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THE USE OF OPERATIONAL METHODS BY THE STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE (KGB) FOR REPRESSION AGAINST THE UKRAINIAN DISSIDENT MOVEMENT IN THE MID-1970S

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Abstract. The article analyzes the extrajudicial informal methods of the State Security Committee's (KGB) struggle against Ukrainian dissidents after the "second wave of arrests" in the mid-1970s. The following secret methods are distinguished: the use of fictitious agents, operational control over the behavior of dissidents, their compromising to like-minded people, the use of external surveillance services, covert searches, auditory control of premises, video equipment and hidden microphones. The author concludes that the use of informal methods by KGB officers has had a significant impact on reducing the intensification of the Sixties human rights movement. Numerous KGB agents, who were recruited in the dissidents' close circle, played an important role in the processes of gathering information about dissidents and operational control over their behavior. As a result of moral pressure from KGB officers, some dissidents were forced to speak in the press condemning their views, which was later used by the system to discredit the dissident movement and its individual members. Almost complete control over the personal life and activities of the objects of the "Block" case was carried out due to the frequent use of "letter measures" – the service of external surveillance, covert searches, auditory control of premises, the use of hidden microphones and video equipment.

Key words: Ukrainian dissident movement, State Security Committee (KGB), "second wave of arrests", secret agents, compromising, repression.

Introduction. The State Security Committee (KGB) under the Council of Ministers (CM) of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR) was a key tool of the Soviet regime in the confrontation with the Ukrainian national movement of the 1950s and 1980s. Through the efforts of the KGB, control over Soviet society and the struggle against dissent within the totalitarian system was exercised. Ukrainian dissidents were subjected to constant pressure, "prevention" and repression by the KGB, which resulted in two waves of arrests among the intellectuals in 1965–1966 and 1972–1973. In the Valentyn Moroz's essay "Report from the Beria Reserve" written during his imprisonment in the Mordovian colonies, author called the KGB "a refrigerator in which the spiritual development of society was frozen for several decades." (Moroz, 1975: 47–48) The KGB's repressive activities became particularly intense in the 1970s, when the republican department was headed by Vitalii Fedorchuk. During their work, KGB officers used a number of unofficial, so-called operational methods to ensure comprehensive control over the dissident environment, which served as a significant complement to judicial repression. The declassification of the documentation of the former KGB archives enabled a comprehensive scientific study of this aspect of the activities of the Soviet secret service. The complete declassification of the documentation of the former archives of the KGB in accordance with the laws on decommunization (2015) made possible a comprehensive scientific study of this aspect of the activities of the Soviet secret service.

The study of the secret methods widely used by the KGB against the Ukrainian national movement is just beginning in modern historiography. A valuable analysis of the Ukrainian dissident movement

in the 1970s and the repressive policy of the Soviet regime against its participants can be found in the works of modern Ukrainian historians Heorhii Kasianov (Kasianov, 1995), Anatolii Rusnachenko (Rusnachenko, 1998), Yurii Danyliuk and Oleh Bazhan (Danyliuk, Bazhan, 2000), Borys Zakharov (Zakharov, 2003). The monograph of Serhii Plokyh on the murder of Stepan Bandera (Plokyh, 2016), which reveals the specifics of the use of KGB agents in the 1950s, is a landmark. Taras Kovalevych's investigation (Kovalevych, 2019–2021) presents the use of secret KGB employees against the Ukrainian national movement based on the analysis of the dissidents' memories. Certain aspects of the confrontation between the Soviet special services and Ukrainian diaspora organizations are revealed in the articles of Ruslan Siromskyi and Volodymyr Kachmar (Siromskyi, 2019; Siromskyi, Kachmar, 2022). The confrontation between the KGB and foreign centers of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) became the subject of an article by Yaroslav Antoniuk and Volodymyr Trofymovych (Antoniuk, Trofymovych, 2021). However, the important aspects of the problem related to the KGB's use of secret extrajudicial methods of struggle against the participants of the resistance movement in the Ukrainian SSR in the 1970s remained almost unnoticed by researchers of Ukrainian dissidence.

