

# FORMATION OF A NEW PARADIGM OF GLOBAL POLITICAL AND MIGRATION PROCESSES UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN UKRAINE

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**Abstract.** The events of February 2022, related to the military aggression of the Russian Federation and a full-scale attack on Ukraine, became the greatest catastrophe of the XXI century and the most brutal war on European soil since the World War II, and is gradually being defined as the World War III in terms of its impact on global political and economic relations and the use of military weaponry. Although no final assessment can be made (the war is ongoing), the undeniable consequence of Russia's aggression has been the disruption of the world order built after World War II and the risk of global chaos. One of the most powerful consequences of the war was an unprecedented wave of Ukrainian migration, the lion's share of which took place in Europe. While European countries, faced with an unprecedented influx of refugees, are withstanding the socio-economic burden with dignity, Ukraine is in fact in a demographic catastrophe. The wave of forced migration coincided with long-term demographic problems: a decline in the birth rate, an increase in the number of middle-aged people, and the outflow of population during the war. All these processes will have a steady impact on global migration and political processes. New instruments of state and global regulation of these processes will be required. They will also require the formation of a new paradigm of global economic development. *The purpose* of the study is to deepen the research on identifying and assessing the preconditions and consequences of migration processes in the world under the influence of military operations in Ukraine. The paper examines the impact of migration processes on globalisation and economic processes in Europe and the world; the dynamics of the share of labour migrants in the total labour force by income level of destination countries in 2013, 2017, 2020; the peculiarities of the migration wave of Ukrainians evacuated due to the military aggression of the Russian Federation in 2022. generalised statistical information on the migration processes of Ukrainians in the period 01.02.2023–21.06.2023; detailed statistical data on the number of Ukrainian citizens abroad (as of 01.02.2023) by migrant countries; political and socio-cultural context of the formation of a new paradigm of migration processes. The full implications for Ukrainian migration will be summarised after the war is over, but the following interim conclusions are relevant today.

**Results.** The analysis of migration processes in the world and Europe in the current context suggests that migration is actively taking place and contributes to the development of international integration, as it reduces the number of barriers and increases opportunities. The war in Ukraine will have a significant impact on the economy in terms of the following effects: disruption of global supply chains, increased inflationary pressures, higher energy and raw material prices; food prices will also rise as supplies of wheat and grain from Russia and Ukraine are disrupted; higher energy and commodity prices will cause further inflation, deterioration of economic prospects, reduced confidence and increased financial market risk associated with greater geopolitical tensions; worsening food security in some developing countries in the Middle East and Africa. On the other hand, migration is currently seen as a tool for long-term growth in the EU. The analysis shows that migration provides significant economic benefits, primarily to host countries. Currently, the EU is facing a growing shortage of skilled labour due to unfavourable demographic trends in Europe. Given the massive emigration

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of Ukrainian citizens to the EU, migrants are solving the problem of staff shortages. Considering that the emigration of Ukrainians provides for adequate social protection and legal support, which guarantees the right to settlement, work and education. The right to employment is readily exercised by Ukrainian migrants, as they are largely people of working age, primarily women.

*Conclusion.* In general, it can be argued that the prospects for regional migration are currently linked to many factors and very uncertain prospects for a return to the pre-2022 or pre-pandemic EaP models. The war in Ukraine is already turning into a protracted conflict that will threaten both the economic situation of millions of people and the hopes of temporarily displaced Ukrainians to return home for a long time. As a result, displaced Ukrainians, the EU host countries and the Ukrainian government will have to deal with the new circumstances, adapting temporary modalities to longer-term solutions.

**Key words:** military aggression, global migration, migration process, migrant countries, evacuees, migration wave, migration crisis, socio-cultural context, global political processes, migration paradigm.

**JEL Classification:** F01, J10, J69, C10, E65

## 1. Introduction

The large-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the hostilities launched by Russian troops on 24 February 2022 resulted in the deaths and injuries of civilians in various regions of the country, the destruction of many critical infrastructure facilities or disruption of their functioning, and massive destruction of civilian objects. All of this and other negative consequences of the military invasion, in turn, led to large-scale migration. According to the EU Council's forecasts, migration could reduce the population of Ukraine by 24-33%, depending on the duration of hostilities and the unstable operation of infrastructure (Potapenko, 2023).

