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THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR AS A NEW TYPE OF POSTMODERN WAR AND A FACTOR IN GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE

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Abstract. The article is devoted to the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian war as a new type of postmodern warfare that has become a factor in global transformations of the geopolitical landscape. For an objective understanding of this statement, the author aims to thoroughly investigate this issue. The author also aims to analyse the Russian-Ukrainian war in the context of its impact on the international security system.

The study allows the author to conclude that the problem and danger of postmodern warfare is that it is difficult to predict due to its complexity, as it covers and targets the political, military, economic, social, information space, etc. But, the irony of postmodern warfare is that measures aimed at managing and reducing risks can lead to the opposite: more destruction and longer conflicts. The author also notes that in the era of postmodern warfare, which has undergone a major transformation in the twenty-first century, there is an understanding that due to the expansion of the «grey zones» of postmodern warfare, we cannot predict the outbreak of war, which affects the adoption of preventive measures. The uncertainty of the outbreak of war also blurs the responsibility of the aggressor.

The article analyses the components of the Russian-Ukrainian war, including military and political (methods of «hybrid warfare», technological, network, etc.; full use of traditional methods of warfare of the twentieth century (shifting front lines, tanks and troops, urban attacks, struggle for air dominance and supply lines, mobilisation of troops, production of weapons, etc;) confrontation of regimes (democratic – autocratic); the factor of the aggressor as a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council), all this set of factors allows the author to confirm his hypothesis that the Russian-Ukrainian war is a new type of war of the postmodern era. The analysis of the reports, strategic positions of countries, military doctrines, military strategies, national security strategies, etc. allows us to note that the Russian-Ukrainian war has become a factor in global transformations of the geopolitical landscape and destabilisation of the international security system.

In the author's opinion, the world community needs to come to the realisation that the current international security system cannot provide answers to the conflicts that arise in the world. It cannot protect the world from war, as this requires new goals and new meanings that would correspond to rapid geopolitical processes. The geopolitical structure of the world is becoming more complex and new centres of power are emerging on the political map. The world needs a new architecture of the global security system that would truly protect the world from the global war that world leaders, international institutions and opinion leaders are talking about.

Key words: postmodernity, postmodern war, Russian-Ukrainian war, geopolitical landscape, international security, architecture of the world security system.

Introduction. «Out of these troubled times can emerge our fifth goal, a new world order: a new era free from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and safer in the search for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. Hundreds of generations have searched for this invisible path to peace, while thousands of wars have raged throughout human history. Today, this new world is struggling to be born, a world very different from the one we have known. A world in which the rule of law will supplant the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognise a shared responsibility for freedom and justice.

A world in which the strong respect the rights of the weak. This is the vision I shared with President Gorbachev (President of the USSR, 1990–1991) in Helsinki. He and other leaders in Europe, the Gulf and around the world understand that how we deal with this crisis today can shape the future for generations to come», is part of a speech by George Bush (US President, 1989–1993) before a joint session of Congress on 11 September 1990, where he describes his vision of a new world order in the wake of the Gulf crisis (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, 1990). We agree that this is an ideal concept of world order. But the vision of building a new world order proclaimed by George W. Bush was not destined to come true, as in the early 1990s, events occurred that resulted from tectonic shifts and fundamental changes in the geopolitical processes of postmodernity. Namely, the collapse of the USSR, which had far-reaching consequences in international relations, and the information technology revolution, also called the «computer age» or «information age», in which humanity was fully immersed in the 1990s. These two processes have negatively influenced global geopolitical transformations, in particular in the field of international security, which has led to changes in military doctrines and military strategies of leading countries. It should be noted that it was in the 1990s that postmodernism came to the field of world politics and international relations, trying to describe the global geopolitical transformations that began to take place in world political processes through its own principles and conceptual apparatus.

