THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR: CAUSES, ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS, AND CONSEQUENCES FOR UKRAINE AND THE GLOBALISED WORLD

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Abstract. The purpose of the *study* is to identify the causes, essential features and consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war for Ukraine and the globalised world. The *research methodology* is based on the use of general scientific methods of cognition (induction, deduction, analysis and synthesis), as well as special scientific research methods: conflict theory, neo-institutionalism, hybrid warfare theory, etc. The *scientific novelty* of the study lies in the fact that the authors have carried out a comprehensive analysis of the preconditions, causes and consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war for Ukraine and the globalised world in the context of the growing confrontation between democracies and autocratic regimes. *Conclusions.* Firstly, the Russian-Ukrainian war has become one of the wars that have a significant impact on the globalised world: it has changed the balance of power in the international arena, demonstrated the ineffectiveness of modern security mechanisms, and is characterised by large-scale military losses and migration processes. Secondly, the main geopolitical preconditions for the war are the following: Russia's neo-imperial policy and history of relations with Ukraine, Ukraine's strategic location and European integration aspirations, and Russia's domestic policy of maintaining an authoritarian regime. In addition to the geopolitical ones, the existential preconditions of the war are also important, as Russian leaders see Ukraine's future in its accession to Russia: an ethnic, economic, geopolitical and spiritual renaissance. Thirdly, the ideological doctrine that justifies Russia's foreign expansion is the doctrine of the "Russian world". Fourthly, the Russian-Ukrainian war has large-scale consequences for both Ukraine (political, military, economic, geopolitical, social) and the globalised world (it has shown the need to reformat the international security system, led to the militarisation of the economies of the world's leading states, and intensified the global confrontation between democracies and authoritarian regimes).

Keywords: Ukraine, European Union, Russian-Ukrainian war, "Russian world", international security, geopolitical preconditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war, global consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

JEL Classification: F52, F51

1. Introduction

"Wars have been inherent in all human civilisations and all forms of economic relations that have existed and exist on earth. According to Wesleyan College researchers, since 3600 BC, there have been approximately 14,600 wars in the world, killing more than 3 billion people (for comparison, in 2001 the world's population was just over 6 billion). And all of human history has known only 292 years without war, and there are serious suspicions that some armed conflicts have not been recorded by historians." (Wars in the history of mankind and the current war in Iraq, 2003) By their very nature, wars and military conflicts have different impacts on human development. Some of them are minor (local wars), and some are global (for example, World War II). The latter include the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Therefore, the relevance of studying the causes and consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war is due to: a) the geopolitical significance of this war

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(the war changed the balance of power in the modern world, disrupted established security mechanisms, and showed the impotence of the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in resolving modern military conflicts); b) global consequences (the war caused an energy and food crisis that affected the global economy, in particular the cost of energy and food; political sanctions against Russia are changing the international economic architecture, forcing states to seek new models of co-operation; it contributed to the growth of military budgets and rethinking the security policies of the world's leading countries); c) the devastating impact on Ukraine (large-scale human losses, humanitarian crisis, destruction of infrastructure, economic decline and millions of refugees are the consequences of the war that require scientific analysis and development of recovery strategies); d) raising a number of problems for science (studying the nature of modern hybrid wars, information technology and international law; analysing internal political changes in Ukraine, in particular the impact of the war on democratic processes, public sentiment and the future foreign policy strategy of the state).

Therefore, the study of the Russian-Ukrainian war is necessary not only to understand current events, but also to formulate long-term security strategies, rebuild Ukraine and strengthen international stability. Since "one of the goals of the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war (which Russia wants to achieve) is to create chaos, undermine the values of the democratic world and cultivate a pervasive atmosphere of mistrust and nihilism" (Andriievskyi, 2018, p. 107).