Main part. The aim of the article is a comprehensive and objective study of the operational methods of the KGB, which were used in the fight against Ukrainian dissidents in the mid-1970s. The tasks of the research are the analysis of the activity of the network of agents and informants of the KGB, the study of the peculiarities of the use of the external surveillance service, the characteristics of the use of methods of compromise, secret searches, wiretapping of homes.

Materials and research methods. The source base of the article was made up of the documents of F. 16 of the Sectoral state archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSA SBU). There are informational and analytical materials of reports and special messages of the leadership of the KGB under the CM of the Ukrainian SSR addressed to republican or all-Union power centers. The article examines the KGB's repressive actions against Ukrainian dissidents in the chronological period from spring 1973 to autumn 1976, from the trials of the movement's leaders Ivan Dziuba, Ivan Svitlychnyi, Yevhen Sverstyuk, Viacheslav Chornovil to the creation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (UHG). The methodological basis of the article was the principles of objectivity, historicism, comprehensiveness, continuity, as well as a complex of general scientific and special historical methods.

Results and their discussion. During the "second wave of arrests" of Ukrainian dissidents in 1972–1973, the Soviet regime dealt a severe blow to Ukrainian sixties human rights activists. The leaders of the movement, Ivan Svitlychnyi, Yevhen Sverstyuk, Vasyl Stus, Mykola Plakhotniuk, Zinovii Antoniuk, Yevhen Proniuk, Vasyl Lisovyi in Kyiv, Viacheslav Chornovil, Ivan Hel, Mykhailo Osadchyi, Iryna and Ihor Kalynets, Stefania Shabatura in Lviv were arrested and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Resistance members who remained at large were forced to significantly reduce or even completely suspend anti-regime activity, production and distribution of self-published literature (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 165). The situation of constant pressure and total control by the KGB led to the transition of most members of the Sixties human rights to the tactics of "Valenrodism", which provided for temporary abstinence from active activities, taking measures to save themselves and like-minded people from repression in order to continue the fight in better times (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 166–167). After the "second wave of arrests", Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, Yurii Badzio, Mykhailyna Kotsiubynska, Leonida Svitlychna, Ivan Rusyn and Oksana Meshko became the leaders of the Kyiv dissident community, Mykhailo and Bohdan Horyn, Atena Pashko, Liubomyra Popadiuk – of the Lviv dissident community; Opanas Zalyvakha and Raisa Moroz from Ivano-Frankivsk were in contact with them (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 167).

During 1973–1976, the KGB leadership under the CM of the Ukrainian SSR continued the massive pressure on Ukrainian dissidents who remained at large as part of the "Block" group operational development case. The main goals of the KGB were to sever contacts between the objects of the case,

to strengthen discord among them, to prevent them from resuming active anti-regime activities, to compromise them in front of like-minded people and the Ukrainian public, and to isolate them from contacts with the Ukrainian diaspora. The KGB paid special attention to coercion to cease the activities of dissidents, “in whose behavior there was a departure from nationalist positions.” (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 166, 177)

In the fight against the circle of Sixties human rights activists, the secret service used a whole range of methods, which can be divided into judicial and extrajudicial, and the latter into official and unofficial (secret). Judicial methods include the detention of dissidents, their arrest, interrogation and conviction under Art. 187–1 and 62 of the Criminal Code (CC) of the Ukrainian SSR. Extrajudicial official methods include preventive measures, warnings, dismissals, expulsions from public organizations or the Communist Party. At the same time, the use of out-of-court unofficial (secret) methods by the KGB became widespread:

- use of fictitious agents;
- operational control over behavior;
- moral pressure and compromising in front of like-minded people;
- watching of objects on the street and in public transport (“NN” – external surveillance; in KGB jargon “Nikolai Nikolaevich”);
- secret searches (measure “D” – “Dmitrii”);
- auditory control of the premises with the help of wires and radio channels (measure “T” – “Tatiana”);
- observation indoors with optical and video equipment (measure “O” – “Olga”);
- the agents' use of microphones hidden in their clothes for eavesdropping during communication with objects (measure “S” – “Sputnik”).

