

THE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OF FRANCE IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

Juraj Ondriaš¹, Mykola Palinchak², Kateryna Brenzovych³

Abstract. Despite the decolonisation process, France has retained a considerable degree of influence over its former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, in recent years, this influence has diminished markedly. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to examine the extent of French economic influence in its former colonies in West and Central Africa. The paper begins by examining the long-term impact of France on the extraction of two key commodities, oil and uranium, on the African continent. This is primarily accomplished through French multinational corporations, which have historical ties to the French government and which exert dominant control over the extraction of the aforementioned mineral resources in the countries under examination. The paper then presents a case study of the Bolloré Group, another French multinational firm that has been active on the continent for an extended period of time across a range of sectors within the economies of the countries under study. In conclusion, the article presents a tabular overview of France's position as a trading partner for fourteen of its former colonies in West and Central Africa. The conclusion is that the decline in France's influence on its former colonies is much slower than one might assume based on recent developments in the political and military spheres (where French influence seems to be declining much faster in the 2020s). The decline is also more noticeable in African countries' exports to France than in their imports from France. The gradual and fluctuating nature of this decline makes it premature to ascertain whether the general decline of French influence, whether economic or political-military, in recent years represents a turning point in the emancipation of France's former colonies, or whether it is merely a transient phenomenon.

Keywords: Central Africa, Françafrique, neocolonialism, Sahel, West Africa.

JEL Classification: F10; F54

1. Introduction

Since the decolonisation of the French colonial Empire (referred to as the French Community between 1958 and 1960) in West and Central Africa, France has retained a significant degree of influence in the region. Although the former colonies gained formal independence in 1960, in practice they remained dependent on the former French metropole for their military security (especially against internal pressures represented by insurgencies and putschists), economic and financial survival, and other aspects of their functioning that constrained their capacity to act as sovereign states. This neocolonialist relationship has come to be known as "Françafrique" (Etogho, Eben & Dalton, 2022). The term is polysemous, denoting, on the one hand, the persistence of French influence

in the political, security and economic-financial realms of newly independent African countries, and on the other, the collective designation for former French colonies situated within this relationship. Indeed, the influence of France was so pervasive that it extended beyond its own colonies to encompass those of Belgium, Portugal and Spain as well (Eben & Dalton, 2022). The unequal relationship, epitomised by the term "Françafrique", became a tangible reality in Western and Central Africa for the following several decades and, to a certain extent, persists to the present day. In recent years, however, there has been a notable decline in France's influence in its former colonies. This trend has reached its zenith in the 2020s in the countries of the Sahel, where coups d'état have occurred in Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali and

¹ University of Economics in Bratislava, Slovak Republic

E-mail: juraj.ondrias@euba.sk

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4837-0097>

² State University "Uzhhorod National University", Ukraine (*corresponding author*)

E-mail: mykola.palinchak@uzhnu.edu.ua

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9990-5314>

³ State University "Uzhhorod National University", Ukraine

E-mail: kateryna.brenzovych@uzhnu.edu.ua

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1935-3581>



Niger. These events have been driven, to a significant extent, by disillusionment with the lack of progress made by French military forces in combating Islamist insurgent groups in the region. Additionally, the severe poverty and other economic challenges that have persisted in the region under French economic dominance have contributed to the rise of these events. To illustrate these issues, eight of the 25 most authoritarian countries (Etogho, Eben & Dalton, 2022) and 44% of medium-intensity conflicts (i.e., with a yearly death toll between 1,000 and 10,000 people) were concentrated in the countries of *Françafrique* as of research from 2022 (Eben & Dalton, 2022). The number of such coups d'état in the region over a relatively short time period has led to the entire Sahel region being labelled a "Coup Belt" in the 2020s. It is noteworthy that with the exception of Sudan, all of the coups in the region have occurred in former French colonies. This is, however, only a part of the broader series of political disturbances sweeping the countries of *Françafrique*, which includes a further coup in Gabon, unsuccessful coup attempts in other countries of the region and ongoing civil conflicts in Chad and the Central African Republic. Furthermore, the continued spread of Islamist militant groups throughout the region and beyond is a further contributing factor. In light of the risks posed by these Islamist groups, both within and beyond the African continent, as well as the multitude of other challenges (including mass emigration from affected countries, the resulting trafficking in humans, drug smuggling, arms trafficking, a disruption in the supply of critical mineral resources, and more) posed by continued turmoil in the region (Antil, 2020), it is imperative to examine the decline of the French-imposed order in the geographical space of *Françafrique*.

The objective of this study is to examine the extent of French economic influence in its former colonies. This paper presents an overview of the forms of French influence, and thus the substance of the term "*Françafrique*" in the economic sphere. It also provides an overview of trade relations between France and its former colonies in West and Central Africa.

The findings of the article begin with an examination of how France has maintained its economic influence over the countries studied through large multinational companies specialising in the countries' key natural resources, which were (and still are) crucial to France and the world economy. The focus is on Elf and Total in the oil sector and Orano and its predecessors in the uranium mining sector. The case study of the Bolloré Group, a French multinational company, is then presented, with a focus on its activities in the sectors of transportation, logistics, media and others. In the final part of the paper, an overview is given of the trade relationship between the region and its former colonial metropole. The paper presents data

in the form of tables which demonstrate how France has been declining in its former sphere of influence over the past three decades.