Since the beginning of Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the Russian-Ukrainian war has become a subject of research by a number of domestic experts. The main areas of their research include: 1) periodisation of the Russian-Ukrainian war and its characterisation (Hai-Nyzhnyk, Hrytsiuk, Husarov, Ilnytskyi, Kutska and others); 2) analysis of theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of the essence of war / hybrid warfare (Andriievskyi, 2018), V. Benchyk, O. Buriachenko, V. Horbulin (Horbulin, Badrak, 2024), S. Matviienkiv, I. Popov, K. Rudnikov and others); 3) study of the concept of the "Russian world" (A. Holtsov, S. Zdioruk (Zdioruk et al., 2014), S. Topalova, V. Yablonskyi and others); 4) characterisation of "rashism" as a political regime that unleashed a war against Ukraine (A. Romaniuk, B. Dem'ianenko (Dem'ianenko, 2018), I. Koval, L. Kysliak, M. Trebin and others); 5) research of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the context of contemporary international relations (V. Horbulin, V. Lipkan, D. Trotsko, Yu. Tyshkun and others); 6) study of factors influencing the outbreak of war and its consequences

(V. Holovko, V. Horbulin and V. Badrak (Horbulin, Badrak, 2024), Yu. Kostenko (2015), O. Yas (2023) and others); 7) study of the consequences of the confrontation between democracies and autocracies in the modern world, including in the context of the electoral confrontation between mainstream and right-wing radical parties in the parliamentary elections in the European Union (A. Kliuchkovych and Yu. Ostapets (2024), A. Prykhodko, Yu. Kopynets and others). The authors of the article focus on the geopolitical and existential causes of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as its consequences for Ukraine and the globalised world.

The purpose of the article is to characterise the causes, nature and consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war for Ukraine and the globalised world.

2. Presentation of the Main Material

The geopolitical preconditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war have been shaped over a long period of time and include a number of factors that contributed to the escalation of the conflict. First, there are historical aspects and Russia's neo-imperial policy. Ukraine has long been under the influence of the Russian Empire and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which shaped the specific relations between the countries. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Russia did not accept Ukraine's independence as a fait accompli, but tried to keep it in its sphere of influence.

"In 2011, V. Putin told B. Clinton that he did not agree with the agreements reached by him and B. Yeltsin on Ukraine (the Budapest Memorandum), as he had nothing to do with them." (Horbulin, Badrak, 2024, p. 24) According to the Budapest Memorandum, Russia, the United States and Britain pledged to guarantee Ukraine's territorial integrity in exchange for its disarmament. In this context, it would be worth quoting the historical statement of French President F. Mitterrand about the Budapest Memorandum after its signing on December 5, 1994, addressed to L. Kuchma: "Son, do not believe this document, they will deceive you." (Horbulin, Badrak, 2024, p. 99)

It is worth noting that "according to the memorandum, the transfer of nuclear weapons to Ukraine (the third potential in the world) was supposed to take place by 2001. In reality, everything happened from March 1994 to June 1996." (Kostenko, 2015, p. 411) Such an accelerated movement of Ukraine towards nuclear non-nuclearity according to the Russian scenario was in line with Russia's main goal of weakening Ukraine as much as possible (militarily and economically) and blocking its rapprochement with the European Union (EU) and NATO. Thus, "having 7-8 billion USD in the state budget at that

time, Ukraine transferred to Russia material assets (nuclear materials, nuclear warheads, equipment) worth more than 100 billion USD" (Kostenko, 2015, p. 411). This was the beginning of Russia's total geopolitical, economic and spiritual expansion against Ukraine.

Second, Ukraine's strategic location. Ukraine is an important geopolitical corridor between Europe and Russia, which makes it a key territory for controlling the region and allows it to maintain dominance in the Black Sea region and increase its influence on Europe. In his book "Foundations of geopolitics. Geopolitical future of Russia" (1997), which had a significant impact on the Russian elite, A. Dugin argued that Ukraine should be annexed by the Russian Federation (RF) because "Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical significance, geographical uniqueness and ethnic exclusivity. Its territorial ambitions pose a great danger to the whole of Eurasia, and without solving the problem of the 'Ukrainian question' it is meaningless to talk about continental policy in Russia." (Dugin, 1977, p. 217) A. Dugin's geopolitical doctrine had a huge impact on V. Putin, which ultimately led to the war of 2022. However, the final decision to launch military aggression (according to NATO military intelligence) was made by V. Putin under the influence of A. Bortnikov (Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) and N. Patrushev (Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation).