The «information age», which brought technical innovations, has created communication systems of enormous breadth and complexity. And rules, norms, customs, language, even the meaning of language itself – all of this has become possible to transform in accordance with any reality that groups or individuals decide to define. The 1990s saw the clear outlines of a new era, one that functions very differently, with new ways of interacting and shifting identities. Identities can multiply depending on the number of perceived realities, and information can be endlessly reproduced, re-shaped and reproduced again. As noted by E. Cohen, E. Sloan, J. Adams, J. Archilla, D. Ronfelt, E. Cohen, L. Friedman, R. Laird, H. May, M. O'Hanlon, B. Schneider, L. Grinter, K. Thomas, etc.), postmodern emphasis on information, language, the use of symbols, traditions, myths, techniques, effects and metaphors to construct truths, as well as geopolitical transformations (transition from a bipolar to a unipolar world) – led to the «revolution in military affairs» (RMA), which in 2001 was renamed «military transformation» (Cohen, 2009 etc.).

The transformation of global political processes in the 1990s and the resulting information technology revolution have led to dramatic changes in the geopolitical landscape that existed before 2014 and shaped the international agenda. However, «Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion in February 2022 has created a global environment that is fundamentally different from anything in the past, even in the most difficult days of the Cold War,» as the Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States states, «and has fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape» (Report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, 2024). Olaf Scholz (Federal Chancellor of Germany, 2021-present) noted that «the world is at a turning point caused by Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine» (Scholz, 2023).

Yes, every era has its own wars and its own forms of warfare, but not every war becomes a «turning point» in the change of epochs. The war that forced states, alliances, military and political blocs to reconsider: strategic positions, military doctrines, military strategies, national security strategies.

Taking into account a number of studies that have been devoted to postmodern wars (new military technologies, forecasts for the future of war, the role of the influence of the information space, network approaches, the use of indirect and covert actions of new technologies, etc.) and the assessment of postmodern world politics and international relations, the author notes that the Russian-Ukrainian war is a new type of war of the postmodern era, which has become a factor in global transformations of the geopolitical landscape. For an objective understanding of this statement, the **author aims to** thoroughly investigate this issue **in** this article. The author also aims to analyse the Russian-

Ukrainian war in the context of its impact on the international security system. For an exhaustive study, the **author sets himself the following tasks**: to study and analyse the elements and methods of postmodern warfare; to analyse the postmodern type of the Russian-Ukrainian war; to study and analyse the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the change of the geopolitical landscape and the impact on the architecture of the global security system.

Basic theoretical and practical provision. Studies of postmodern warfare in the 21st century describe it as a combination of traditional and modern, indirect and direct, regular and irregular, symmetrical and asymmetrical, military and civilian components, following the postmodern motto «everything is allowed», and that postmodern warfare poses a serious challenge to the way we conceptualise and actually wage war in the era of high technology and geopolitical transformations (Coker, 2008 etc.). G. Lucas, points out that «the phenomenon of postmodern warfare raises many questions that include political, theoretical, conceptual, legal, ethical and practical aspects» (Lucas, 2010).

It is worth noting, however, that «postmodern» is a very complex and controversial term, and is applied to different areas. There are enough systemic similarities between different descriptions of postmodern phenomena in such diverse fields as art, literature, economics, philosophy and war. As C. Gray, «especially for postmodernity, this is true of information. As a weapon, as a myth, as a metaphor, as a force multiplier, as an advantage, as a factor, and as an asset, information (and its servants – computers to process it, multimedia to distribute it, systems to present it) has become the central sign of postmodernity. In warfare, information (often called intelligence) has always been important. Now it is the most important military factor, but still not the only one» (Gray, 1997). The conclusions of C. Gray are logical, given that information is indeed not the only component of postmodern warfare.

In our opinion, an interesting justification of the elements of postmodern warfare is provided by H. Ehrhart, based on scientific research, military doctrines and warfare practices. Although the elements identified by H. Ehrhart do not claim to be complete, they differ from other positions in that they describe the "grey zone" (the boundaries between peace and war) of postmodern warfare. He identifies four interrelated elements:

The first element H. Ehrhart identifies is information, which he considers the main raw material of the global information society. About which D. Romfeldt notes that it is not just a force multiplier, but also a «force modifier» (Romfeldt, 1998: 131); K. Dickson points out that «the postmodern understanding of power is determined by how much information is controlled to determine and shape what is known» (Dickson, 2004). The second important element of postmodern warfare, according to H. Ehrhart, is the tendency towards flexible networks and a combination of tools, means and methods. The third element of postmodern warfare is the use of indirect and/or covert approaches, or, in postmodern terms, the interaction of appearance and reality. Reaching out to local partners, proxies, is an important aspect of this element, Ehrhart notes. He cites the example of potential proxies such as private security and military companies, local security forces, and non-governmental organisations. Another aspect of indirect action, he notes, is subversion, such as attempts to undermine the legitimacy of a government. So, Ehrhart concludes, on the one hand, modern information and communication technologies provide a high level of transparency. On the other hand, there is a growing range of possibilities for indirect and covert operations that are changing the quality of warfare. The fourth main element he highlights is a mixture or combination of traditional and new technologies. For example, the C4ISTAR complex combines command, control, communications and computing systems with intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition systems. Ehrhart also draws attention to defensive and offensive cyber activities, which are another means of warfare and an important aspect of postmodern warfare. Since the initiator of a cyber attack cannot be accurately identified, this area of warfare is an ideal field for covert operations from a distance. The perpetrators of cyber attacks are almost impossible to identify. They do not use kinetic energy, but they can cause great damage and are therefore perceived as a «non-physical form of warfare» (Ehrhart, 2017).

It should be noted that different combinations of these elements contribute to changing the conduct of warfare at all levels of influence and open up new forms of intervention. In his research, H. Ehrhart rightly asks whether the concept of war is even suitable for certain types of actions in the «grey zone». According to Clausewitz, war «is an act of violence aimed at forcing our enemy to do our will» (Clausewitz, 1982: 101). But when does this act of violence actually begin? Not every act of violence by the state is a war. So, when does a postmodern war begin and what are the general characteristics of its various forms? The information level of conflict still hardly knows any real boundaries. The fact that the hitherto unregulated cybersphere has become a new field of conflict, as P. Singer notes, confirms the assumption that the forms of postmodern warfare are evolving (Singer, 2014). Geographical and normative boundaries are increasingly blurred, and new weapons technologies open up new horizons. The expansion of the «grey zone», as H. Ehrhart rightly points out, can lead to even greater instability, provoking preventive or pre-emptive actions in response, thereby triggering a spiral of escalation. A wider «grey zone» provides more room for political manoeuvre and the ability to blur ownership. The reason for the trend towards postmodern warfare, as noted by H. Ehrhart points out, and the current reality of military conflicts, which are multiplying exponentially, is the fact that authoritarian regimes and non-state actors have also turned to postmodern warfare, using its elements in different ways. Therefore, this trend, he emphasises, «is a global and structural phenomenon ...» (Ehrhart, 2017: 272).

Let's pay attention to another interesting tool of postmodern warfare mentioned by S. Carvin. Carvin proposes to use the prism of culture to ask questions about the way war is waged. He proposes to understand culture as a «set of tools». The advantage of this approach, as Carvin notes, which was conceptualised by A. Swindler, is that culture consists of «symbols, stories, rituals and worldviews» from which actors choose familiar ways that are applied in new ways to solve new problems. Based on this set of tools, «strategies of action» are formed – a stable sequence of actions over time. Thus, culture does not define the purpose of action, but rather provides the components used to construct action strategies. And it helps to explain why these strategies can continue to exist long after the values that once shaped them have faded or evolved (Carvin, 2022). T. Farrell notes that military activity is shaped by a culture that operates at many levels – organisational, national, regional and international (Farrell, 2005: 4). This tool of postmodern warfare draws our attention because, in our opinion, it was used by Russia in the formation of the mythology of the Soviet Union.

Thus, we can draw the following conclusions – the problem and danger of postmodern warfare is that it is difficult to predict because of its complexity, as it covers and targets the political, military, economic, social, information space, etc. But the irony of postmodern warfare is that measures aimed at managing and reducing risks can lead to the opposite: more destruction and longer conflicts. And if Clausewitz noted that «every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions and its own special prejudices,» then as G. Lucas: «Ours is an era of 'irregular' or unconventional warfare, along with the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the new military technologies that accompany it» (Lucas, 2010). A capacious understanding and, in our opinion, although extraordinary, reflecting the philosophy and essence of postmodern warfare was presented by S. Gray in his book «Postmodern Warfare: The New Politics of Conflict» where he noted that «Postmodern warfare has brought us to the edge of an abyss. Either we will witness the death of humanity, or we will rise above war and create a world without violence» (Gray, 1997).