Due to the fact that after the “second wave of arrests” members of the Sixties human rights circle significantly reduced and limited their dissident activities, during 1973–1976 the KGB under the CM of the Ukrainian SSR preferred extrajudicial methods. Judicial repression was used less frequently than during the “second wave of arrests”. In particular, during January 1974 – March 1975, only 8 objects of the “Block” case were repressed under Art. 187 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR (“the spread of knowingly false fabrications that defame the Soviet state and social order”) or on fabricated charges of committing criminal offenses. For part 2 of Art. 62 (“anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda”) only Ivano-Frankivsk dissident Oksana Popovych was convicted (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 81).

In the mid-1970s, the involvement of fictitious agents by KGB officers to obtain valuable information about dissidents and to monitor their activities became widespread. As a rule, close friends, acquaintances or even relatives of the objects of the “Block” case and their contacts were recruited. Quite often, already recruited KGB agents specifically got acquainted with dissidents, pretended to be like-minded and tried to gain trust. As of June 1974, 105 people had been recruited as KGB agents from among the contacts in the “Block” case (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 184); by March 1975 – another 53 (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 81); by November 1975 – another 28 (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1047. P. 74); by August 1976 – another 28 (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1054. P. 126). In total, from 1971 to August 1976, KGB officers had managed to attract 227 contacts of the “Block” case as agents (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1054. P. 126). Agents under the code names “Ovid”, “Vasyliiev”, “Yaroslavna”, “Rubin”, “Harmash”, “Yantarskyi”, “Edelveis”, “Andrii”, “Prokopenko”, “Roman”, “Correspondent”, “Ivan”, “Tyshchenko”, “Arsen”, “Denysov”, “Doroshenko”, “Diana”, “Myroslava”, “Dniprovskyi”, “Antuan”, “Persnyi”, “Student”, “Author”, “Karpenko” were the most active in Kyiv and Kyiv region; “Romanov”, “Anzhelika”, “Halychanka”, “Kristiana”, “Lubomyr”, “Maxym”, “Piatnytskyi”, “Victoria”, “Nadia”, “Perov”, “Haidai” – in Lviv and Lviv region. At the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974, judging by the materials of the report notes, the KGB officers recruited as an agent Halyna Chubai – the wife of the object of the “Block” case, Lviv poet Hryhorii Chubai

(HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 180). Active efforts were made to recruit agents from among the wives of dissidents who were in prison.

The agents provided KGB officers with valuable information about the dissidents' activities and intentions, and controlled the distribution of samizdat among them. In particular, through the efforts of agents "Rubin" and "Garmash" in late 1973, the KGB found out that O. Meshko kept at home illegal self-published documents (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 168). At the turn of 1973–1974, agent "Ovid" informed the KGB that B. Antonenko-Davydovych had written an article criticizing the Soviet reality and handing it over to M. Kotsiubynska (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 167). In early 1975, agents "Perov" and "Victoria" entered into the trust of M. Horyn, the leader of Lviv dissidents; they reported to the KGB information about M. Horyn's work on memories of his imprisonment called "My Christ" (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 70–71).

In the first half of 1974, agents were involved in gathering information about persons whom the KGB considered involved in resuming the publication of the self-published magazine "Ukrainian Herald": agent Anzhelika worked with Liudmila Sheremetieva, "Victoria" and "Nadiia" – with Liubomyra Popadiuk, "Vasyliiev" – with Atena Pashko (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 71). In November–December 1974, agents "Ovid" and "Vasyliiev" received information from Yu. Badzio and B. Antonenko-Davydovych that editorial office of the "Ukrainian Herald" was located in Lviv (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 71). In addition, KGB agents recruited in the Mordovian colonies one of the imprisoned friends of Zoryan Popadiuk, the leader of the underground organization Ukrainian National Liberation Front (UNVF), as an agent "Travnevyi". After his release from prison, agent "Travnevyi" entered into trust with L. Popadiuk, Z. Popadiuk's mother. As a result of the agent's meeting with L. Popadyuk organized by the KGB, the officers received information about the latter's alleged involvement in the transfer of the "Ukrainian Herald" issues abroad and her contacts with the magazine's publishers (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 72–73).