The focus of this paper is on *Françafrique* not only in a functional sense (i.e., the unequal relationship between France and its former colonies), but also in a narrower territorial sense. In this article, the term "*Françafrique*" will be used to refer to the former French colonies in Western and Central Africa, with the exclusion of the countries of the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia). This is due to the fact that these countries have an Arabic character, which results in a different dynamic with France than the Sub-Saharan region. The dynamic between France and the Sub-Saharan region differs from that observed in other former French colonies in Africa, such as Djibouti or Madagascar. The latter's geographical location presents distinct challenges when compared to the main grouping of Francophone states in West and Central Africa. This grouping encompasses the countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Senegal and Togo. The paper employs a holistic approach, treating the region as a unified complex entity, without a deep focus on the particular conditions in individual states.

Consequently, the overarching scope of the article on Western and Central Africa as a whole represents a limitation to this work, as it allows for the identification of broad trends common to *Françafrique*. However, it precludes a more detailed examination of the specific trends and events in each country or smaller group of countries within the confines of a single scientific paper. This limitation can be addressed in future research by focusing the scope of subsequent studies on a more specific area. The principal limitation on research is that while the decline in French influence over the region has been ongoing for several decades, it has accelerated markedly in recent years. This is most evident in the coups d'état in several Sahel states as well as Gabon since 2021. Consequently, insufficient time has elapsed to study the phenomenon in the requisite breadth and depth for definitive and reliable monographs on the subject to become widely available. Consequently, the principal sources of references were online databases of scientific journals, including EBSCO (for English-language sources) and Persée and Cairn (for French-language sources), as well as publications of relevant international organisations and think tanks (such as the World Nuclear Association or the Council on Foreign Relations) and online portals of journalistic periodicals or news websites, including *Le Monde*, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, the BBC, *Les Echos* or *Al-Jazeera*, which provide more up-to-date information on the studied issues. The research methodology

employed included the examination and analysis of available scholarly sources, with findings then synthesised into a coherent narrative. A further method employed was the examination of quantitative data on mutual trade between France and its individual former colonies in the defined region, which was sourced from the database of the Observatory of Economic Complexity.

2. Literature Review

The decline of Françafrique has been a topic of discussion and analysis for the past three decades. The practical realities have unfolded at a slower pace than the prognoses, as will be demonstrated below. In light of recent developments, however, the contemporary context offers an entirely novel dynamic for this trend. To some extent, the current situation has overtaken the existing academic literature. The accelerated pace of recent developments has created a gap in the existing literature, which this paper aims to address by situating current events within a broader historical context.

Among the original monographs dealing with the attempts of West African governments to escape the negative consequences of continued French dominance was *Françafrique: Le plus long scandale de la république* (1998) by François-Xavier Verschave. In this book, he outlined the networks of French domination over its former colonies, which have been followed by subsequent authors, particularly in the areas of political decision-making, economic penetration and military and intelligence co-operation. One of the more prominent follow-ups to examine these same networks in recent years is *L'empire qui ne veut pas mourir: Une histoire de la Françafrique* (2021), edited by Thomas Borrell, Amzat Boukari-Yabara, Benoît Collombat and Thomas Deltombe. In addition to providing an updated account of the narrative, this book offers a more detailed examination of the cultural ties between France and Africa, as well as the role of mineral extraction in fuelling the global transition towards a more environmentally sustainable economy and the fourth industrial revolution. A more detailed perspective is provided by François Pacquement and Victoria Licker in their monograph *Le financement du développement: Histoire et pratiques* (2019). This study examines the patterns of French development aid and identifies the distinctive features that differentiate it from the development and humanitarian aid policies of other countries and international actors. Another economically oriented work on the broad subject of French West Africa is *Africa's Last Colonial Currency: The CFA Franc Story* (2021) by Fanny Pigeaud and Ndong Samba Silla, a definitive monograph that places the CFA franc in the context of France's EU membership and other aspects of international

monetary relations. Fanny Pigeaud contributes to other media outlets such as Agence France Press and Le Monde diplomatique with her expertise in West and Central Africa. Looking beyond France's activities to other actors on the African continent, the book *A New Scramble for Africa?: Imperialism, Investment and Development* (2009), edited by Roger Southall and Henning Melber, stands out as an indigenous African perspective on the issue, as both editors are South African academics.

However, given that the shift away from French dominance in the political and military realms is a relatively recent phenomenon, linked to the perceived failure of French intervention against Islamist and other militants in West Africa, the aforementioned monographs do not always reflect the current situation on the ground. Scientific journals, on the other hand, are better suited for researchers and stakeholders to provide an insight into the contemporary context in the region. Among the most prominent researchers in this field is Alain Antil, who serves as the director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Centre at the Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI). Among his more recent articles are *Anti-French Discourse in Francophone Africa* (2023), *Le G5 Sahel et le concept de "sécurité-développement"* and *Endless Violence in the Sahel* (both 2020). A similar focus is provided by French academic Salim Chena with his articles *Un Sahel couleur kaki. Multiplication des acteurs, complexification des enjeux* (2020) or *The state and transnational relations: The case of the Sahel-Saharan area* (2014). While Chena's expertise lies in the countries of the Maghreb, he employs a comprehensive methodology to examine the challenges facing Francophone Africa and the role of France in these issues. Nathaniel K. Powell, a postcolonial relations researcher at Lancaster University with a specialisation in France and Africa, offers an external perspective on these matters. Apart from his monograph *France's Wars in Chad: Military Intervention and African Decolonization* (2021), he is also the author of articles such as *Battling Instability? The Recurring Logic of French Military Interventions in Africa* (2017) and *A flawed strategy in the Sahel: How French intervention contributes to Instability* (2016), which deal with the French presence in Africa generally, as well as other articles focusing on France's relations with a particular country in the region, most recently *Why France failed in Mali* (2022).

