 and 8.5 times higher than Ukrainian-language ones (Sedliar, Lymar, 2012: 65). Monitoring of the eight highest-rated TV channels shows that programs in Ukrainian in 2013 accounted for 31.8% of airtime, and in Russian – 50.3%. In the same year, the share of songs and programs in Ukrainian on the air of the six highest-rated radio stations was 26.3%, and in Russian – 43.8%. (Yablonskyi, & Zdioruk, 2014: 44).

Using content analysis and original interviews with editorial staff, J. Szostek reveals factors that shaped reporting about Russia in Ukraine in 2010–2011. The researcher demonstrates that news pro-

viders in Ukraine that had a Russian shareholder or partner tended to be more restrained in their criticism of Russia than comparable news providers without such Moscow connections. There was also diversity among Russia's news exporters: some clearly served Moscow interests, while others were commercially driven and balanced demands from Kremlin against the demands of their audience. (Szostek, 2014: 463–482).

Russian television channels (Channel One, TNT, NTV, STS, etc.), as well as Internet sites that contributed to the popularization of Russian culture, had significant popularity in Ukraine. According to D. Sherr, the Russian cinema's products that are shown on television are one of the most powerful forms of the Russian Federation's soft power in the Russian-speaking regions of independent states (Sherr, 2013: 91). In addition to the obligatory entertainment quota, which is familiar to any Western audience, the Russian television «cocktail» often includes nostalgic films about an idealized or fictional past, dramas about the police and intelligence services, and documentaries about the unshakable heritage of Russian culture.

An important part of Russian soft power in Ukraine was the presence of close personal ties between people living in both states. A 2011 survey showed that half of Ukrainians have relatives in Russia, and a third have close friends and acquaintances (Vershinin, 2016: 57). According to statistical data, during 2008–2013 more than 80% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia (Stavlennia naseleennia Ukrainy do Rosii..., 2021).

**Conclusions.** The events of 2014 (annexation of Crimea, support for separatism in Donbas), when the Russian Federation resorted to hard power, showed the failure of Russia's soft influence in Ukraine. The reasons for this were:

- 1) stereotyped attitudes towards Ukraine as a constantly loyal and close country;
- 2) the predominance of the pro-Western national project in Ukraine, which is based on the opposition of Russian and Ukrainian development models;
- 3) the Russian Federation does not have a sufficiently attractive image for Ukrainians, taking into account the specifics of its political (authoritarianism) and economic (raw materials) systems;
- 4) insufficient institutional support for the soft influence policy, which is especially noticeable against the background of the Western non-governmental organizations' activity in Ukraine;
- 5) the delay in implementing a targeted soft power policy at the state level.

At the same time, it is worth noting certain successes of Russian soft power related to the church, educational, cultural, information and economic spheres. However, these achievements, mostly related to the previous common historical experience of the two countries, were often accumulated inertially, without the planned and systematic use of soft impact tools.

#### References:

1. Aref'ev, A. (2013). Inostrannye studenty v rossijskikh vuzah (doklad) [Foreign students in Russian universities (report)]. *Demoskop Weekly*, 571–572. Retrieved from <http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2013/0571/analit02.php>
2. Bogomolov, A., & Lytvynenko, O. (2012). *A Ghost in the Mirror: Russian Soft Power in Ukraine*. Retrieved from [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263853878\\_A\\_Ghost\\_in\\_the\\_Mirror\\_Russian\\_Soft\\_Power\\_in\\_Ukraine\\_The\\_Aims\\_and\\_Means\\_of\\_Russian\\_Influence\\_Abroad\\_Series\\_A\\_Ghost\\_in\\_the\\_Mirror\\_Russian\\_Soft\\_Power\\_in\\_Ukraine](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263853878_A_Ghost_in_the_Mirror_Russian_Soft_Power_in_Ukraine_The_Aims_and_Means_of_Russian_Influence_Abroad_Series_A_Ghost_in_the_Mirror_Russian_Soft_Power_in_Ukraine)
3. Cheskin, A. (2017). Russian soft power in Ukraine: A structural perspective. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 50(4), 277–287. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.09.001>
4. Federal'noe agentstvo po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimyh gosudarstv, sootechestvennikov, prozhivayushchih za rubezhom, i po mezhdunarodnomu gumanitarnomu sotrudnichestvu (Rossotrudnichestvo) [Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo)]. *rs.gov.ru*. Retrieved from <http://rs.gov.ru/>