Taking into account the analysis of elements and methods of postmodern warfare, as well as S. Gray's statement, we can assume that the Russian-Ukrainian war has become a factor in the transformation of the security sphere at the international, regional and national levels.

For an objective analysis of the Russian-Ukrainian war as a new type of postmodern war, let us turn to the retrospective of the period of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, when the entire Western community was confident that peace was about to come. A vivid depiction of the

spirit of European politics of that period is the description by O. Scholz in his article «The Global Zeitenwende. How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era» where he notes that «for most of the world, the three decades after the fall of the Iron Curtain were a period of relative peace and prosperity. In the 1990s, it seemed that a more stable world order had finally been established. The former members of the Warsaw Pact decided to become allies within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and join the EU. Europe (...) no longer seemed like an unfounded hope. In this new era, it was seen as possible that Russia could become a partner of the West, rather than an adversary like the Soviet Union. As a result, most European countries downsized their armies and cut defence budgets. For Germany, the logic seemed simple: why maintain a large military force of about 500,000 soldiers if all our neighbours are our friends or partners?» (Scholz, 2023). It should be noted that such euphoria over the end of the era of Soviet dominance on the European continent did indeed influence the strategy of the European Union and NATO. The focus of European security and defence policy was shifted to other areas, mainly economic. NATO has shifted its focus to the war in the Balkans and the consequences of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. But at the same time, it should be noted, as C. Gray in his book «Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict», the United States saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and a weak Russia as a green light for new military adventures or even new official declarations of the Axis of Americana. In February 1992, leaked Pentagon Papers revealed that the Department of Defence was planning a strategy aimed at preventing any other state from even playing a regional role in world affairs. As noted in the documents, a unipolar world justifies spending \$6 trillion on the US armed forces, which will leave them with 1.6 million soldiers and unprecedented global military dominance (Gray, 1997).

It should also be noted that a number of objective and subjective positions of the Western bloc countries after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union influenced the decision-making regarding Russia, which eventually became fateful. For example, due to their tacit consent, Russia was admitted to the permanent membership of the UN Security Council to replace the Soviet Union (Buriachenko, 2023: 75). Due to the uncompromising position of the United States, the nuclear arsenals of post-Soviet countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan) were transferred to Russia. It should be noted that today Russia has the largest nuclear arsenal (5,977 nuclear warheads). Russia became a strategic partner of NATO, which resulted in the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 to work on security issues and joint projects. Russia became a strategic partner of the United States on disarmament and security issues. It was invited to join the G7 club. That is, at the time of the beginning of the military phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war (2014), Russia was a member of the "club of actors" that influenced global political processes. It considered itself a major geopolitical player, not without the US position as the leader of the post-bipolar era.

Let us return to the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian war as a postmodern war. It was not without reason that we noted that the beginning of the military phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war took place in 2014, since the Russian-Ukrainian war is a postmodern war, its «grey zone» as mentioned by H. Ehrhart, does not allow us to determine the beginning of this war. Given the fact that Russia has used the concept of «hybrid» warfare against Ukraine, which is largely unique from a structural and functional point of view (i.e., it is «hybrid» in form and «asymmetric» in content). Here is an interpretation of the concept of «hybrid» warfare. This is a special type of armed conflict in which combat operations play a secondary role. The goal of a «hybrid» war is to impose the will of the enemy through the use of various types of force. At the same time, combat operations play a supporting role in weakening the enemy, being only a catalyst for destabilisation processes previously launched through economic, political, informational and other methods» (Tsentr Razumkova, 2016). Thus, each specific element used by Russia in its «hybrid» war against Ukraine is not new in essence and has been used in almost all postmodern wars, but what is unique is the coherence and interconnection of these elements, the dynamism and flexibility of their use, and the growing importance

of the information factor. Moreover, in some cases, the information factor becomes an independent component and is no less important than the military one. The elements of hybrid warfare used by Russia in Ukraine are not Russian know-how, but it is on the Ukrainian direction that the Russian regime uses almost the entire arsenal of hybrid elements, from direct armed aggression to a set of economic, energy, information and other means of undermining the country from within. For example, information sabotage, espionage, export of corruption, discrediting state structures, and support for destructive forces.