The main types of migration currently observed in Ukraine include the following:

- Migration abroad. As of 8 November 2022, more than 7.8 million Ukrainian refugees were forced to leave Ukraine, almost 4.7 million of whom were granted temporary protection (Hill Kulu, 2022);
- Internal displacement within the country. According to the International Organisation for Migration, internal displacement within Ukraine affected about 8 million people (OIOM UN Migration, 2022);
- Illegal transfer of Ukrainian citizens to the Russian Federation. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of September 2022, 2.9 million people and 9,400 Ukrainian children were displaced to Russia (Potapenko V., 2023). According to information as of June 2022, 234,000 Ukrainian children were taken from Ukraine to the territory of the Russian Federation, certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Belarus (Potapenko, 2023);
- Immigration to Ukraine. According to demographers, Ukraine expects a further decline in the total population, an increase in the share of ethnic Ukrainians, an increase in the number of Crimean

Tatars, and an increase in the share of migrants from the North and South Caucasus, Asia, and Africa.

All these processes will have a steady impact on global migration and political processes. New instruments of state and global regulation of these processes will be required. They will also require the formation of a new paradigm of global economic development.

The following scholars have made a significant contribution to the study of this issue: Bauer T., Zimmermann K. (2018), Borjas G. J. (2006), Brenke K. (2015). Their works were devoted to the regulation of international labour migration processes, in particular in Western European countries. Given the significant theoretical basis of the issue under study, the scientific tasks of determining the impact of migration processes on the political and economic development of the world and Europe, in the current conditions of global turmoil and especially under the influence of military operations in Ukraine, remain to be further developed.

The main research method in this article is statistical data analysis. Visualisation of the dynamics of international migration processes is based on the data of the International Organisation for Migration. The results are summarised using a systematic approach.

The study also used the methodology of interdisciplinary comparison, content analysis and integration of heterogeneous characteristics into the system, which allowed for a new scientific approach, namely to characterise the structural characteristics of migration processes and their impact on global political and economic processes. As well as to propose a new paradigm of world development and interaction of countries in the new conditions.

Given the relevance of the issue, the short chronological period of the problem under study, combined with the rapidity of events due to the ongoing hostilities, the paper uses modern research on forced migration and war in Ukraine (Malyk,

2022; Protsyk, Kara, 2022; Rendiuk, 2022); Mishchuk H., Oliinyk O. (2022) are concerned with the issue of studying migration attitudes and professional employment, the economic consequences of migration are highlighted by Tur O. (2022); the problems of refugees in the context of the latest statistics are outlined in works of Fylypovych L. (2022), Yadlovska O. (2022). The research is also based on media publications.

The aim is to deepen the study of identifying and assessing the preconditions and consequences of migration processes in the world under the influence of military operations in Ukraine.

## 2. The Impact of Migration Processes on Globalisation and Economic Processes in Europe and the World

Migration processes have been shaped over the years depending on the level of development of a particular region on the planet. International migration in the modern world, along with the processes of globalisation, integration, and international capital flows, is increasingly becoming an influential factor in determining the foundations of the global and domestic socio-economic systems. In recent years, globalisation has had a significant impact on migration processes in the world. More and more new economic regions are being formed, seeking to cooperate through joint production to increase its efficiency (different stages of production are carried out in different territories. As a result, new regions with rapidly growing economies are being formed, creating new flows of migrants in the world (Vyshnevska, Petrenko, 2022).

Globalisation is also dissolving the national and cultural characteristics of modern European states and hindering nation-building. Practice shows that

modern globalisation processes exacerbate interethnic relations and increase the fear of immigrants; in many European countries, the processes of confrontation between the titular nation and immigrant groups have intensified, and national identity and national solidarity of certain ethnic groups are being restored (Andreiko, 2019). These are some of the negative consequences of globalisation processes in the world.

Over the past 50 years, the total number of international migrants has increased significantly. In 2020, almost 281 million people lived in countries other than their countries of birth, which is almost 128 million more than 30 years ago, when it was 153 million in 1990 and 84 million in 1970 (Vyshnevska, Petrenko, 2022).

It is important to study changes in the proportional distribution of migrants in countries with different income levels. The share of international labour migrants in upper-middle- and high-income countries remained stable at 86.4% in 2013, 86.5% in 2017 and 86.9% in 2020. However, over time, these two categories have undergone marked changes: from 2013 to 2020, high-income countries experienced a 7.3% drop in labour migrants (from 74.7% to 67.4%), while upper-middle-income countries saw a 7.8% increase (from 11.7% to 19.5%) (see Figure 1 for an analysis of these changes).