Many agents worked with one of Kyiv dissident leaders, literary critic and publicist Yurii Badzio. Agent "Yantarskyi", who entered into the trust of Yu. Badzio, was instructed to assist him and mediate in maintaining contacts with like-minded people in order to identify, verify and intercept the samizdat (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 171). At the end of 1974, agents "Vasyliiev" and "Ovid" were introduced on the instructions of the KGB into the operation of the literary critic, and they began to enjoy his full confidence. The publicist began to tell them about his plans to prepare a monograph with a theoretically justified demand for the separation of the Ukrainian SSR from the USSR and the corresponding program of action (it was about the book "The Right to Live"). In early March 1975, Yu. Badzio even suggested that agent "Vasyliiev" write one of the sections of this monograph on the situation of Ukrainian literature in the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, the dissident asked agent "Ovid" to find him a reliable typist who would be engaged in printing labor (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 65–66). Thanks to the activities of KGB agents, officers established reliable operational control over Yu. Badzio's actions and had every opportunity to prevent the dissemination of his treatise "The Right to Live" through samizdat.

Quite often, agents were used to influence and exert moral pressure on the objects of the "Block" case and their contacts in order to deliberately stop their dissident activities. In particular, such influence was exerted on Ivan Honchar by agents "Roman" and "Korespondent", on Hryhoriy Kochur by "Ivan" and "Tyshchenko", and on Viktor Ivanysenko by "Arsen" and "Denysov" (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 175). Mathematician Viktor Bondarchuk, who sympathized with the Ukrainian dissident movement and signed letters to the authorities in support of it, under the influence of KGB agent "Karpenko" in early 1975 agreed to verbally condemn his own activities, speaking to colleagues at the Institute of Cybernetics of the Ukrainian SSR (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 77). Poet from Vyshhorod (Kyiv region) Volodymyr Komashkov cut off contacts with the Sixties human rights community after conversations to agent "Prokopenko". In

January 1975, he assured the KGB that he would no longer engage in dissident activities (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 78).

One of the KGB's strategic goals was to prevent contacts between dissidents and members of the diaspora who tried to promote the development of the Ukrainian national movement in the USSR. By order of the KGB, recruited agents under the guise of members of the resistance movement often contacted Ukrainian tourists, citizens of Western Europe and America, who sought to establish contacts with the Sixties human rights community. For example, in March 1974 agent "Myroslav" had a meeting with a Ukrainian tourist from Canada, Z. Barchynskyi; the KGB took steps to intercept and control this channel of communication between dissidents and the diaspora. The following month, KGB agents "Dniprovskiy", "Antuan", and "Persnyi" met with a tourist from Canada A. Semotyuk, a member of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (ZP UHVR). In April-May 1974, US citizen A. Chornodolsky had meetings with agent "Ostap" in Odesa and agent "Victoria" in Lviv (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 186–188). In all cases, the KGB tried to establish contacts between the agents and Ukrainians who came from abroad in order to consolidate further contacts of agents with Ukrainian diaspora organizations. This measures created the preconditions for establishing operational games with these organizations.

KGB officers often tried to provide operational control over the behavior of dissidents through the use of agents and technical means. The main purpose of the special services in this case was to prevent open protests and intensification of actions undesirable for the authorities by individual members of the resistance movement. For example, in October 1973, the KGB organized I. Rusyn's business trip from Kyiv to the Chernivtsi region, where full control over his behavior was ensured through a pre-prepared intelligence environment. As a result, I. Rusyn's use of "nationalist" expressions during conversations was recorded, and three slanderous statements were received against him from citizens (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 172). The KGB exercised full control over I. Dziuba's behavior after his "repentant" statement and his release from prison in October 1973. A few months later, in December 1973, M. Kotsiubynska sent a letter to I. Dziuba calling him to return to the dissident movement. The process of passing the letter through postal channels was monitored by the special services and its handing over to the critic was organized at a time when a KGB officer was next to him. In this situation, I. Dziuba had no choice but to pass the letter to the officer (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 168).