3. Results: Examination of French Economic Influence

The dissolution of the French colonial empire in Sub-Saharan Africa was relatively orderly and peaceful, resulting in the preservation of the original economic networks between the metropole and the newly

independent states. As had been the case prior to decolonisation, the region continued to serve as a source of minerals (notably energy resources, including oil and uranium, as well as gold, bauxite, and others) and agricultural products for French enterprises to extract, process, and export to the French and global markets.

To provide a concise overview of the role of French economic influence in the region prior to a more comprehensive examination, it is essential to recognise the continued significance of West and Central African markets for French manufacturing and services. The French building materials company Lafarge is deeply embedded in Africa through its partnerships and mergers with African companies, giving it access to booming construction markets that are struggling to keep pace with the continent's growing population and resulting economic development and demand for housing and infrastructure (Gibbs, 2024). The three largest French companies in the field of construction and civil engineering – Vinci, Bouygues and Eiffage (all of which are also in the top five companies in Europe) – were also significantly engaged in infrastructure construction in African countries. Similarly, the telecommunications giant Orange is present in up to twenty African countries, primarily in Francophone West and Central Africa. It services over 120 million customers, representing 12.8% of the company's activity in 2016. In the majority of these countries, Orange is the dominant telecommunications provider, ranking either first or second in terms of market share. Additionally, the company has developed a mobile payment platform. It attains this status either independently or through collaborative arrangements with local service providers. An illustrative example is Senegal, where it holds a 42% equity interest in the national telecommunications operator Sonatel (Bessières, 2017).

Another notable indication of France's economic preeminence is the sustained usage of the CFA franc in the two monetary zones of West and Central Africa. The CFA franc is guaranteed by France and is credited with ensuring monetary stability and the ease of doing business in the countries of *Françafrique* that use it (King, 2022). On the other hand, it has been criticised by many within these countries and by outside observers for placing even more influence in the hands of the French state. This is mainly achieved by requiring African member countries to keep 50% of their foreign exchange reserves in France, thus limiting their access to their own funds. France, for its part, argues that this is necessary to prevent irresponsible financial decisions by African governments. The CFA franc, which is pegged to the euro (and formerly to the French franc), is also overvalued in comparison to the euro. This has the effect of making exports from the member states more expensive, which in turn hinders their export

trade and thus the accumulation of capital from selling exports (French, 2024).

3.1 French Influence over Oil and Uranium Extraction

In the context of the post-war economic boom, which was sustained by the extraction of oil, the pre-eminent position was occupied by the publicly owned oil company Elf Aquitaine. Elf was established in 1966 as a conglomerate comprising several state-owned enterprises and government agencies with the objective of ensuring French national energy security through the provision of a reliable oil supply. In order to demonstrate the connections between Elf and the political establishment of France, it is pertinent to note that one of its founders was Pierre Guillaumat, a former Gaullist Minister of the Armies of France. The company was a pioneer in the field of oil extraction in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region previously considered to possess relatively limited oil reserves. The forerunners of Elf initiated the exploration of oil reserves in the Sub-Saharan region as early as 1962, commencing operations off the coast of Gabon (Delanglade, 2019). In 1967, Elf was part of the French complex of overt and covert organisations which provided support to Omar Bongo in his ascension to the presidency of Gabon, a position he held until his death in 2009 (Vallée, 2000). The French government retained its stake in the company until 1996, after which it maintained a golden share. This illustrates the interconnectivity between French government interests and private interests in the oil extraction industry in Africa and other regions where Elf was operational. Nevertheless, Elf was ultimately superseded by its principal competitor, Total, which finally absorbed Elf in 1999. Therefore, Total can be considered the successor of Elf in Africa, although it has its own history on the continent that dates back to the 1950s in colonial Algeria. This history began with the *Compagnie française des pétroles* (CFP), which was a private company formed at the behest of the French government in 1924. Presently, Total has a presence in 28 African countries, including both Francophone and non-Francophone countries, as an oil extractor or supplier of finished oil-based products (TotalEnergies, n.d.). In Sub-Saharan Africa, Total is currently producing oil in Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania and the Republic of Congo, and is exploring in Guinea and Senegal. At its peak in 2014, Total's operations accounted for 30% of the oil extracted in Africa (Delanglade, 2019). Although it has experienced a decline in its prominence amidst the recent surge of interest in Africa, it remains one of the most significant French companies operating on the continent, and thus represents a prominent manifestation of French economic influence in its former colonies.

A comparable scenario pertains to the mining of uranium, another pivotal energy commodity for France. Given that the country has been reliant on nuclear power since the 1980s (and has been a nuclear weapons power since 1960), it is dependent on radioactive ores, notably uranium, to fuel its energy sector. The two principal source countries of uranium ore in Francophone Africa are Gabon and Niger. Gabon was the former source of uranium for France, with mining beginning in 1958 and famously supplying the material for France's nuclear weapons programme. However, uranium mining in the country was later abandoned and French attention shifted entirely to Niger. Mining in Niger began in 1968 under the supervision of the French Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat à l'énergie atomique, CEA). In 1976, this government agency was involved in the establishment of the state-owned multinational company that has come to dominate uranium mining in Niger, originally known as Cogema (from: *Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaire*), then from 2001 as Areva and from 2018 as Orano. In the latter year, the French government became the majority shareholder (Desquesnes & Vidal, 2020). In 2022, Orano was the third largest uranium producer globally, responsible for 11% of the world's total production.