Third, Ukraine's European integration aspirations. The point is that Ukraine's rejection of Eurasian integration and its course towards the European Union and NATO have provoked a negative reaction from Russia. The events of the Orange Revolution (2004-2005) and the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014) were turning points that demonstrated Ukraine's irreversible movement towards the European Union (EU). The 2014 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was perceived by Moscow as a threat to its influence in the region.

Fourth, the military and political dimension. Russia believes that NATO's expansion to the East, Western military exercises in Ukraine, and its military-technical co-operation with the United States and Europe are a threat to its security. The annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas were the initial stages of Russia's expansion.

Fifth, the energy factor. Ukraine is an important transit country for Russian gas to Europe, making it a key energy hub. Therefore, Ukraine's energy independence and diversification of gas supplies have become another challenge for Moscow.

The existential causes of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In order to comprehend the origins of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it is imperative to address two distinct categories of causation. Firstly, there are the existential/essential/being causes, which are characterised by their elusiveness and lack of overt discourse. Secondly, there are the superficial causes, often termed "casus belli", which were employed to rationalise Russia's invasion of Ukraine to the general populace.

The Kremlin sees Ukraine's accession to Russia as its future: an ethnic (ending the depopulation of Russians), economic (Ukraine's high economic potential), geopolitical (return of global hegemony) and spiritual (Ukraine's sacredness, as Putin himself said that "Kyiv is the mother of Russian cities") renaissance. This creates a narrow field of manoeuvre for both Ukraine and the Moscow regime. The point is that this is an existential war for both Russia and Ukraine: for Russia, it is the return of its former imperial greatness, and for Ukraine, it is the preservation of its Ukrainian identity. Therefore, after a series of failed attempts by the Kremlin to absorb Ukraine in the Belarusian scenario, Russia had no choice but to launch direct aggression, explaining it with trivial (formal) reasons (casus belli): protection of the Russian-speaking population, threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity, etc.

In addition, Putin's political regime uses aggression against Ukraine to consolidate its power and divert the population's attention from internal problems. The war has become a tool for preserving the authoritarian regime and mobilising Russian society around nationalist ideas.

Thus, the geopolitical and existential preconditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war were formed by a complex of historical, political and economic factors. In this aspect, the war is not only a conflict between two states, but also part of the global confrontation between the democratic world and Russian authoritarianism.

The ideological doctrine of the "Russian world" and its significance for justifying the need for the Russian-Ukrainian war. The "Russian world" is characterised as "a global cultural and civilisational phenomenon consisting of Russia as a mother state and the Russian diaspora, uniting people who, regardless of nationality, feel Russian, are carriers of Russian culture and the Russian language, are spiritually connected to Russia and are not indifferent to its affairs and fate" (Zdioruk, et al., 2014, p. 17-18). The concept of the "Russian world" is based on the idea of a special world-historical mission of the Russian state: "Moscow as the Third Rome". This is an eschatological concept according to which Moscow is not only the Third Rome, but also the last Rome. In 2018, at the Valdai Forum, V. Putin, based on this concept, spoke about nuclear war and raised the question of the expediency of the world's existence if Russia is not in it. Therefore, in his opinion, such a world should be destroyed.

The year of 1998 marked the beginning of the emergence of the "Russian world" concept as a basic

formula defining the strategy of Russian policy in the post-Soviet space. The strategy is based on the assertion that there is a common socio-cultural space that should be integrated into the "Russian world". The researchers attribute the granting of the concept of the status of a state policy aimed at structuring the "Russian world" throughout the entire space where 'people think and speak Russian' to Putin's speech at the Congress of Foreign Compatriots in 2001. Since 2010, the "Russian world" has been used as an ideology of the authorities to strengthen their legitimacy and win the political struggle (Zdioruk, et al., 2014, p. 12-14).