At the behest of KGB officers, agents sometimes stopped dissidents' "undesirable" actions by simply persuading them during the conversation. In particular, in early 1975, B. Antonenko-Davidovych handed his acquaintance, the Moscow writer A. Kuznetsov, a pamphlet "Purge", dedicated to the period of Stalin's repressions. The transfer was made by one of the Kyiv writer's close acquaintances, KGB agent "Ovid". During a conversation with A. Kuznetsov, he persuaded the latter not to publish or distribute the pamphlet in order "not to worsen the already difficult situation of Antonenko-Davidovych." (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 69) Thus, the secret service managed to limit the distribution of anti-Soviet work without its seizure and publicity. In addition, confidence to agent "Ovid" among dissidents has increased, his intelligence positions were improved.

A fairly common method of the KGB's struggle against the Ukrainian Sixties human rights group was to discredit its members in front of like-minded people. Some members of the dissident movement came under moral pressure from the KGB and were inclined to write papers or articles in the press condemning their past activities or ideology of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." KGB officers, in turn, made every effort to disseminate the published materials among members of the resistance movement and abroad, among the Ukrainian diaspora. Such steps by individual dissidents, carried out under KGB pressure, were generally negatively perceived by other members of the movement. There were open accusations of collaboration with the secret service, which certainly played in favor

of the KGB, as it led to the split and fragmentation of the movement, the separation of compromised dissidents from other members of the resistance.

In particular, I. Dziuba, under the control of the KGB, wrote and published the works “Faces of the Crystal”, “Experience of World Historical Significance”, a number of articles in which he condemned his national-communist views set out in the work “Internationalism or Russification?” and openly supported the official concept of building a “single Soviet people” in the USSR (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1047. P. 68). Among the Sixties human rights activists, these publications were perceived as evidence of the “final fall” of I. Dziuba and his departure from the dissident movement (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 77). In April 1974, Zinovia Franko published in the newspaper “News from Ukraine”, which was the mouthpiece of Soviet propaganda for the Western Ukrainian diaspora, a review of “Spots can not be washed away” on the book “Swastika on cassocks”, directed against the Greek Catholic clergy in Western Ukraine (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 180). One of the leaders of Lviv dissidents, M. Kosiv, was forced to write an article in the spirit of Soviet propaganda, “The Uniate Church is the enemy of the reunification of Ukrainian lands”, which provoked a rather sharp reaction from S. Shabatura and Iryna Kalynets (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 78). KGB officers persuaded some representatives of the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia who supported the objects of the “Block” case or published “ideologically unsustainable” works, in particular writers Ivan Chendei, Viktor Korzh, and Borys Kharchuk, to similar publications in the press (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 185).

Sometimes, KGB officers simply framed individual members of the resistance movement in order to discredit, carrying out operational and investigative actions in such a way as to cast suspicion on them in cooperation with the secret service. For example, in December 1973, a few days after M. Kotsiubynska sent a letter to I. Dziuba in order to return him to dissident activities, she and O. Meshko were searched. The KGB deliberately acted in such a way as to give the impression that I. Dziuba had made a denunciation of his friends (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 168).

After the “second wave of arrests”, the KGB used “letter measures” against dissidents with considerable intensity. The purpose of their application was complete control over the life and activities of the objects of the “Block” case and their contacts, gathering information about the content of conversations between dissidents, their production and distribution of self-published literature, and so on. As a rule, they were used in combination with the use of agents and various operational and technical means.

For example, the external surveillance service (“NN”) was used in the process of monitoring Cherednychenko’s couple during 1974–1975, whom the KGB suspected of involvement in the production of № 7–8 of the magazine “Ukrainian Herald” (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 67). In early 1975, the same service supervised the mother of political prisoner Zorian Popadyuk, Liubomyra Popadiuk, around the clock, who collected information on the arrests and expulsions of individual students at Lviv University to the West. On March 8, 1975, “NN” officers recorded L. Popadyuk’s visit to Moscow and her meeting with one of the close acquaintances of Russian dissident leader Andrei Sakharov. L. Popadiuk knew about the constant surveillance of her by the KGB. Therefore, trying to pass a statement in defense of Ukrainian women political prisoners to Moscow dissidents, she changed her appearance a bit, put on a wig and borrowed outerwear from her acquaintances for the trip (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 72–73).