With regard to Niger, it was estimated in 2021 that the country possessed 5% of the world's uranium reserves, amounting to 311,000 tonnes. Furthermore, it was the seventh largest uranium producer globally (World Nuclear Association, 2024a). Although these figures represent a decline from the 7% of global reserves projected for 2018, when Niger was the fourth largest producer, they nonetheless position Niger as the country with the largest uranium reserves on the African continent (Mohanty, 2018). Over the previous decade, the country's output has exhibited a consistent decline, from 4,518 tonnes to 2,020 tonnes between 2013 and 2022 (World Nuclear Association, 2024a). Nevertheless, throughout this period of decline, it remained the second largest source of uranium for France, providing the French nuclear energy sector with 20% of its uranium needs, equating to 17,165 tonnes. For context, Kazakhstan was the primary source of uranium for France, accounting for 27% of French uranium imports and 23,822 tonnes. This illustrates that France is considerably less dependent on Niger as a supplier than Niger is on France as a purchaser. Orano and its subsidiaries effectively hold a monopoly over Nigerien production, with the exception of a nascent presence of Chinese companies (World Nuclear Association, 2024b). The regulated nature of radioactive material and the limited market for it have led to the production and trade of uranium being regarded as the archetypical neocolonialist enterprise. Prices are typically set by the dominant powers, such as the USA and France, via their

linked multinational companies, rather than by the producing countries as is the case with oil (Andersson, 2014). Similarly, Niger has demonstrated a lack of bargaining power in its negotiations with Orano and its predecessors. Niger's endeavours to enhance its standing in the global uranium market proved unsuccessful, thereby demonstrating the constraints of its economic autonomy. In 1974, the then-president of Niger, Hamani Diori, attempted to increase the price of uranium, a decision that ultimately led to his deposition in a coup. Given that French military personnel stationed in the countries of *Françafrique* typically intervened against coups that posed a threat to leaders aligned with French interests, their inaction in this instance led to the widespread perception that France (and the USA) was complicit in the coup. A similar scenario occurred in 2010, when then-President Mamadou Tandja was also ousted in a coup two years after requesting and securing an increase in the price of uranium. It is estimated that Orano or its predecessors have extracted approximately 130,000 tonnes of uranium from Niger over the course of their operations in the country, which equates to over a quarter of the country's estimated uranium reserves. Tandja's successor, Mahamadou Issoufou (a former employee of Areva), attempted a different strategy by negotiating more favourable tax rates on uranium ore. This has been the subject of criticism, however, with Areva and now Orano successfully avoiding payment of the tax (Desquesnes & Vidal, 2020).

Uranium mining in Niger is concentrated in the vicinity of the city of Arlit, situated in the northwestern region of the country within the Sahel. The exposed location renders the site and its employees susceptible to assaults by Islamist organisations and militias. In September 2010, seven Orano employees were abducted by AQIM, while 16 employees were compelled to evacuate in May 2023 in the face of a jihadist attack (Cessac, 2023). The principal mines are located in the Air region, on the outskirts of Arlit. They are operated by the *Société des mines de l'Air (Somair)*, a subsidiary of Orano established in 1968. Somair maintains a 63.4% share in its ownership (Maad, 2023). The mines have an annual production capacity of 2,300 tonnes of uranium. A second mine was situated in Akokan, a distance of 10 km from Arlit. This mine, which contributed 2,500 tonnes of uranium per year (Mohanty, 2018), was closed in 2021 upon exhaustion of its reserves. Nevertheless, the local subsidiary of Orano, *Compagnie minière d'Akouta* (also known as Cominak, which was established in 1974 and in which Orano has a 59% share), is attempting to implement a redevelopment project with the objective of reopening the site. A third site, the Imouraren mine, 80km south of Arlit, is being explored as it is believed to contain one of the world's largest uranium deposits, at around 200,000 tonnes.

Orano already has a 63.52% stake in this mine and a licence to operate since 2009, but mining has not started because the fall in the world price of uranium has made it less profitable than expected. This decline was precipitated by the 2011 disaster at the Japanese Fukushima nuclear power plant and the subsequent shift away from nuclear power by several Western countries (Maad, 2023). In 2023, the Nigerien military junta revoked Orano's concession for the Imouraren mine, casting doubt on the immediate future of uranium mining in this locality (World Nuclear Association, 2024b). Notwithstanding the aforementioned operations, Niger continues to be one of the most impoverished countries globally, with only approximately 10% of the population having access to electricity. Despite uranium representing approximately 70% of the country's exports in 2018, these only constituted 5% of the national GDP (Mohanty, 2018).

3.2 The Bolloré Group as an Example of Cross-Sector French Influence

However, the economic rationale of *Françafrique* is not solely contingent upon the exploitation of natural resources for the benefit of the metropole. Additionally, other sectors of the economies of former French colonies have been subject to significant French corporate influence, including transportation and logistics, media and telecommunications, electricity generation, and select manufacturing and service industries (Chena, 2020). One of the most notable examples is the Bolloré Group, which has a particular focus on the areas of transportation, logistics and communications. The Bolloré Group first entered the African market in the mid-1980s and has since become a prominent presence in the economies and various other aspects of life of most African states, not only the former French colonies. In 2007, the company operated 200 branches across 43 countries in Africa, employing a workforce of 19,000 (Deltombe, 2009). By 2013, the group had expanded its reach to 46 countries across the continent, including Somaliland, which is not formally recognised as a country (Bhuckory, 2013). In the preceding year, Africa accounted for 80% of the group's profits (Pigeaud, 2021a). Through its subsidiary Blue Solutions, it has developed electrical energy storage systems based on lithium metal polymer batteries throughout French-speaking Africa, for example in Benin, Cameroon, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire or Niger (De Batscap à Blue Solutions, 2013). This afforded the company a significant degree of influence over the electric power consumption in these countries. Furthermore, the company is engaged in the domain of public transport in Africa, as evidenced by its provision of electric buses for the Ivorian capital, Abidjan. Additionally, the Bolloré Group holds a 39% interest in Socfin, an

industrial agriculture holding group specialising in the production of palm oil and rubber in Africa and Southeast Asia. Its African subsidiary, Socfinaf, operates in eight countries: Cameroon, the DRC, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Sierra Leone.