This change in the share of labour migrants may be influenced by economic growth in middle-income countries and/or changes in labour immigration rules in high-income countries.

The share of labour migrants in the total labour force was quite low in low-income countries (2.3%), as well as in lower middle and upper middle-income countries (1.4% and 2.2%, respectively), but much higher in high-income countries (18.2%).

The UN identifies Europe as the most popular region of arrival for migrants from around the world




Figure 1. Dynamics of the share of labour migrants in the total labour force by income level of destination countries in 2013, 2017, 2020

Source: developed based on (Vyshnevska, Petrenko, 2022)

with 87 million migrants (30.9%), followed by Asia with 86 million international migrants (30.5%). North America is the destination for 59 million international migrants (20.9%), followed by Africa with 25 million migrants (9%) (Gordienko, 2022).

Out of the 20 largest migrant countries in Europe, Switzerland had the largest share of migrants in its population (29%), followed by Sweden (20%), Austria (19%) and Germany (19%) (Lever, Matyashovska, Shumilo, 2019).

The fact that Europe is the world's leading migrant destination is due to certain political and economic situations in regions close to Europe. The events in the Middle East, in particular the war in Syria, have significantly exacerbated the situation with refugees in Europe, with some analysts comparing the situation to the period of World War II.

Among the most common causes of the current migration crisis are armed conflicts, low living standards in some countries, and ineffective EU policy in this area. To resolve the migration crisis, cooperation between EU member states in the field of migration and cooperation at the intergovernmental level is important, in particular, intergovernmental groups have been established, such as the Coordinators Group for the Free Movement of People, the Task Force on Immigration, the Trevi Group, etc.

At the present stage of development, European migration policy is guided by several European agreements and conventions that have been enacted over the past two decades. These include the Schengen Agreements of 1985 and 1990, the Dublin Convention of 1990, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 (Vyshnevskaya, Petrenko, 2022).

The events of February 2022, related to the military aggression of the Russian Federation and a full-scale attack on Ukraine, became the greatest catastrophe of the XXI century and the most brutal war on European soil since the World War II, and is gradually being defined as the World War III in terms of its impact on global political and economic relations and the use of military weapons. Although no final assessment has been made (the war is ongoing), the undeniable consequence of Russia's aggression has been the violation of the world order built after World War II and the risk of global chaos.

One of the most powerful consequences of the war was an unprecedented wave of Ukrainian migration, the lion's share of which was to Europe. While European countries, faced with an unprecedented influx of refugees, are withstanding the socio-economic burden with dignity, Ukraine has found itself in a demographic catastrophe. The wave of forced migration coincided with long-term demographic problems: a decline in the birth rate, an increase in the number of middle-aged people, and the outflow

of population during the war. In particular, over the years of independence, the population of Ukraine has decreased by 10 million (in some studies, by 12-13 million), the fertility rate in Ukraine is 1.22 per woman, which is one of the lowest in the world, and the number of evacuees in 2022 is estimated at 7-7.5 million. The trend of low fertility and ageing is typical for many countries around the world (Yadlovskaya, 2022). However, Western countries are addressing these problems by introducing production automation and attracting migrants. Because of the war, Ukrainians have become or may become a significant labour force for developed Western countries in terms of quantity and quality. Ukraine itself is on the verge of global social problems.

### **3. Peculiarities of the Migration Wave of Ukrainians Evacuated Due to the Military Aggression of the Russian Federation in 2022**

The demographic situation is one of the most difficult challenges Ukraine has faced since regaining its independence in 1991. The optimistic advertising of the 1990s, "There are 52 million of us", which was far from reality even then, now looks like a figure from another reality. The predominance of mortality over births, mass emigration of the population, particularly young people, low fertility rates and a difficult socio-economic situation have made depopulation a characteristic phenomenon in Ukraine.

Unfortunately, it is not even possible to establish exactly how many people lived in Ukraine before the full-scale invasion. Thus, according to government estimates, 37.3 million people lived in Ukraine (excluding the temporarily occupied territories) as of 1 December 2019. Instead, the State Statistics Service estimated the number of people living in Ukraine (excluding the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea) at 41.1 million as of 1 February 2022. The annual decrease was over 420 thousand people (Civil Network OPORA, 2023).