The practical implementation of the "Russian world" project became possible due to the establishment of a neo-totalitarian regime in Russia, which was called Rashism (Russian fascism). "Rashism is a political ideology and social practice of the Russian ruling regime of the late XX – early XXI centuries, based on the ideas of a special civilisational mission of Russians, intolerance to elements of the culture of other peoples; on Soviet-style totalitarianism and imperialism, the use of Russian Orthodoxy as a moral doctrine, on geopolitical instruments of influence, primarily energy carriers for European countries, military force, in relation to countries within the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation." (Dem'ianenko, 2018, p. 39)

The main markers of the 'Russian world' doctrine include: 1) the ideological maxim "Russia as the centre of Orthodox civilisation" (the Kremlin positions Russia as the spiritual heir of Kyivan Rus and the "defender of the Orthodox world"; the Moscow Patriarchate plays a key role in spreading the "Russian world" ideology); 2) the Russian language as a unifying factor in this phenomenon (demanding the status of Russian as a "pan-Slavic" and "historical" language for post-Soviet countries, promoting Russian education and culture as a way to preserve Russia's influence in neighbouring states; 3) political neo-imperialism (it is argued that Russia has a "historical right" to interfere in the affairs of former Soviet republics and this is a justification for aggression against Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova); 4) denial of the sovereignty of Ukraine and other post-Soviet states (Ukrainians and Belarusians are considered "part of the Russian people", and Ukraine's independence is perceived as a "geopolitical catastrophe"); 5) the narrative of the "historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians"; 6) anti-Western rhetoric (opposition of the "Russian world" to Western civilisation, the statement that the West is waging a "war" against traditional values and Russia). The main functions of this doctrine are as follows: a) an instrument of hybrid warfare (used to ideologically justify military actions on foreign territories); 7) a means of influencing the diaspora; c) a mechanism for legitimising authoritarianism (the concept justifies the centralisation of power in Russia by creating an image of a "besieged fortress").

Thus, the concept of the "Russian world" is not just a cultural project, but an ideological tool of Russia's aggressive foreign policy. It is the basis for Russia's information, political and military operations against Ukraine and other countries that do not agree with Russian dominance.

The beginning and characteristics of the stages of the Russian-Ukrainian war. It should be noted that the desire to return Ukraine to Russia arose almost the next day after the signing of the agreement on the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The agreement was signed by Ukraine, Belarus and Russia on December 8, 1991 in Belovezhskaya Pushcha (Belarus). According to it, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist.

American political scientist Fukuyama calls the collapse of the USSR the "end of history", which is associated with the final victory of democracy over totalitarianism and fascism. Unfortunately, this did not happen, and the confrontation continues, but in the format between authoritarian states (Russia, China and others) and liberal democracies. Passively waiting for the triumph of liberal democracy has only led to its weakening. And the US terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, put an end to yet another myth that democracies do not need to defend themselves. Russia's war against Ukraine is an example of such a major confrontation that is still ongoing.

Thus, since 1991. Russia and Ukraine, according to the theory of democratic transit, have been "on the road to democracy". The path of the two states was different: Russia returned to a neo-totalitarian regime, which is now called Rashism or Putinism, while in Ukraine scholars note the existence of a hybrid political regime, which is no longer authoritarianism, but it is not a regime of consolidated democracy either (Zelenko, 2022, pp. 105–108).

During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, there was a perception of a certain degree of loyalty towards Ukraine. However, with the ascension of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency on 31 December 1999, there was a marked shift in the geopolitical landscape. Russia's policy towards Ukraine is changing and is manifested in: a) efforts to increase energy dependence; b) Russian oligarchs buying up Ukrainian enterprises, land, and banks; c) the creation of an agent network in the government; d) financing the "fifth column"; and e) the destruction of the armed forces and military potential.

For the first time, an open conflict between Russia and Ukraine occurred as a result of the Revolution of Dignity. The Revolution of Dignity was a political and social change in Ukraine from 30 November 2013 to February 2014, caused by the protest of Ukrainian citizens against the unlawful dispersal of a peaceful action of students and civil society activists that began on November 21, 2013, as a resistance against the

country's political leadership's departure from the legally enshrined course towards European integration.