However, the Bolloré Group's main activities are in the fields of transport, import-export logistics, port infrastructure management and related activities. The group exercises control through subsidiaries such as Bolloré Transport & Logistics (formerly Bolloré Africa Logistics) and SDV International Logistics. The latter had a hundred-year history as a freight trading company between France and its African colonies before being acquired by the Bolloré Group in 1986 to launch its expansion in Africa. By 2021, Bolloré Transport & Logistics had established a presence in 42 ports, acting as a shipping agent and stevedore, as well as operating 16 cargo terminals, predominantly in Francophone Africa (Pigeaud, 2021a). The Bolloré Group owned or operated a number of ports in Francophone Africa, including those in Nouakchott (Mauritania), Dakar (Senegal), Abidjan and San Pedro (Ivory Coast), Lomé (Togo), Cotonou (Benin), Douala and Kribi (Cameroon), and Libreville (Gabon). The Bolloré Group's operations extended beyond the coastal region, encompassing the river port in Bangui, Central African Republic. Additionally, the group has engaged in the development of railway infrastructure. In 1999, the company was awarded a 35-year concession to manage the railway operator in Cameroon, Camrail. Additionally, the company held concessions in the railway company of Benin (Bénirail), in which the Bolloré Group had a 40% share since 2015, which extended to the Nigerien capital of Niamey. A similar situation pertains with regard to Sitarail, which offers rail transportation services in Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso. It provides the landlocked country with an outlet to the coast (Bolloré to sell African concessions, 2022). It is also noteworthy that the Bolloré Group operated several significant ports in Anglophone West African countries, including Lagos in Nigeria, Tema in Ghana, Monrovia in Liberia, and Freetown in Sierra Leone (Weir, 2021). In that year, the Bolloré Group reached a zenith in its operations in this sector. In the preceding year, Cameroon had declined to extend the concession for the port of Douala, which thus reverted to state control in 2021. The group has held this concession in conjunction with Maersk since 2004. However, its activity in Cameroon dates back to 1986, when it acquired the local subsidiary of the Compagnie Financière de Suez, which had been operating there since the 1940s (Pigeaud, 2021b). Subsequently, the group resolved to divest its Bolloré Transport & Logistics subsidiary, comprising the ports and the railways, initially to the Italians-Swiss Mediterranean Shipping Company in

2021 and subsequently to the French Compagnie maritime d'affrètement – Compagnie générale maritime (CMA CGM) in 2024 (Pigeaud, 2021a).

Additionally, the Bolloré Group plays a prominent role in the African information sector. The company exercises majority control of the Canal+ Group through its 27% stake in the multimedia company Vivendi. The latter's subsidiary, Canal+ International (and its own further subsidiary, Canal+ Afrique), offers television channels and packages in forty African countries, with 32 channels provided in Francophone countries alone. In 2020, Canal+ became a 12% shareholder in the South African media group MultiChoice, thereby expanding its influence in Anglophone and Lusophone Africa. The initial 6.5% share was increased to 15.37% the following year, thereby establishing the company as the largest shareholder in the group. With 14.5 million subscribers in 2019, MultiChoice is the largest pay-TV operator on the continent and has a dominant market position in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Anglophone countries. Although Canal+ asserts that it has no intention of competing with MultiChoice in English-speaking and Portuguese-speaking Africa, its shareholding affords it (and, by extension, the Bolloré Group) a degree of influence over the operations and offerings of MultiChoice (Ahougnon, 2021). Additionally, Bolloré exercises control over Havas, a marketing, advertising, and public relations company, through its ownership of Vivendi. This affords the Bolloré Group a considerable degree of influence within the information space of the continent.

To demonstrate the extent of its impact and the intertwined nature of politics and economics within *Françafrique*, the Bolloré Group's leadership fostered close ties with prominent French politicians at the pinnacle of the government (notably with former President Nicolas Sarkozy) and African leaders such as Paul Biya of Cameroon or Charles Taylor of Liberia, who was not directly involved in *Françafrique*. Nevertheless, despite the Bolloré Group's robust standing and its extensive political affiliations in both France and Africa, its position in the African continental market is, at the very least, in relative decline. In 2007, Africa constituted 25% of the group's turnover, representing 1.4 billion euros out of a total turnover of 6.4 billion euros (Deltombe, 2009). By 2021, while the turnover of Bolloré Transport & Logistics, the principal African subsidiary of the group, had increased to 2.1 billion euros, this represented a relative decrease in comparison to the total turnover of the group, which stood at 24.11 billion euros. Inclusive of operations in the media and communications sectors, Africa accounted for a mere 11% of the group's total turnover for that year (Pigeaud, 2021a).

3.3 The Position of France as a Trade Partner to its Former Colonies

In contrast to the conspicuous and precipitous decline of French political and military sway in the "Coup Belt" during the 2020s, a more detailed examination of the data reveals that France's dominant role in the trade of *Françafrique* has been eroding much earlier. While data obtained from the database of the Observatory of Economic Complexity is only available until the year 2022, and thus does not yet include the time period following the recent wave of coups in the Sahel states (except for Guinea, whose coup dates to 2021), some obvious trends are visible, as discussed in the following tables.