Dissidents could not feel free even during outdoor recreation. In the summer of 1975, the wife of political prisoner I. Svitlychnyi, Leonida Svitlychna, Yurii Badzio, and his wife, Svitlana Kyrychenko, literary critic Viktor Ivanysenko, and chemist Henrikh Dvorko were vacationing in the Gomel region of the Byelorussian SSR on the Pripyat River. A group of “NN” employees equipped with operational equipment was sent there under the guise of tourists. The KGB managed to overhear several conversations of vacationers about the situation of Ukrainian political prisoners in prisons and camps. The

presence of the KGB agent “Kolosov” among dissidents on vacation greatly facilitated the task of the “NN” service (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1047. P. 54).

Secret searches (measure “D”) were carried out by KGB officers in dissidents’ apartments when they were not at home. The purpose of such searches, as a rule, was to check one or another information about the activities of dissidents, search for banned literature and self-publishing. Sometimes, for a period of time after a secret search, official searches were conducted in the same premises, during which previously found materials were seized, which were later used as evidence of the “anti-Soviet” activities of the suspects.

In particular, in the first half of 1974, with the help of measure “D”, KGB officers received confirmation of the fact that M. Kotsiubynska kept anti-Soviet pamphlets written by B. Antonenko-Davydovych in her apartment (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1035. P. 167). During a secret search at the workplace of Ju. Smyrnyi, a fireman at the plant “Sokil” in Kyiv, who had acquaintances with Yu. Badzio, O. Meshko and B. Antonenko-Davydovych, it was discovered that he kept banned literature from an old pre-Soviet edition. In this way, the information about Yu. Smyrnyi’s intentions to create a secret public library for the free study of philosophy and other social sciences was confirmed (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1047. P. 57–58).

In 1975, a close acquaintance of V. Ivanysenko, Oleksa Stavtskyi, a former researcher at the Institute of Literature of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, was suspected of authorship of some of the materials published in the “Ukrainian Herald” magazine. In order to create favorable conditions for the measure “D” in two rooms of his apartment, which was intended for rent, two secret KGB officers were accommodated. As a result of a secret search, the forbidden literature and manuscripts of O. Stavtskyi, his personal diary with records about I. Svitlychnyi and other objects of the “Block” case were found and photographed (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1047. P. 61).

The secret search was successfully used by KGB officers in the process of identifying the editorial board of the “Ukrainian Herald”, which was restored in 1974 (№ 7–8). In September 1975, as a result of operative measures, Roman Nakonechny, a Lviv resident and deputy director of art store, came into the KGB’s field of vision. He acted as an intermediary between the publishers of the illegal magazine, O. Shevchenko and S. Khmara. As a result of the measure “D” held in his apartment, I. Dziuba’s treatise “Internationalism or Russification?”, 30 postcards with handwritten texts of anti-Soviet content and unmanifested photographic film were found. After the film was shown in the laboratory of the Lviv KGB department, it turned out that the typewritten text of the № 9 of the “Ukrainian Herald” had been filmed on it. Apparently, the film was intended for transmission abroad and subsequent publication and distribution of a new issue of the magazine. In order to prevent such a development, KGB officers secretly replaced the photographic film with another, specially made in the laboratory. The new film was completely identical in appearance to the removed one, but it was impossible to show photos from it (the signs of camera malfunction were simulated) (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1047. P. 65–66). Thus, as a result of the use of a secret search, the next issue of the “Ukrainian Herald” was never published.