Taking advantage of the situation in Kyiv, Russia launched a military invasion of Ukraine on February 20, 2014, with the aim of annexing and occupying the Crimean peninsula. After the occupation of Crimea, Russia launched a war in eastern Ukraine.

In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Donbas, Putin delivered his next Valdai speech in which he criticised the unipolar world created by the United States and stated that Russia was returning to big politics, turning it into one of the poles of world politics (he expressed the same ideas about Russia's place in the world on October 10, 2007, at the Munich Security Conference). These two speeches indicate Moscow's return to geopolitics in its usual aggressive imperial format after the collapse of the USSR. Experts called Putin's Munich speech the beginning of a "new Cold War".

The full-scale military campaign began after a prolonged build-up of Russian troops since November 2021 along Ukraine's border with the Russian Federation and Belarus and the recognition by Russian authorities on February 21, 2022 of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) as independent state entities. Recognising these entities as states, V. Putin stressed that the Minsk Agreements are no longer valid, as Ukraine does not recognise them. On the eve of the invasion, more than 180 battalion tactical groups of the Russian Federation were concentrated along the Ukrainian-Russian border.

On February 24, at around 4 a.m. Kyiv time, Putin announced the start of a special military operation in Ukraine. The goals of the special operation were as follows: 1) denazification of Ukraine; 2) demilitarisation of Ukraine; 3) protection of people from the genocide of the Kyiv regime; 4) preemptive defence of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation against attack by Ukraine. In addition to these, there are latent goals of this war, which are described in their "scenarios" by Kremlin political technologists from the Federal Security Service and the Presidential Administration. For instance, the following proposal outlines a strategy for the complete destruction of Ukraine: "The elimination of armed Nazi formations (which means any armed formations of Ukraine, including the Armed Forces of Ukraine), as well as everything that ensures their activity: military, information, and educational infrastructure; the formation of people's self-government bodies and police in the liberated territories to protect the population from the terror of underground Nazi groups; the installation of the Russian information space; the seizure of educational materials and the prohibition of educational programmes at all levels containing Nazi ideological attitudes; massive

investigative actions to establish personal responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, the spread of Nazi ideology and support for the Nazi regime; lustration, disclosure of the names of the Nazi regime's collaborators, their involvement in forced labour to restore the destroyed infrastructure as punishment for Nazi activities (among those who will not be subject to execution or imprisonment); adoption of primary regulations on denazification from the bottom up at the local level under the supervision of Russia, prohibition of all types and forms of revival of Nazi ideology; installation of memorials, memorial signs, monuments to the victims of Ukrainian Nazism, perpetuation of the memory of the heroes of the struggle against it; inclusion of a set of anti-fascist and denazification norms in the constitution of the new people's republics; creation of permanent denazification bodies for a period of 25 years; deportation of millions of Ukrainians to build new cities in western Siberia" (Timofeitsev, 2022).

When giving the order to occupy Ukraine, V. Putin was guided by the following motives: 1) the weakness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) compared to the Russian army; 2) the lack of unity of the collective West in the issue of military assistance to Ukraine; 3) the presence of a large "fifth column" in Ukraine, on the recruitment of which, according to unofficial data, the Kremlin spent 5 billion USD; 4) the positive perception of the war against Ukraine in Russian society (over 70 % of citizens).

The Russian-Ukrainian war has several key stages, each characterised by specific forms of warfare, changes in tactics and strategy, and impact on international security.

1. Preparatory stage (1991-2013). Characteristics: after the collapse of the USSR, Russia did not recognise Ukraine as a fully independent subject of international relations; formation of Ukraine's dependence on Russia in the fields of energy, security, economy and politics; information expansion: promotion of the "Russian world" ideology, manipulation of language, religion and history; 2003 – Russia's attempt to seize the island of Tuzla as a test of Ukraine's reaction; 2010-2013 – strengthening of Russian influence through pro-Russian forces in Ukrainian politics.