It is evident that over the past three decades, France has experienced a decline in its ranking as a trading partner for its former colonies in the majority of surveyed countries. There are, however, a few exceptions, namely Benin, Chad, Gabon and Niger, where the trend is less clear due to the volatility of the rankings or a lack of significant movement in the French position. The decline has been more pronounced in the case of exports to France than in imports from the country. A similar decline can be observed in the percentage represented by France among the sources of imports and destinations of exports of African countries. In comparison, the total value of imports and exports is subject to greater volatility over the period under review. In general, for the countries under study, while the total value of imports from France has either been continuously increasing or has undergone a recent decrease after a previous increase, the total value of exports has been more volatile. However, the trend in recent years is generally towards a lesser role for France, although there are exceptions such as Cameroon or Mali before its most recent coup. The results, namely the rankings, also demonstrate that the former metropole is a more significant source of imports than it is an export destination for the countries of *Françafrique*. This may indicate that it is more straightforward for African countries to diversify the geographical distribution of their exports, given that they tend to export raw materials (natural and energy resources and agricultural commodities). These are in demand in various countries across the globe, with many of these countries eager to have their companies acquire new sources of these primary commodities. In other words, economic superpowers such as the USA or China, but also less dominant economic powers such as Russia, India, Japan, and the developed countries of the broader West, have a demand for the raw materials that African countries can offer. Conversely, the African market may be perceived as an unprofitable investment for foreign companies due to the poverty of its states and populations. This has resulted in

Table 1

Trade between Benin and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (million USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	190	20.4	1.	5.5	2.79	11.-12.
2000	230	17	2.	4.04	1.38	16.
2005	242	9.57	2.	8.02	1.55	11.
2010	544	8.87	2.	7.71	0.62	24.
2015	302	3.98	7.	18.6	1.67	14.
2020	225	5.33	3.	10.3	0.81	18.
2022	295	4.83	5.	15.9	0.95	12.

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.).

Table 2

Trade between Burkina Faso and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	142	26.6	1.	44.1	16.3	2.
2000	154	20.4	2.	48.8	14.2	2.
2005	253	20	1.	72.9	12	3.
2010	315	14.7	2.	19.8	1.12	18.
2015	292	9.71	2.	59.1	1.61	7.
2020	370	9.19	3.	51.1	0.62	9.
2022	384	7.28	4.	35.4	0.43	14.

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.).

Table 3

Trade between Cameroon and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (million USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (million USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	434	34.5	1.	491	24.5	1.
2000	460	27.3	1.	308	13	2.
2005	581	18.4	2.	424	11.2	3.
2010	811	15.4	2.	324	7.07	6.
2015	724	10	3.	311	6.53	4.
2020	589	7.47	3.	174	3.93	7.
2022	656	8.01	2.	1020	14.7	2.

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.).

Table 4

Trade between the Central African Republic and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (million USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (million USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	78.4	38.7	1.	25.9	11.8	2.-3.
2000	45.2	45.6	1.	14.7	5.72	2.
2005	38.3	20.6	1.	35.6	17	2.
2010	62.1	12	2.	18.5	11.8	3.
2015	73.6	12.9	1.	66.5	43.3	1.
2020	65	11.4	2.	8.45	4.98	4.
2022	51	5.82	4.	14.7	6.37	5.

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.).

Table 5

Trade between Chad and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (million USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	79	34.5	1.	10.5	8.87	3.
2000	54.9	44.9	1.	5.15	5.55	3.
2005	93.4	24.6	1.	15.3	0.72	7.
2010	165	12.5	3.	46.2	1.53	5.
2015	142	16.1	1.	44.2	1.88	8.
2020	99.4	8.67	4.	328	20.4	2.
2022	82.3	7.43	3.	419	9.55	5.

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.).

Table 6

Trade between Gabon and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (million USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (million USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	368	48	1.	325	12.5	2.
2000	424	40.6	1.	233	6.66	3.
2005	579	33.7	1.	345	6.39	2.
2010	799	23.7	1.	412	5.29	4.
2015	NA	NA	NA	239	2.03	16.
2020	516	13.7	1.	324	4.05	4.
2022	555	21.1	2.	326	4.14	6.

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.).

Table 7

Trade between Guinea and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	192	20.5	1.	58.3	6.62	8.
2000	132	15.2	2.	98.2	9.84	3.
2005	135	9.31	2.	148	10.7	3.
2010	153	7.53	3.	54	2.81	11.
2015	159	4.15	4.	118	4.44	7.
2020	164	3.46	5.	55.1	0.47	14.
2022	168	2.76	8.	26.3	0.25	13.

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.).

Table 8

Trade between Ivory Coast and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (million USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	941	30.3	1.	777	17.3	1.
2000	788	24.6	1.	647	14.2	1.
2005	1270	22.9	2.	1470	18.5	1.
2010	1140	13.4	2.	848	7.65	3.
2015	1340	11.5	3.	884	6.42	3.
2020	1260	10.8	3.	828	6.01	4.
2022	1440	7.89	3.	940	5.36	5.

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.).

Table 9

Trade between Mali and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (million USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (million USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	171	27.7	1.	7.56	3.27	7.
2000	151	15	2.	14.3	1.99	11.
2005	256	13.6	2.	27.9	2.47	5.
2010	440	12.2	2.	23.9	1.03	14.
2015	359	11	4.	12.1	0.34	11.
2020	401	8.83	4.	7.3	0.14	11.
2022	367	6.04	4.	16.5	0.22	9.

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.).

Table 10

Trade between Mauritania and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	137	26.2	1.	80.7	13.8	3.
2000	183	29.1	1.	100	16.3	2.
2005	228	13.3	2.	127	11.7	3.
2010	296	11	3.	239	8.31	2.
2015	224	4.91	4.	60.7	1.97	11.
2020	270	7.89	2.	52	1.35	13.
2022	273	5.03	6.	81.3	1.66	12.

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.).