Often the measure “D” was used in combination with the work of the agency. In particular, at the end of 1975, KGB agent “Zygmund”, who worked with L. Popadyuk and A. Pashko, received information that they had a significant number of self-published documents intended for transfer abroad. According to “Zygmund”’s denunciation, these materials were stored in balls with groats in the apartment of their mutual acquaintance Maria Hel, the wife of political prisoner I. Hel. During a secret search, 12 handwritten documents made by prisoners D. Shumuk, V. Romaniuk, M. Osadchyi, B. Rebryk, S. Karavanskyi, I. Hel and others were indeed found in cellophane bags covered with groats. In January 1976, M. Hel brought these manuscripts to Moscow and handed them over to human rights activist Lyudmila Alekseeva. As most of these materials had previously been published

abroad, the KGB gave an instruction not to obstruct their transmission in order to consolidate the agency's position among dissidents (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1054. P. 115–116).

Dissenters, of course, knew about the possibility of secret searches in their premises. Yuri Badzio kept up to 10 special tags in his apartment, which allowed him to record traces of a possible secret search (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1054. P. 110). Quite often dissidents tried not to keep samizdat or other compromising materials in their apartment, fearing both secret and official searches. Thus, in the first half of 1976, during the event “D” at the apartment of O. Meshko in Kiev, KGB officers failed to find the manuscript of her voluminous human rights work (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1054. P. 114).

The main task of the measure “T” (auditory control of the premises with the help of wires and radio channels) was to listen to conversations between dissidents in their homes. In particular, at the end of 1975 it was decided to equip the apartment of the already mentioned Ju. Smyrnyi with the necessary equipment for the measure “T” in order to clarify the nature of his conversations with the readers of the secret public library, which he planned to organize (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1054. P. 111). The conversations of the Cherednychenkos couple, Yu. Badzio, O. Meshko, Vitaliy and Oles Shevchenko, and others were also controlled in a similar way (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1054. P. 110–118). Often, through the efforts of the agency, the KGB did everything possible to ensure that conversations between dissidents took place in apartments equipped with the necessary listening equipment. Since the object of the case “Block” K. Storchak spent most of 1976 in the hospital due to illness, the content of his conversations with visitors was monitored by the KGB through auditory control of the ward by measure “T” (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1054. P. 113).

Observations in the premises with the help of optical and video equipment (measure “O”) and the use by agents of microphones hidden in clothes during communication with objects (measure “S”) played a supporting role in the process of gathering information about dissidents. Measure “O”, in particular, was used by KGB officers during operational actions related to the investigation of the appearance of № 7–8 of the illegal magazine “Ukrainian Herald”. During 1975–1976, the Kyiv apartment of the Cherednychenkos couple, as well as the housing of Yu. Badzio and S. Kyrychenko, were equipped with video equipment (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1054. P. 110). A microphone hidden in his clothes was used by a KGB agent “Vasyliiev”, in February 1975 during conversations with A. Pashko, trying to obtain information about the resumption of the publication of the “Ukrainian Herald” (HDA SBU. F. 16. Spr. 1043. P. 71–72). Apparently, these measures did not become widespread as of the mid-1970s due to the lack or imperfection of the necessary operational and technical means.

Conclusions. Thus, the use of operational methods by the KGB in the fight against Ukrainian dissidents in the mid-1970s in the “Block” case was quite intense and had a significant impact on reducing the activity of the dissident environment after the “second wave of arrests.” Numerous KGB agents, who were widely recruited in the dissidents' close circle, played an important role in the processes of gathering information about dissidents and operational control over their behavior. As a result of moral pressure from KGB officers, some dissidents were forced to speak out in the press condemning their views, which was later used by the system to discredit the dissident movement and its individual members. Almost complete control over the personal life and activities of the objects of the “Block” case was carried out due to the frequent use of “letter measures” – the service of external surveillance, secret searches, auditory control of premises, the use of hidden microphones and video equipment. We consider a more detailed and thorough analysis of each of the above-mentioned secret methods of the KGB based on a comparison of archival documents with the memories of dissidents, as well as establishing the real names of KGB agents who acted against members of the resistance movement, and study of special service measures against Ukrainian political prisoners in places of deprivation of liberty and diaspora organizations in Western countries to be promising directions for further research.

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