Let us also look at the Russian-Ukrainian war through the prism of culture (S. Carvin's theory, cited above), as we have noted earlier. The Russian leadership chose to create and cultivate the mythology of the Soviet Union and used it as a tool for building a strategy of action to create fertile ground for undermining Ukraine from within and implementing its narratives through its agents of influence.

Russia's use of hybrid methods in the war against Ukraine (information, technological, cyber attacks, a network of agents of influence, etc.) and the full use of traditional methods of warfare of the twentieth century (shifting the front lines of tanks and troops, urban attacks, the struggle for dominance in the air and for supply lines, mobilisation of troops, production of weapons, etc.) allows us to assert that the Russian-Ukrainian war, even from this point of view, is a new type of postmodern war. «Most clearly, as V. Horbulin notes, the nature of the new type of war was demonstrated first by Russia's annexation of the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the spring of 2014, and then by the support of local radical elements and the invasion of Russian units in the eastern regions of Ukraine, and then by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army in February 2022, when the war escalated into a phase of open armed aggression by Russia» (Horbulin, 2015). We should also note the political aspect of this war. This is a war between different regimes, namely Ukraine, which professes democratic values, and Russia, which has turned into not just an autocratic state, but one with elements of totalitarianism. Additionally, it should be noted that since the Second World War, this is the first time that a party to the conflict (aggressor) is a nuclear weapon state, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and also a guarantor of the security of the country against which the aggression was committed (Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum), which affects the resolution of this conflict. So, taking into account a number of the above factors, we can say that this war is unique and literally unprecedented.

The postmodern era has seen many wars (the Gulf War, the Chechen War, the Kosovo War, the Iraq War, the Afghanistan War, the Syrian War, the Russian-Georgian War, the war in the Middle East, etc.), but it was the Russian-Ukrainian war that triggered global transformations. And as noted in the Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, it has become a factor in «a fundamental change in the geopolitical landscape» (Report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, 2024). «Russia's brutal attack on Ukraine in February 2022» as O. Scholz notes, «marked the beginning of a fundamentally new reality: the return of imperialism to Europe. He also emphasises that «the consequences of Russia's war affect not only Ukraine. When Putin gave the order to attack, he destroyed the European and international peace architecture that had been built up over decades. (...) Russia ignored the most important principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter... . (...) Like an imperial power, Russia is now trying to forcefully move borders and divide the world into blocs and spheres of influence again» (Scholz, 2023).

The starting point of Russia's stated ambitions can be seen in Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, where he criticised the unipolarity of the world and the US and NATO policies towards Russia. Here are some of the narratives of his speech: «For today's world, the unipolar model is not only unacceptable, but impossible. (...) Certain norms, almost the entire system of law of one state, first of all, of course, the United States, has crossed its national borders in all spheres: in the economy, in politics, in the humanitarian sphere, and is being imposed on other states. (...) Russia is a country with more than a thousand years of history, and it has almost always enjoyed the

privilege of pursuing an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today» (Putin's speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference, 2007). Putin's Munich speech was called the declaration of a second Cold War. Soon after, the Russian leadership moved from words to deeds – in 2008 in Georgia, in 2014 Russia occupied and annexed Crimea, and deployed its troops in eastern Ukraine, which was a blatant violation of international law. In 2022, it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It seized Ukrainian nuclear power plants (Chornobyl NPP, Zaporizhzhia NPP, which is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe), violating three international conventions at once: On the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, and on the Prevention of the Taking of Hostages. It has withdrawn from arms control treaties. In 2020, Russia amended the Constitution to enshrine the priority of the Constitution over decisions of international organisations and courts – «decisions of interstate bodies adopted on the basis of the provisions of international treaties of the Russian Federation in their interpretation that contradicts the Constitution of the Russian Federation are not enforceable in the Russian Federation». Amendments were also made to the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the Arbitration Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, the Code of Administrative Procedure of the Russian Federation, the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, as well as more than a hundred sectoral laws. In general, the amendments put the current legislation of the Russian Federation above international law and introduce the concept of the inadmissibility of applying the rules of international treaties in their interpretation, which contradicts the Basic Law. Thus, by its actions, Russia has violated all possible norms of international law that underpin the architecture of the global security system.