In addition, as of 1 January 2022, according to Eurostat, Ukraine's population was 41 million. Meanwhile, according to the World Bank, 43.8 million people lived in Ukraine in 2021. The UN provided approximately the same data. As can be seen, even according to the most conservative estimates, Ukraine's population has decreased by more than 8 million people in 30 years (OPORA Civil Network, 2023).

The state budget for 2023 revealed staggering figures for the population of Ukraine. As of 1 January 2022, 34.5 million people lived in Ukraine, and this figure does not take into account the external migration of a significant part of the population that began after the outbreak of the war, as there is currently virtually no complete statistical information

available in Ukraine. Sources of alternative information include administrative data on individual sectors of the economy and the results of surveys of enterprises conducted by various organisations. For example, in terms of the size of the population in the country, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine relied on data from the UN Refugee Agency, according to which, as of 30 August 2022, external migration of Ukrainian citizens due to security risks (counted by the number of border crossings from Ukraine since 24 February 2022) amounted to 12 million people. Of these, 5.3 million people returned to Ukraine (Tur, 2022). For example, in terms of the population in the country, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine relied on data from the UN Refugee Agency, according to which, as of 30 August 2022, external migration of Ukrainian citizens due to security risks (counted by the number of border crossings from Ukraine since 24 February 2022) amounted to 12 million people. Of these, 5.3 million people returned to Ukraine (Tur, 2022).

Unfortunately, the full-scale Russian invasion accelerated the depopulation and caused a real demographic catastrophe – tens of thousands of dead and wounded, millions of internally displaced persons and emigrants. And if to put aside the calamities and horrors of war for a moment, the Ukrainian

authorities will face a really important question: "Who will live in Ukraine after the victory?"

There are more than a dozen smaller issues related to this issue that are already on the agenda: the reconstruction of homes, work with IDPs, the return of IDPs from abroad, stimulating the birth rate, combating early mortality, etc. Furthermore, the influx of migrants could rise once the borders, which are currently shut for the overwhelming majority of men, are opened without restrictions.

In response to a request from the Civil Network OPORA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that as of 21 June 2023, 8 million 177 thousand Ukrainians were abroad. Compared to the data as of 1 February 2023, i.e., in less than 5 months, this number has increased by almost 188 thousand people (Civil Network OPORA, 2023).

**Table 1**  
**Generalised statistical information**  
**on migration processes of Ukrainians**  
**in the period 01.02.2023–21.06.2023**

Date	Number of Ukrainians living abroad
01.02.2023	7 989 027
29.03.2023	8 054 849
21.06.2023	8 177 638

Source: based on the (Civil Network OPORA, 2023)

Table 2

**Detailed statistical data, number of Ukrainian citizens residing abroad (as of 01.02.2023), by migrant country**

Country	Number of Ukrainian citizens residing abroad (as of 01.02.2023)	Number of Ukrainian citizens registered with the consular authorities (as of 12.12.2022)
Poland	1 786 000	67 000
Germany	1 200 000	101 416
USA	894 665	42 336
Czechia	631 705	no data available (not covered by the request)
Italy	400023	no data available
Canada	311 351	5 060
Spain	270 000	no data available
Israel	220 000	no data available
Hungary	175 500	7 195
Moldova	158 613	68 699
Slovakia	148 678	9 377
France	147 253	no data available
UK	140 300	no data available
Romania	126 165	931
Greece	100 942	no data available
Austria	97 002	no data available
the Netherlands	95 000	no data available
Portugal	87 250	no data available
Estonia	74 980	5 503
Lithuania	61 487	36 874
Latvia	34 531	1 906
Georgia	31 398	no data available
Other countries	796 184	102 295
<b>Total</b>	<b>7 989 027</b>	<b>448 592</b>

Source: based on the (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine)

More than half of Ukrainians live in just three countries: Poland – 22%, Germany – 14.6% and the United States – 11%. Many Ukrainian citizens have also found refuge in the Czech Republic (7.9%), Italy (5%), Canada (4.9%), Spain (3.4%), and Israel (2.75%) (Civil Network OPORA, 2023).