5. Feklyunina, V. (2016). Soft power and identity: Russia, Ukraine and the 'Russian world(s)'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 22(4), 773–796. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115601200>
6. Hudson, V. (2015). 'Forced to Friendship'? Russian (Mis-)Understandings of Soft Power and the Implications for Audience Attraction in Ukraine. *Politics*, 35(3-4), 330–346. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12106>
7. Informacionnyj portal fonda «Russkij mir» [Information portal of the Russkiy Mir Foundation]. *russkiymir.ru*. Retrieved from <https://russkiymir.ru>
8. Istoriiia i suchasnist ukrainskoho pravoslavia. Statystyka (2013) [History and modernity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Statistics]. *Istorychna Pravda*, 25 lypnia. Retrieved from <https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2013/07/25/131816/>
9. Ivanchenko, V. (2015). «Myagkaya sila» Rossii i ukrainskij precedent [Russia's soft power and the Ukrainian precedent]. *RSMD*, 5 dekabrya. Retrieved from <https://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/viktoriiia-ivanchenko/31293/>
10. Koncepciya vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj Federacii [The concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation] (2013). *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved from <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d447a0ce9f5a96bdc3.pdf>
11. *Mihratsiinyi profil Ukrainy. 2011–2015* (2016) [Migration profile of Ukraine. 2011–2015]. Kyiv. Retrieved from [https://dmsu.gov.ua/assets/files/mig\\_profil/MP2015.pdf](https://dmsu.gov.ua/assets/files/mig_profil/MP2015.pdf)
12. Sedliar, Yu., & Lymar, M.. (2012). «Miaka syla» Rosii u konteksti ukrainsko-rosiiskyykh vidnosyn [Russia's soft power in the context of Ukrainian-Russian relations]. *Naukovi pratsi Chornomorskoho derzhavnoho universytetu imeni Petra Mohyly. Ser.: Istoriiia*, 159(171), 63–69.
13. Sherr, D. (2013). *Zhestkaya diplomatiya i myagkoe prinuzhdenie: rossijskoe vliyanie za rubezhom [Hard diplomacy and soft coercion: Russian influence abroad]*. Kiev: Zapovit.
14. Slovo Svyatejshego Patriarha Kirilla v Nikol'skom kafedral'nom sobore goroda Gorlovki [The speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill in the St. Nicholas Cathedral in Gorlovka] (2009). *Russian Orthodox Church: official website of the Moscow Patriarchate*. Retrieved from <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/707934.html>
15. Stavlennia naseleennia Ukrainy do Rosii ta naseleennia Rosii do Ukrainy: presreliz [The attitude of the Ukraine's population to Russia and the Russia's population to Ukraine: press release] (2021). *Kyivskiy mizhnarodnyi instytut sotsiologii (KMIS)*, 17 hrudnia. Retrieved from <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1078>
16. Szostek, J. (2014). Russia and the News Media in Ukraine: A Case of «Soft Power»? *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, 28(3), 463–486. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325414537297>
17. Tereschenko, D., & Koval, N. (2022). *First Roubles, Then Guns: The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund: case study*. Ukrainian Institute. Retrieved from [https://ui.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/case-study\\_the-alexander-gorchakov-public-diplomacy-fund.pdf](https://ui.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/case-study_the-alexander-gorchakov-public-diplomacy-fund.pdf)
18. U 2013 rotsi yevropeysku osvitu obraly 29 tysiach ukraintsiv (statystychni dani Tsentru doslidzhenia suspilstva) [In 2013, 29,000 Ukrainians chose European education (statistics of the Center for Social Research)] (2014). *osvita.ua*. Retrieved from [https://osvita.ua/abroad/higher\\_school/39508/](https://osvita.ua/abroad/higher_school/39508/)
19. Vershinin, A. (2016). Ukrainskaya politika Rossii: mezhdru myagkoj i zhestkoj silami [Ukrainian policy of Russia: between soft and hard powers]. *Kontury global'nyh transformacij: politika, ekonomika, pravo*, 3(9), 38–74.
20. Vladimir Putin: Nam neobhodima novaya strategiya nacional'noj politiki [Vladimir Putin: We need a new national policy strategy] (2012). *Rossijskaya gazeta*, 22 yanvaryia. Retrieved from <https://rg.ru/2012/01/23/nacvopros.html>
21. Vorochkov, A. (2016). «Myagkaya sila» sovremennoj Rossii: institucional'nyj aspekt [Soft power of modern Russia: the institutional aspect]. *Teorii i problemy politicheskikh issledovanij*, 5A(5), 258–275.
22. Vystuplenie V. V. Putina na prieme po sluchayu 1020-letiya Kreshcheniya Rusi [Vladimir Putin's speech at a reception on the occasion of the 1020th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus] (2008). *archive.government.ru*. Retrieved from <http://archive.government.ru/docs/1525/>

23. Yablonskyi, V., & Zdioruk, S. (Eds.). (2014). *Ukraina ta proekt «russkoho myra»: analitychna dopovid [Ukraine and the Russian world project: an analytical report]*. Kyiv: Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen.
24. Za vstup Ukrainy do YeS vystupaiut 41% hromadian, za Mytnyi soiuz – 35% (2013) [41% of citizens support Ukraine's accession to the EU, and 35% support the Customs Union]. *Dzerkalo tyzhnia. Ukraina*, 03 zhovtnia. Retrieved from [https://zn.ua/ukr/POLITICS/za-vstup-ukrayini-do-yes-vistupayut-41-gromadyan-za-mitniy-soyuz-35-129478\\_.html](https://zn.ua/ukr/POLITICS/za-vstup-ukrayini-do-yes-vistupayut-41-gromadyan-za-mitniy-soyuz-35-129478_.html)