A logical question arises: when a state pursues such an aggressive policy, there should be an appropriate response from the world community and especially international institutions (UN, UN Security Council, etc.), which were entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring peace and security after the worst catastrophe of the twentieth century – the Second World War. So, what was Russia's response to prevent this war, since its inevitability was predicted by J. Mearsheimer back in 1993 against the background of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament, who pointed out that «a war between Russia and Ukraine would be a disaster. Wars between great powers are very expensive and dangerous, they lead to massive loss of life and chaos around the world, and they spread to other countries. The likely outcome of this war – Russia's conquest of Ukraine – will damage the prospects for peace in the whole of Europe» (Mearsheimer, 1993). Unfortunately, it must be stated that no substantive conclusions were drawn regarding Russia after Putin's resonant speech at the Munich Security Conference. Even after 2014, following the beginning of the military phase of Russia's war against Ukraine, although certain sanctions were imposed on Russia, they did not lead to the end of Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a number of resolutions were adopted by the UN General Assembly, the EU, NATO, other international organisations and Western bloc countries. A large number of sanctions of various kinds have been imposed on Russia, but this does not prevent it from continuing its aggression against Ukraine, adding nuclear blackmail to its rhetoric.

The international security system, which was developed and implemented by the world community in the aftermath of the Second World War, failed to respond to Russia's aggressive actions, even though it was aware that this would lead to the most acute security crisis in Europe since the Second World War. As a result, the conceptual approaches to the prospects of ensuring the security and defence of the European continent, as well as the development of new priorities and approaches to the implementation of foreign policy, have been seriously rethought. Geopolitics has undergone a regrouping – a change of alliances. As noted in a study by the National Institute for Strategic Studies: «The Great War, which began after eight years of smouldering conflict, led to the emergence of three groups of states: those that supported Ukraine; those that sided with Russia; those that did not join any of the first two groups, seeking to minimise risks» (Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen, 2023).

The further the Russian-Ukrainian war continues, the more we see the polarisation of the geopolitical landscape. And it is not for nothing that the leaders of the European Union are asking themselves how they, as Europeans, and as the European Union, can exist as an independent player in an increasingly multipolar world. The answer to this question is complicated, as the geopolitical landscape is in the process of ongoing transformation. In addition, the US National Defence Strategy Commission Report (published on 29 July 2024), which addresses the threat of a global conflict against the alliance of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, was a very worrying signal. In the report, the Commission notes that «the United States faces the most challenging global environment with the most serious consequences since the end of the Cold War. Trends are worsening, not improving». The Commission points out that the United States has been late to recognise the threat posed by Russia and the growing power of China. And according to the Commission, now is the time for urgent and serious changes (Report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, 2024). The world community was also concerned about the Final Report of the Commission to the US Congress (published in October 2023), which completely changes the political rhetoric and international context of the strategy of deterrence and limitation of nuclear weapons. The Commission's recommendations in this report, in our opinion, may have negative consequences, as they ignore the possibility of a US arms race with Russia and China, which could lead to a cyclical arms race (Buriachenko, 2023: 126). Such warnings are confirmed by the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). It provides the following data: nine countries – the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the DPRK and Israel – continue to modernise their nuclear arsenal, while the number of nuclear warheads in the operational state is growing. Out of the 12,121 nuclear warheads in the world as of January 2024, about 9,585 were operational. About 3,904 of them were deployed on missiles or aircraft at that time (60 more than in January 2023). About 2,100 of the deployed warheads were on high alert on ballistic missiles. SIPRI also claims that China has probably put its warheads on high alert for the first time, while India, Pakistan and the DPRK are working on equipping ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, which is likely to lead to an increase in the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads (SIPRI yearbook, 2024).