2. The annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in Donbas (February 2014 – February 2015). Characteristics: February 2014 – use of "hybrid warfare": deployment of unmarked Russian troops ("little green men"), blocking of Ukrainian military units in Crimea; March 2014 – illegal referendum and annexation of Crimea; April 2014 – outbreak of hostilities in Donbas: Russia's support for separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, creation of self-proclaimed "Donetsk People's Republic" and "Luhansk People's Republic"; August 2014 – direct invasion of Russian

troops (Ilovaisk); February 2015 – signing of the Minsk agreements after the battle for Debaltseve.

3. Relative stabilisation period (2015-2021). Characteristics: the war moved into the phase of a positional conflict, without major offensive operations; Russia provided constant support to militants, arms and financing; use of information warfare, cyberattacks, economic pressure on Ukraine; Russia's preparations for a full-scale invasion: military buildup, deployment of exercises on the borders.

4. Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine (starting from February 24, 2022). Characteristics: February 24, 2022 - the beginning of the war: massive missile attacks, invasion of troops from different directions (North, South, East), battles for Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Kherson, Mariupol; April 2022 – retreat of Russian troops from Northern Ukraine after the failure of the blitzkrieg; autumn 2022 – counter-offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, liberation of Kharkiv and Kherson; winter-spring 2023 – the Battle of Bakhmut, change in the tactics of the war of attrition; summer 2023-2025 – war in the positional phase, intensification of drone strikes, attacks on Russian military facilities and oil refineries.

The consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war for Ukraine. The Russian-Ukrainian war has had significant ramifications for Ukraine in all spheres of life, ranging from political transformation to socio-economic challenges and changes in international politics. The political consequences include the following: consolidation of the nation (the war accelerated the formation of the Ukrainian political nation, increased support for sovereignty and independence); strengthening of state institutions (enhanced role of the Armed Forces, the Security Service of Ukraine and other security agencies); Delegitimisation of pro-Russian forces (suspension of pro-Russian parties, closure of Russian propaganda media, exposure of Russian special agents, etc.); Euro-Atlantic vector of Ukraine's development.

The military consequences are as follows: the formation of a modern army (Ukraine gained unique combat experience, the army was modernised with Western weapons; changes in military doctrine (transition to a strategy of defensive deterrence and technological warfare); strengthening of the defence industry (development of weapons and ammunition production).

The economic consequences include the following: destruction of infrastructure (destruction of industrial facilities, roads, residential buildings (losses are estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars); a drop in gross domestic product (in 2022, the economy shrank by more than 30%); large-scale labour migration; economic adaptation and transition to a military-style economy, development of the IT sector, agricultural exports and Western investment.

It should be noted that the social consequences are extremely complex: a humanitarian crisis (more than 6 million refugees, millions of internally displaced persons); demographic changes (rapid population decline, declining birth rates, an ageing nation, increased emigration, and a growing number of people with disabilities); and psychological consequences (post-traumatic stress disorder in the military and civilian population). It is worth noting that "as of January 1, 2024, the Institute of Demography estimated the population of Ukraine at more than 35 million. Since the beginning of the Great War, the population of Ukraine has decreased by 10 million people, or by about a quarter. In general, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates the number of Ukrainian refugees at 6.7 million, meaning that more than 4 million of our citizens live in the EU. According to various surveys, between 25-50% of the population plans to stay abroad. That means that only about 3 million people will return to Ukraine." (Khmelnytska, 2024)

The geopolitical consequences include: international support (Ukraine received unprecedented military, financial and humanitarian assistance from Western countries: as of 12.02.2025, 26 meetings in the Ramstein format were held to coordinate military assistance to Ukraine); isolation of Russia (sanctions against Russia: as of 24.02.2025, the EU approved the 16th package of sanctions against Russia); reduction of Russia's influence on the world stage; strengthening of Ukraine's position in the international arena (Kyiv has become a key player in European security).