Almost 63% of Ukrainians abroad are adults, 22% are children under 18. The age of another 15% of people is not specified. It is worth noting that only 1 in 16 Ukrainians abroad is registered with the consulate. As of 21 June 2023, there were just over 493,000 such citizens, and 88% of them were adults. This information indicates that about 20% of the population of Ukraine as of 24 February 2022 is currently abroad due to the war.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of 1 February 2023, the total number of Ukrainian citizens residing abroad was almost 8 million (7,989,027). Of these, about 5.84 million (5,841,619) are adult citizens of Ukraine. At the same time, as of 12 December 2022, 448,592 Ukrainian citizens were registered with the consular authorities (Civil Network OPORA, 2023).


This difference in data is due to the fact that consular registration of Ukrainian citizens residing outside Ukraine is mostly voluntary and optional (with a few exceptions). It is worth noting that on 30 December 2022, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the Procedure on Organisation and Maintaining Military Records of Conscripts, Liable for Military Service and Reservists No. 1487, which established the obligation for conscripts, persons liable for military service and reservists to be registered for military service if they leave Ukraine for more than three months at the place of consular registration at foreign diplomatic missions of Ukraine. However,

there is currently no practice of applying this requirement, so it is impossible to assess its effectiveness. At the same time, consular records do not allow to establish the scale of external movement.

To date, the migration of Ukrainians as a result of military aggression is incomplete, but several stages and consequences can be identified: the peak of migration occurred in late February and March, the second wave in late summer 2022, the so-called "pre-winter" wave in mid-autumn, and the next wave in early spring 2023 due to constant missile threats and, in general, the continuation of the war. At the same time, regardless of the periods that researchers distinguish, they all point to negative consequences for Ukraine and the largest reduction in the number of Ukrainians living within the state since independence (Yadlovska, 2022).

Continuing to analyse the number of Ukrainian migrants, the period of August 2022 is highlighted, when it became clear that the war would be prolonged into the winter, which would lead to further migration. During the period from 24 February 2022 to 2 August 2022, 10,321,348 people crossed the border, while 4,257,925 citizens returned. Naturally, some of them are volunteers and cross the border many times (Yadlovska, 2022).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' response to the clarification request, like the previous one, does not contain information on the number of Ukrainians who were abroad until 24 February 2022. With this in mind, it is worth noting that the number of Ukrainian citizens who entered the host country after 24 February 2022 does not allow for an assessment of the dynamics of displacement, also because it does not take into account Ukrainians who returned to Ukraine or crossed the state border in both directions several times. In turn,



(upper trend – number of registered persons; lower trend – number of officially registered persons)

Figure 2. Number of Ukrainians seeking temporary accommodation abroad

the statistics on persons who have been granted the relevant protection status is incomplete, although it does show to some extent that the dynamics of displacement is significant (Civil Network OPORA, 2023).

Only in those countries where it is conducted, the number of such people is about 1.5 million. That is why it is difficult to determine how much the number of potential voters abroad has increased.

Given this, it can be assumed that as of 24 January 2023, according to UNHCR, there were 5 million 125 thousand Ukrainians in Europe. This figure is only growing over time. While in mid-August there were 4.4 million people, by the end of January 2023, their number had increased by 719,000 (Civil Network OPORA, 2023).

#### **4. Political and Socio-Cultural Context for the Formation of a New Paradigm of Migration Processes**

By 2022, global processes in terms of migration risks were characterised by several major crises caused by wars or political upheavals in countries facing a significant outflow of their population. In the last quarter of the XX century and throughout the XXI century, Europe and the world have already faced migration flows that caused powerful migration crises: Afghanistan (1979–1989) – from 5.6 to 7.2 million refugees and emigrants; Venezuela (2013–2019) – from 3.3 to 4 million refugees; Syria (2019–2020) – almost 5.5 and up to 6.9 million people. Moreover, in 2017–2019, the problem of refugees and illegal migration was not only not solved, but rather exacerbated (Yadlovska, 2022).

This resulted in the formation of uncontrolled migration flows, which put a heavy burden on the economies of host countries, including the European Union (EU). The most significant challenge for Europe was the penultimate migration crisis of late 2015, which set a world record for the number of internally displaced persons fleeing wars and persecution (McAuliffe, Triandafyllidou, 2021). The unprecedented number of displaced people of 65.3 million, of whom 21.3 million were refugees, was the highest number of migrants registered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) since the UN was established in 1949. It should be noted that a large proportion of the displaced migrated to Europe: 4.9 million from Syria, 2.7 million from Afghanistan and 1.1 million from Somalia. The majority of these refugees have been settled in the Global South, in countries such as Turkey, Iran and Lebanon. Overall, only 107,000 refugees were admitted to official resettlement programmes. In the summer of 2015, more than a million people – 1,000,573 people seeking shelter – arrived in Europe by sea across the Mediterranean,

mainly through Greece and Italy. Of these, 3,735 went missing, probably drowned (Almustafa, 2022).