So, taking into account the analysis of the current international security system, we can make a thorough remark. The «geopolitical storm» that is currently taking place in world political processes, as we can already state, as a result of Russia's war against Ukraine, has a remote cause in time. Namely, when, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as we noted in more detail earlier, it was Russia that the Western world chose as a partner in the post-Soviet territory of influence. Western think tanks did not calculate Russia's imperial ambitions, which caused turbulence in the geopolitical landscape and gave rise to the emergence or re-emergence of new countries, including an economically strong, politically confident player like China, the restoration of Iran's position, the emergence of the DPRK and other actors in international relations who are dissatisfied with the policies of the United States and the Western bloc after years of isolation. Also, the weakening of the United States as a leader of the post-bipolar era, which, unfortunately, is now unable to broadcast goals and meanings (both political and economic) to the whole world, to construct them as a large «geopolitical narrative», for example, as a «rac Americana», and the European Union has become a hostage to its own structural weakness, which significantly restrains its traditional weapon – «soft power», further confirms that the world is moving into a new stage – a multipolar world. Where different countries and models of governance compete for power and influence, or rather for spheres of influence, where the world can be divided into blocs of great powers and vassal states.

It should also be noted that the current international security system cannot ensure peace. The United Nations is inherently a reflection of the world order, and there is no world order today. The organisation can only be effective if its members are willing to act together. But in the case of the Russian-Ukrainian war, we see no efforts to act together, neither on the part of member states nor on the part of

the UN Security Council. We can say that the international security system is going through a major crisis. In the paradigm in which it exists, it has exhausted itself. We thoroughly and objectively note, based on our research, that the international security system needs fundamental changes. In its current state, it is unable to resolve conflicts that arise on the geopolitical map, as its goals, meanings and actions remain at the level of resolving conflicts of the twentieth century. The international security system could not withstand the speed of technological changes and transformations, which are exponential in themselves. And most importantly, it was not ready for the advent of postmodernity in international relations, especially in its main practical area – diplomacy, which was marked, for example, by «situational alliances», «changing geometry» of relations, interests, goals, etc.

Conclusions. Based on the results of this study, we can draw the following conclusions. In the era of postmodern warfare, which has undergone a major transformation in the twenty-first century, we have come to understand that due to the expansion of the «grey zones» of postmodern warfare, we cannot predict the outbreak of war, which affects the adoption of preventive measures. The uncertainty of the outbreak of war also blurs the responsibility of the aggressor. The Russian-Ukrainian war is an example of this, as, firstly, we cannot give a clear answer when Russia actually started the war against Ukraine. We can only see the beginning of the military phase, as it is present; secondly, Russia began to bear tangible responsibility for its aggression against Ukraine only after the full-scale invasion.

Also, having analysed the components of the Russian-Ukrainian war, including military and political ones (methods of «hybrid warfare», technological, network, etc.; full use of traditional methods of warfare of the twentieth century (shifting front lines, tanks and troops, urban attacks, struggle for air dominance and supply lines, mobilisation of troops, production of weapons, etc.); confrontation of regimes (democratic – autocratic); the factor of the aggressor as a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council), so this whole set of factors allows us to confirm our hypothesis that the Russian-Ukrainian war is a new type of war of the postmodern era. Also, taking into account the statements of global actors, reports of the US National Defence Strategy Commission, the US Congressional Commission on the US Strategic Posture, and the updated strategic positions, military doctrines, military strategies, national security strategies of countries, alliances, and blocs following the Russian-Ukrainian war, we can state that this war has become a factor in global transformations of the geopolitical landscape and destabilisation of the international security system that has been built over decades.

It should be noted that awareness of geopolitical changes in the world requires not only political courage, but also a certain emotional readiness. The world community needs to come to the realisation that the current international security system cannot provide answers to the conflicts that arise in the world. It cannot protect the world from war, as this requires new goals and new meanings that would correspond to rapid geopolitical processes. The geopolitical structure of the world is becoming more complex and new centres of power are emerging on the political map. The world needs a new architecture of the global security system that would truly protect the world from the global war that world leaders, international institutions and opinion leaders have recently been talking about. Therefore, it is very important for the world community to finally draw conclusions from this war and consolidate to develop a new architecture of the global security system. Given that all conceptual developments are scientific achievements, it is important for the scientific community to conduct research and develop new conceptual models that could answer such an important question as the formation of a new global effective security system and the approach of countries to its implementation.

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