The main directions of the Russian-Ukrainian war's impact on the globalised world. The Russian-Ukrainian war has become a key factor in changes in global politics, economics and security. It has affected international relations, accelerated the reformatting of geopolitical alliances and changed the strategic goals of the leading powers. As Horbulin V. and Badrak V. note, "the results of this war in 2023 will have affected the fate of the entire planet. The global problem is whether the world will be able to start building a new structure of international security during this war. Because in 2022, Putin's Moscow destroyed not only the existing global security system, but also upset the nuclear balance of power." (Horbulin, Badrak, 2024, p. 101)

Therefore, first of all, it should be noted that the international security system needs to be reformatted, as the UN, OSCE, and NATO have failed to respond effectively to the Russian Federation's aggression. The Russian-Ukrainian war has shown that 'in the modern world, there are no guaranteed and effective mechanisms for "forcing peace" when one of the parties is categorically unwilling to agree to end the war' (Yenin, et al., p. 12). Experience has shown that NATO can intervene in a military conflict and positively help resolve it, but only in the case of a local conflict

between weak parties (e.g., in Yugoslavia). And if the conflict involves great powers (India, the Kashmir conflict), or if one of the parties is a nuclear power, NATO becomes a passive observer. This was the case with Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, and this is the case with Russia's war against Ukraine in 2022.

"For European countries and European institutions, Razumkov Centre experts note, Russian aggression has turned out to be a 'perfect storm', thanks to which the European community, while providing enormous assistance to Ukraine, has realised the need for updates in the global and European security systems, international division of labour, global energy supplies and value chains for a peaceful future for humanity." (Yurchyshyn, et al., p. 6)

It should also be noted that one of the results of the Russian-Ukrainian war was the expansion of NATO, as the war forced Sweden (2024) and Finland (2023) to join the organisation and a change in the military strategies of NATO member states (reorientation of armies to the possibility of a large-scale conflict with Russia).

The impact of this war on the global economy and energy markets remains significant. This includes Europe's refusal to buy Russian energy and the search for alternative energy sources, food security (the blocking of Ukrainian ports and the destruction of agricultural facilities caused a food crisis in the countries of the global South), and the redistribution of investments.

The war continued the transformation of the information space (the importance of digital technologies in warfare and mobilisation of public opinion; intensification of hacker attacks and development of digital warfare methods), has a global impact on legal norms (reform of international law), and has set a precedent for other states (Taiwan, the Middle East, the Balkan countries).

Thus, the modern international security system is in the process of transformation. The Russian-Ukrainian war has accelerated the strengthening of NATO, the search for alternative security mechanisms for Europe, the development of cyber defence and energy independence. The future of international security will depend on the ability of democratic countries to respond to new threats and create effective mechanisms to deter authoritarian regimes.

The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war *on the intensification of confrontation between democracies and authoritarian regimes* is unprecedented. The war exacerbated the confrontation between democratic countries (the United States, the European Union, and others) and autocracies (Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea); it led to a significant rapprochement between Russia and China, and contributed to the militarisation of the world (increased military budgets of the United States, Germany, Poland,

Japan, South Korea, etc.). The outcome of this war will have a significant impact on the course of this competition. Huriiev S. and Treisman D. in their book "Spin-dictators. How the face of tyranny is changing in the 21st century" note that "in 2019, the number of democracies decreased to 87, while the number of dictatorships increased to 92 (at the beginning of the 21st century, there were 98 democracies and 80 autocracies)" (Huriiev, Treisman, 2023, p. 9). This process is ongoing, as evidenced by the emergence of a number of liberal democracies in Central Europe (Slovakia, Hungary). It will be even more accelerated if Russia wins (even partially) this war. This will once again demonstrate the inability of democracies to defend themselves, and, conversely, will show the possibility of success for autocratic regimes (Russia and China). This confrontation also states a return to the "bipolar world" (Yurchyshyn, et al., p. 6).

Another area of escalation of this confrontation is the struggle in the EU elections between mainstream and populist right-wing radical parties that advocate lifting sanctions against Russia, ending military aid to Ukraine and establishing good neighbourly relations with Russia. As of 31.12.2024, in 23 European countries, right-wing radical parties (31 parties) have their own factions in national parliaments and participate in the activities of governments, which allows for important institutional changes in the European party landscape.