Thus, by the end of the 20s of the XXI century, Europe had already experienced powerful challenges due to large-scale migration and faced socio-cultural challenges as well, as migrants caused ambiguous perceptions of language barriers and difficulties with the socio-economic integration of migrants.

However, the migration crisis of 2022 and the outflow of people from Ukraine has far surpassed all previous migrations. The current Ukrainian forced migration crisis has no analogues in terms of its scale, geographical coverage, quantitative indicators and timeframe. In the final version, the number of Ukrainian migrants could reach 16 million. In a worst-case scenario, 25 million people may need humanitarian assistance by the end of 2022. On the other hand, according to the UN International Organization for Migration (hereinafter referred to as IOM), another 7.7 million Ukrainian citizens are considered internally displaced. The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (hereinafter – MESU) reported that about a quarter of all IDPs are schoolchildren or students (Rendiuk, 2022).

In total, as of 2 August 2022, 6,180,946 refugees were registered in Europe, of whom 3,766,794 were temporarily registered as protected persons. Most refugees registered in Poland. Poland also registered the highest number of border crossings – 508,448 people. Obviously, the main reason for migration today is the war, and people will make decisions about returning home based on the security situation in the country, the availability of social infrastructure, housing, and the state of the economy (Rendiuk, 2022).

In early September 2023, European officials said that EU governments should prepare for the long-term protection of millions of Ukrainian refugees, rather than temporary shelter in crisis situations. To this end, EU legislation was amended, to which all countries automatically acceded, and Denmark adopted its own directives, but in line with EU decisions.

To ease the burden on shelter systems in Europe, Ukrainian refugees can now rely on the Temporary Protection Directive, which grants them protection status for a minimum of one year, with the possibility of extension to three years. As of early autumn 2022, the following expectations were projected for further arrivals and distribution of refugees across the EU.

Surveys show that at the beginning of the war, about 90% of Ukrainian refugees planned to return to Ukraine. However, experts believe that real aspirations contradict such statements, as non-return to the homeland is assessed as a so-called "socially undesirable response". Some respondents say they will return after the end of hostilities and the start of work or the restoration of enterprises, while others say they may return in a few years after the war –

such respondents tend to settle in the countries where they migrated to at the time.

Surveys conducted in mid-2022 on the return of Ukrainians to their homeland revealed the following key information: 10.9 per cent of those who do not plan to return home. This means 606,500 adult citizens of Ukraine, the vast majority of whom are of reproductive age. According to researchers, in particular Rendiuk T., the figure could reach up to 1 million people if the war continues for a longer period. Along with certain losses of manpower by the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the fighting with Russia, as well as tens of thousands of civilian casualties on the contact line and deep inside Ukrainian territory from the aggressor's systematic attacks on Ukrainian cities with missiles, drones, aircraft and artillery, the population of Ukraine is experiencing a significant reduction. But the greatest loss is caused by forced irreversible emigration, which negatively affects the gene pool of the Ukrainian people (Rendiuk, 2022).

It is a very optimistic forecast for the return of Ukrainians: on the one hand, such trends were typical for the spring of 2022, when there was hope for the rapid liberation of the territories, and on the other hand, the continuation of the war actually helps Ukrainians integrate into the society of the countries where they are staying, try to find work and stay abroad.

Consider the survey of the end of 2022 and the high percentage of Ukrainians who have found a job. Recent surveys in the EU at the end of 2022 show that about 30% of Ukrainian refugees have already integrated into the EU labour markets, and 20% continue to work for Ukrainian employers. Overall, Ukrainian refugees increased the available labour force in the EU by 0.5% in 2022. Overall, 81% of Ukrainian refugees stated that they would like to return to Ukraine in the future, and 13% plan to return in the next three months. When assessing the percentage of Ukrainian refugees returning to their homeland, it should also be borne in mind that it is determined not only by the intentions (wishes) of refugees, but also by the specifics of their legal status. Temporary protection status does not grant immigrants the right to permanent residence in the EU (Yadlovskaya, 2022).