Table 11

Trade between Niger and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (million USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (million USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	107.0	25.7	1.	138.0	30.8	2.
2000	68.9	14.9	1.	85.8	16.7	2.
2005	135.0	14.4	1.	167.0	34.8	1.
2010	297.0	14.6	2.	302.0	38.1	1.
2015	586.0	25.2	1.	558.0	38.2	1.
2020	300.0	11.1	2.	43.4	1.57	9.
2022	491.0	14.0	2.	291.0	9.0	2.

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.).

Table 12

Trade between the Republic of the Congo and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (million USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (million USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	256	30	1.	104	6.71	5.-6.
2000	160	22.6	1.	74.1	2.50	5.
2005	326	20.5	1.	175	2.98	6.
2010	583	10.3	2.	772	7.62	5.
2015	739	5.75	6.	121	1.05	16.
2020	306	9.25	3.	60.7	0.78	18.
2022	339	9.02	2.	25.9	0.21	15.

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.).

Table 13

Trade between Senegal and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (million USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (million USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	451	35.7	1.	196	38	1.
2000	504	24	1.	152	16.9	1.
2005	773	19.9	1.	168	11.5	3.
2010	970	15.6	1.	115	5.29	4.
2015	877	10.4	2.	96.4	3.64	8.
2020	991	8.97	2.	94.2	2.31	11.
2022	1110	6.76	3.	92	1.48	15.

Source: *Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.)*

Table 14

Trade between Togo and France, 1995-2022

Year	Import from France			Export to France		
	Value (million USD)	As a % of total import	Rank	Value (million USD)	As a % of total export	Rank
1995	129	15.2	1.	29.2	6.91	4.
2000	126	15.1	1.	10.9	2.82	13.
2005	229	10.5	2.	19.6	2.78	8.
2010	242	6.82	3.	45.2	3.38	11.
2015	635	6.42	4.	31.6	1.29	18.
2020	264	2.6	8.	60.8	2.99	12.
2022	288	1.57	12.	38.3	0.86	23.

Source: *Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.)*

French companies maintaining their dominant position as importers to the markets of Françafrique. Additionally, these companies have established close relationships with the ruling elites of these countries, which has facilitated the acquisition of state contracts and market access.

4. Conclusions

Over six decades after the dissolution of the French colonial empire in Africa, it is evident that France has retained a considerable degree of influence over its former colonies. In the economic sphere, the metropole has maintained its influence through the continued presence of France-based multinational corporations, several of which were originally established as extensions of the French government. These companies frequently held or continue to hold a disproportionately large share in pivotal sectors of the economies of the countries of Françafrique. These sectors include the extraction of natural resources, which are essential to the economies of African countries (such as oil, uranium, and other minerals), as well as the provision of critical services, including transport and logistics, multimedia, and telecommunications. One consequence of this economic penetration is that while specific companies may enter or exit the African market for reasons of

economic rationality or success (e.g., through mergers, acquisitions, or conversely by selling off assets or entire divisions), their presence in the key sectors of the African economies is enduring. This phenomenon can be observed in the merger of Elf into Total, in the transformation of Cogema into Areva and later Orano, or the acquisition of SDV by the Bolloré Group, which has now sold off much of its African operations to CMA CGM. All of these examples pertain to French businesses. As a result, the aforementioned sectors of the African economies remain under the control of prominent French companies, thereby maintaining France's influence through these national champions.

However, the 2020s appear to be a period of significant transformation, with numerous former French colonies demonstrating a rejection of continued influence from their erstwhile colonial metropolis. This phenomenon is most evident in the political and security realms, with a comparatively less pronounced impact in the economic sphere. The data indicates that the significance of France as a trading partner is generally declining across the countries of Françafrique, both in terms of overall ranking and as a percentage of these countries' imports and exports. Nevertheless, this phenomenon is more long-term and not as rapid as the decline in the political and security spheres.

The average French exporter to former colonies still relies on France as a source of imports to a greater extent than as a destination for exports. While these countries have achieved some success in diversifying their export partners, they remain dependent on France for the finished goods and services they require. This phenomenon can be attributed to the observation that the commodities exported by African countries are in general demand among their global trading partners. Nonetheless, their own underdeveloped domestic markets are not as attractive to these partners, especially when these markets are already dominated by French multinationals. Moreover, despite the observed shift away from the former metropole, the position of France in the territorial structure of trade of the Francophone countries of West and Central Africa remains rather volatile. This raises questions

as to whether this truly represents a mark of increasing and lasting economic independence from France.

As the latest wave of coups has occurred too recently for its economic consequences to be reflected in the most recent statistical data, it remains to be seen whether this political change will have an impact on the economic position of France in the affected countries. It is nevertheless evident that France is losing influence in the external trade of the countries formerly under its colonial rule, a process that has been gathering pace in recent years. This trend is likely to continue with the rise of new economic powers interested in penetrating African markets. Even if the economic turn away from France is slower than the political-military one, it could provide the necessary support for the emancipation of the countries of Françafrique.