"Compared to the 2019 European Parliament elections," Ostapets Yu. and Kliuchkovych A. note, that "the number of MEPs belonging to right-wing radical factions increased by 69 representatives in the 2024 elections. The structure of the European Parliament in terms of parliamentary factions has also changed. First, the eponymous faction of the European right-wing radical party Identity and Democracy ceased to exist. Second, two new factions of right-wing radical political forces were formed: Patriots for Europe and Europe of Sovereign Nations." (Ostapets, Kliuchkovych, 2024, p. 144) The main reasons for the popularity of right-wing radical parties in the European Union include the following: 1) the economic crisis / "great recession" (2008-2009); 2) migration processes / migration crisis of 2015-2019; 3) growing distrust of "mainstream" parties; 4) Euroscepticism; 5) the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Possibilities of ending the Russian-Ukrainian war and signing a peace treaty. Based on the study of a number of modern conflicts, three types of conflict outcomes can be identified: "victory of one of the parties (in this case, the winner establishes its own rules and realises most of its goals), compromise (both parties to the conflict achieve partial fulfilment of their goals), and 'freezing' of the conflict (partial settlement)" (Yenin, et al., p. 6). Meanwhile, a conflict can be considered resolved when "armed confrontation has ceased, there

is no peacekeeping contingent, and a full settlement has taken place in accordance with international law" (Yenin, et al., p. 7).

In the case of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it is the unwillingness of one of the parties to end the war (Russia), as it claims four Ukrainian oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia) and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which was annexed in 2014. Thus, without "coercion to peace" (meaning Russia), the Russian-Ukrainian war in its various variants (hot phase, frozen conflict) may continue until both sides are exhausted. It is unwise to entertain the hope that the international community will establish peace and develop a workable peace treaty. It is evident from an examination of global precedent that the attainment of peace is contingent upon the consensus of both parties involved, in addition to the exertion of collective pressure on the aggressor.

3. Conclusions

1. The Russian-Ukrainian war has become one of the wars that have a significant impact on the globalised world: it has changed the balance of power in the international arena, demonstrated the ineffectiveness of modern security mechanisms, and is characterised by large-scale military losses and migration of the Ukrainian population.

2. The geopolitical prerequisites for the Russian-Ukrainian war are as follows: Russia's neo-imperial policy and history of relations with Ukraine, Ukraine's strategic location and European integration aspirations, and Russia's domestic policy to preserve Putin's authoritarian regime. In addition to the geopolitical ones, the existential preconditions of the war are also important, as Russian leaders see Ukraine's future in its accession to Russia: ethnic, economic, geopolitical and spiritual renaissance.

3. The ideological doctrine that justifies Russia's external expansion is the doctrine of the "Russian world". The main characteristics of the "Russian world" include: 1) the ideological maxim "Russia as the centre of Orthodox civilisation"; 2) the Russian language as a unifying factor of the "Russian world"; 3) political neo-imperialism; 4) denial of the sovereignty of Ukraine and other post-Soviet states; 5) anti-Western rhetoric.

4. The Russian-Ukrainian war has large-scale consequences for Ukraine in all spheres of life: from political transformation to socio-economic challenges and changes in international politics (political, military, economic, geopolitical and social consequences). Thus, the Russian-Ukrainian war has significantly transformed Ukraine, making it stronger militarily and politically. However, rebuilding the country and socio-economic recovery will require significant resources and time.

5. The Russian-Ukrainian war has become a key factor in changes in global politics, economics and security. It has affected international relations, accelerated the reformatting of geopolitical alliances and changed the strategic approaches of the leading powers. First of all, it should be noted that the international security system needs to be reformatted, as the UN, OSCE, and NATO have failed to respond effectively to the Russian Federation's aggression. The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the growing confrontation between democracies and authoritarian regimes is unprecedented. The war has exacerbated the confrontation between democracies (the United States, the European Union) and autocracies (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea). Another area of such aggravation is the struggle in the parliamentary and local elections in the European Union between mainstream and populist right-wing radical parties that advocate lifting sanctions against Russia, ending military aid to Ukraine and establishing good neighbourly relations with Russia. This means that such a confrontation will continue and the future development of humanity will depend on its results.

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