The war in Ukraine has changed the way research is conducted, as 22.4% of scientists do not currently have sufficient conditions and opportunities to continue their research. About 80% of scientists and researchers who left Ukraine after the outbreak of hostilities on its territory continue to work remotely in Ukraine. At the same time, 14.4% say that such forced migration has had a positive impact on their academic or research activities, as they have found a new (or additional) opportunity to study or work in a foreign institution (Mishchuk, Oliinyk, 2022).

It is important to develop initiatives to preserve the Ukrainian language among migrants, because the

ways to preserve the national mentality, are defined by distinct vectors: the functioning and support of the state language – Ukrainian and the subsequent return of Ukrainian refugees to Ukraine.

Ukraine's geographical and cultural proximity to Europe, the presence of a diaspora, and the status of temporary protection will help increase the participation of forced migrants in the labour force. In particular, the international Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates that the labour force of all EU countries will grow by 0.5% by the end of 2022, which is twice as much as during the previous wave of migrants in 2014–2017. The greatest impact is expected in the Czech Republic (2.2%), Poland (2.1%), Estonia (1.9%), and several other countries (Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Romania) – from 1% to 1.5%. For its part, employment growth in the EU as a whole may reach 0.4% (Tur, 2022).

However, despite the rather optimistic assessments of the host countries of Ukrainians, the available data indicate a moderate integration of forced migrants into their labour markets. Thus, although 63% of surveyed migrants had worked in Ukraine before the full-scale invasion, only 28% were employed in September.

In Germany, in June 2022, more than 350,000 Ukrainians were registered as job seekers, but less than 10% found work, with some industries citing a figure of 22%. In France, only about 15% of migrants are employed, given language barriers and a relatively small diaspora, and in Spain, 13% of the 90,000 Ukrainians of working age. In Poland, on the other hand, 1.2 million migrants have received social security numbers and about half of them have found jobs.

However, they mostly worked in lower-paid sectors – logistics, industry, agriculture, construction, and hospitality – although a significant number of them were highly qualified. According to a recent report by the ILO, the employment statistics of the host countries of Ukrainians are beginning to reflect their impact on the labour market, which is not yet threatening. For example, in Germany, unemployment has increased due to the inclusion of migrants in the statistics since June 2022, but there are no signs of structural changes in the labour market. In Poland, despite the large number of migrants, unemployment decreased (Protsyk, Kara, 2022).

Migration challenges caused by the migration crisis in the EU, as defined by Malyk I., have the following main manifestations. The quantitative and qualitative component of forced migrants (refugees) from Ukraine as a result of the full-scale phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war was not foreseen. Accordingly, the greatest burden on the socio-economic sphere



fell on neighbouring countries and those whose economies were initially sufficiently stable and prepared for migration challenges (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Germany).

The scale of forced migrants from Ukraine in 2022 far exceeded the "Syrian migration crisis" of 2015–2017. Russia has always viewed the migration crisis in the EU as another form of hybrid warfare, and Ukrainian refugees as a tool for its implementation. The ultimate goal of such a hybrid war is to undermine the stability and integrity of the European community in order to weaken it and as an ideal mechanism for increasing contradictions within the EU. Sheltering such a large number of people in such a short time takes its toll on the country's economy, the burden falls on citizens-taxpayers, which can lead to changes in the internal policies of countries (Fylypovych, 2022).

The war in Ukraine will have a significant impact on the economy and consumers in terms of the following manifestations: extended disruptions in global supply chains, increased inflationary pressures, and higher energy and raw material prices; food prices are also under upward pressure as wheat and grain supplies from Russia and Ukraine are disrupted; higher energy and commodity prices will drive global inflation in 2022 and beyond, and beyond, both in developed and emerging markets; higher inflation will offset the positive impact of higher commodity prices for some resource-oriented emerging economies; deteriorating economic prospects, lower private sector confidence and greater financial market risk associated with greater geopolitical tensions; food security in some emerging markets in the Middle East and Africa may be at risk.

On the other hand, migration is currently seen as a tool for long-term growth in the EU. The analysis shows that migration provides significant economic benefits, primarily to host countries. Currently, the EU is facing a growing shortage of skilled labour, mainly due to unfavourable demographic trends in Europe. Given the massive emigration of Ukrainian citizens to the EU, an important question arises as to whether migrants, especially from Ukraine, solve the problem of the EU's labour shortage.