References:

- Ahounon, S. (2021, September 25). Vivendi, via sa filiale Canal+, est désormais premier actionnaire de MultiChoice, opérateur africain No1 de télévision payante. *Agence Ecofin*. Available at: <https://www.agenceecofin.com/audiovisuel/2509-91835-vivendi-via-sa-filiale-canal-est-desormais-premier-actionnaire-de-multichoice-operateur-africain-no1-de-television-payante>
- Andersson, J. (2014). Being Nuclear [Review of the book *Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade*, by G. Hecht]. *Critique internationale*, 2014/4(65), 201–205. Available at: <https://www.cairn.info/revue-critique-internationale-2014-4-page-201.htm>
- Antil, A. (2020). Le G5 Sahel et le concept de "sécurité-développement". *Recherches Internationales.*, n. 117, 59–74. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3406/rint.2020.1737>
- Bessières, H. (2017, May 16). Pourquoi Orange insiste en Afrique malgré les difficultés. *Journal du Net*. Available at: <https://www.journaldunet.com/ebusiness/telecoms-fai/1194535-orange-insiste-en-afrique-malgre-les-difficultes/>
- Bhuckory, K. (2013, March 13). Bolloré Plans to Expand Container Port Work Across Africa. *Bloomberg*. Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-12/bolloré-plans-to-expand-container-port-operations-across-africa>
- Bolloré to sell African concessions. (2022, February 10). *Railway Gazette International*. Available at: <https://www.railwaygazette.com/business/bolloré-to-sell-african-concessions/60925.article>
- Cessac, M. (2023, July 31). Après le coup d'Etat au Niger, Orano poursuit ses activités d'extraction d'uranium dans le nord du pays. *Le Monde*. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/07/31/apres-le-coup-d-etat-au-niger-orano-active-une-cellule-de-crise-pour-veiller-sur-ses-mines-d-uranium-dans-le-nord-du-pays_6183940_3210.html
- Chena, S. (2020). Un Sahel couleur kaki. Multiplication des acteurs, complexification des enjeux. *Recherches Internationales.*, n. 117, 75–93. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3406/rint.2020.1738>
- De Batscap à Blue Solutions (2013, September 20). *Le Télégramme*. Available at: <https://www.letelegramme.fr/france/de-batscap-a-blue-solutions-1948699.php>
- Delanglade, S. (2019, August 6). La saga africaine de Total. *Les Echos*. Available at: <https://www.lesechos.fr/2014/04/la-saga-africaine-de-total-1101931>
- Deltombe, T. (2009, April). Les guerres africaines de Vincent Bolloré. *Le Monde diplomatique*. Available at: <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2009/04/DELTOMBE/16970>
- Desquesnes, N. & Vidal, A. (2020). L'uranium de la Françafrique. *Z : Revue itinérante d'enquête et de critique sociale*, Vol. 1(13), p. 188–195. Available at: <https://www.cairn.info/revue-z-2020-1-page-188.htm?contenu=article>
- Eben, S. & Dalton, A. (2022). The Geopolitics of French Wars in Africa: What Can Be Done? *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 81(5), p. 957–976. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12497>. Available at: <https://web-1p-1ebscohost-1com-1w0ghstc71563.han5.savba.sk/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=7&sid=e5f40041-94fc-4758-a236-00e8ebaa6325%40redis>
- Etogho, E., Eben, S. & Dalton, A. (2022). French Neocolonialism in Africa: Historical Overview and Summary of Current Events. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 81(5), p. 829–849. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12493>. Available at: <https://web-1p-1ebscohost-1com-1w0ghstc71563.han5.savba.sk/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=8&sid=e5f40041-94fc-4758-a236-00e8ebaa6325%40redis>
- French, H. W. (2024, February 26). The End of Françafrique? *Foreign Policy*. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/26/france-sahel-mali-niger-francafrique-burkina-faso/>

- Gibbs, T. (2024). A French Neo-colonialism? The Controversial Concept of Françafrique. *English Historical Review*, Vol. 139(596), p. 193–214. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cead179>
- King, I. (2022, March 18). True Sovereignty? The CFA Franc and French Influence in West and Central Africa. *Harvard International Review*. Available at: <https://hir.harvard.edu/true-sovereignty-the-cfa-franc-and-french-influence-in-west-and-central-africa/>
- Maad, A. (2023, August 4). A quel point la France est-elle dépendante de l'uranium nigérien? *Le Monde*. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2023/08/03/a-quel-point-la-france-est-elle-dependante-de-l-uranium-nigerien_6184374_4355770.html
- Mohanty, A. (2018, April 19). Uranium in Niger: When a Blessing Becomes a Curse. *Geopolitical Monitor*. Available at: <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/uranium-in-niger-when-a-blessing-becomes-a-curse/>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Benin*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ben>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Burkina Faso*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/bfa>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Cameroon*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/cmr>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Central African Republic*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/caf>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Chad*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/tcd>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Gabon*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/gab>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Guinea*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/gin>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Ivory Coast*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/civ>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Mali*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/mli>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Mauritania*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/mrt>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Niger*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ner>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Republic of the Congo*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/cog>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Senegal*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/sen>
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). *Togo*. Available at: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/tgo>
- Pigeaud, F. (2021a, December). Fin de partie pour Bolloré en Afrique? *Le Monde diplomatique*. Available at: <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2021/12/PIGEAUD/64118>
- Pigeaud, F. (2021b, January). Au Cameroun, Bolloré en disgrâce. *Le Monde diplomatique*. Available at: <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2021/01/PIGEAUD/62633>
- TotalEnergies. (n.d.). *TotalEnergies en Afrique*. Available at: <https://totalenergies.ma/totalenergies-en-afrique>
- Vallée, O. (2000, April). Elf au service de l'Etat français. *Le Monde diplomatique*. Available at: <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2000/04/VALLEE/2234>
- Weir, A. (2021). How Vincent Bolloré won control of Ghana's biggest port. *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 62(7), p. 1–9. Available at: https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/13322/SPECIAL_REPORT_How_Vincent_Bollor%C3%A9_won_control_of_Ghana%E2%80%99s_biggest_port
- World Nuclear Association. (2024a). *World Uranium Mining Production*. Available at: <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production>
- World Nuclear Association. (2024b). *Uranium in Niger*. Available at: <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/niger>

Received on: 07th of October, 2024

Accepted on: 23th of November, 2024

Published on: 30th of December, 2024