Especially given that the emigration of Ukrainians provides for adequate social protection and legal support, which guarantees the right to settlement, work, and education. The right to employment is readily exercised by Ukrainian migrants, as they are largely people of working age, primarily women.

In general, it can be argued that the prospects for regional migration are currently linked to many factors and very uncertain prospects for a return to the pre-2022 or pre-pandemic EaP models. The war in Ukraine is already turning into a protracted conflict that will threaten the economic situation of millions

of people and the hopes of temporarily displaced Ukrainians to return home for a long time.

It also means that large-scale displacement will remain a key, defining feature of the region in the coming years. As a result, displaced Ukrainians, host EU countries and the Ukrainian government will have to deal with the new circumstances, adapting temporary modalities to longer-term solutions.

Regrettably, the longer the hostilities continue, the more Ukrainians will decide not to return to Ukraine, as this time promotes the integration of Ukrainians, their involvement in the labour market abroad and developed countries are seen as more favourable places to live. It is particularly difficult to return Ukrainian citizens from the areas where the fighting took place and from the border areas, the latter being potentially threatening. Thus, migration has a significant negative impact on economic development. The government of Ukraine needs to develop measures to reduce migration flows from the country and the post-war return of Ukrainian migrants to avoid a demographic catastrophe.

## 5. Conclusions

Summarising the results, the following conclusions can be drawn.

Russia's military aggression in sovereign Ukraine has caused the largest migration wave on a European and global scale in the late XX and early XXI centuries and the largest outflow of population for Ukraine itself since its independence and even in its history, and it is transnational in nature. The full implications for Ukrainian migration will be summarised after the war is over, but the following interim conclusions are relevant today.

The analysis of migration processes in the world and Europe in the current context suggests that migration is actively taking place and contributes to the development of international integration, as it reduces the number of barriers and increases opportunities. The article analyses and identifies the most popular regions of the world and the most popular countries of destination for migrants in Europe.

According to various estimates, before the full-scale invasion, between 37.3 and 43.8 million people lived on the territory of Ukraine. As of 1 February 2022, the State Statistics Service estimated the population (excluding the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) at 41.1 million people. However, according to the State Budget 2023, as of 1 January 2022, 34.5 million people lived in Ukraine, and this figure does not take into account external migration; taking into account various indicators, as of September 2023, only 27.8 million people lived in Ukraine.

According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of 21 June 2023, 8 million 177 thousand

Ukrainian citizens were abroad, about 20% of the population of Ukraine as of 24 February 2022. Almost half of Ukrainians are in just three countries: Poland – 22%, Germany – 15%, and the United States – 11%. Only 6% of Ukrainians abroad are registered with the consulate.

The migration of Ukrainians, which had all the signs of evacuation, is gradually turning into labour migration of Ukrainians in Europe, as well as Canada and the United States.

Due to the escalation and continuation of the war on the territory of Ukraine and the inability to return, women migrants abroad are setting up their lives, integrating into the programmes of the countries they are in, finding work and renting accommodation. However, in the future, this will become the basis for migrants not to return to Ukraine and, most likely, the process of family reunification will take place, which will cause men to leave.

It should be noted that most Ukrainians are currently living in Europe, enjoying social protection and benefits as war victims, and therefore, once the war is over and the victory is won, this status will be cancelled. As a result, Ukrainian citizens with this status will either have to leave the country, apply for another status, or find employment (different

countries have different employment conditions for foreigners). Citizens granted temporary refugee status are non-residents of Ukraine. It should be emphasised that some Ukrainians will return to a peaceful Ukraine and declare this intention even now, as evidenced by survey data. At the same time, forecasts of Ukrainians' return are generally unoptimistic and threatening to the demographic and economic situation in Ukraine.

The scientific novelty of the study lies in the systematic analysis of migration processes in Ukraine, Europe and the world, their current state in connection with the war in Ukraine and possible further changes. In particular, the study analyses how the share of migrants in the population of countries has changed, the number of migrants in different countries by their income level, and identifies the political and socio-cultural consequences of such changes.

The practical significance of this study is that the results of the analysis can be used by public authorities in developing programmes for Ukraine's further integration into the European Union. Further research will be aimed at developing new mechanisms and policies to create a more effective migration policy.

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Received on: 02th of October, 2023

Accepted on: 23th of November, 2023

Published on: 28th of December, 2023