

BICAMERALISM AS A TOOL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN UKRAINE

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Abstract. The development of parliamentarism in Ukraine is particularly important for restoring the constitutional balance of power between the different branches of government and returning leadership of the main areas of state building to the Supreme Council of Ukraine. These areas include responding to the challenges of the Russian-Ukrainian war, performing the functions of law-making and forming the government, and developing public policy, modernisation and economic growth. In the context of the de facto restoration of the super-presidential model, which was precipitated by Russia's full-scale invasion, the search for an optimal model of parliamentary system is becoming increasingly relevant. The objective of the present study is to ascertain the potential directions for the transformation of parliamentarism in Ukraine. The notion of bicameralism is posited as a means of augmenting the role of parliament. The research aims to determine the following indicators based on an expert survey: 1) the level of support for bicameralism among experts; 2) the assessment of key parameters of the institutional model of the upper chamber; 3) restrictions on political parties' participation in forming the upper chamber; 4) requirements for members of the upper chamber to be politically neutral; 5) the potential economic impact of bicameralism (in terms of ensuring budgetary balance between the centre and communities). In January-February 2026, the authors conducted a research study entitled "Bicameralism as a tool for political stabilisation and representation in Ukraine". The research was overseen by an expert panel comprising over fifty specialists, including representatives from the fields of political science and constitutional law, as well as deputies of city and regional councils, volunteers from public organisations, and veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war. It is evident that the activities of parliament require appropriate transformations. The institutional reconstruction of the interaction between parliament and the president will determine the prospects for the economy and politics of the post-war country. The findings of the research, when considered as a whole, demonstrate an almost equal distribution of experts in their attitude to the prospects of involving a bicameral parliament: the data indicates that 51.7% of respondents expressed support for this proposition, while 48.3% did not express support. Experts have noted the relevance of bicameralism for contemporary Ukrainian policy, and the need for a reasoned public debate and proper regulatory and legal justification for potential reform. The majority of experts (72.4%) advocate for the delineation of the upper chamber's role in economic policy, emphasising the enhancement of budgetary policy and the assurance of a more equitable distribution of financial resources between the central government and local communities. The issue of the nomination process for candidates to the upper chamber proved controversial. It is evident that there is a discernible demand for the upper chamber of parliament to be depoliticised. The majority of experts (58.6%) advocate for substantial limitations or complete elimination of political parties from the process of establishing the upper chamber. Furthermore, these experts express support for the implementation of the principle of political neutrality for members of the upper chamber throughout their term of office.

Keywords: parliamentarism, political institutions, economic development, democracy, bicameralism, legitimacy, political parties, political representation, budgetary process, decentralisation, economic recovery.

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1. Introduction

The issue of transforming the parliamentary model in Ukraine is of particular relevance in the context of (post-)war conditions and post-war institutional reconstruction of the state. It is evident that the deepening of decentralisation processes (regarded as a successful reform) and the prospects for implementing the requirements of the Electoral Code with regard to a proportional electoral model (party representation) necessitate a restoration of the balance between party representation and community interests.

In this extensive political context, the discourse on the merits of incorporating bicameralism transcends the realms of constitutional theory, thereby acquiring a strategic significance for the delineation of the future configuration of public authority, political modernisation, and economic modernisation. In the discipline of political science, a bicameral parliamentary structure is conventionally regarded as a means of reinforcing the system of checks and balances, ensuring the representation of diverse interests, and enhancing the efficacy of the legislative process.

Conversely, the efficacy of bicameralism is contingent upon the particular institutional design, encompassing the method of forming the upper chamber, the extent of its powers, and the nature of its interaction with the lower chamber, as well as the degree of political autonomy. In order to ascertain certain aspects of the formation of a bicameral parliament in Ukraine, the authors conducted an expert research study entitled "Bicameralism as an instrument of political stabilisation and representation in Ukraine".

2. Literature Review

In the domain of foreign political science, the study of bicameralism is a well-established mainstream area of research. In addition, as John Uhr correctly observes, there is no uniform model of bicameralism and no single theory that can provide a comprehensive explanation for it. The scholar posits that contemporary bicameral systems amalgamate "heritage" and "innovation", thereby engendering distinctive legislative mechanisms of political representation (Uhr, 2009).

In their seminal work, Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson meticulously delineate the incentives for the delegation of decision-making powers between legislative chambers. They adroitly elucidate how presidential veto power and bicameralism can incentivise the legislative chamber to establish internal veto players or supermajority rules (Diermeier & Myerson, 1999). Sean Mueller's work (2024) provides a comprehensive analysis of the nature, form and impact of bicameral political systems.

John Coakley examines how 28 countries (all but one of which are unitary states) transitioned to a bicameral system. The author observes this tendency, initially within the framework of the historical progression of upper chambers and the proponents of bicameralism, and subsequently in relation to the distinguishing characteristics that differentiate contemporary second chambers from first chambers. The "census" of upper chambers is utilised to furnish data on second chambers in federal and unitary states, thereby facilitating comparison with antecedent data and distinguishing between "new" and long-established second chambers. The study's findings indicate that the emergence of second chambers is predominantly observed in political systems where liberal democratic principles are not firmly established. This observation suggests that the ongoing discourse surrounding the role of second chambers in democratic states is likely to persist (Coakley, 2014).

As posited by William B. Heller, the presence of second chambers is conducive to the representation of groups or interests that might otherwise be marginalised or overlooked. This is achieved not only by increasing the number of legislative seats for legislators elected from different constituencies and possibly under different rules, but more importantly, by giving more legislators a voice in the legislative process (Heller, 2007).

Michael Cutrone and Nolan McCarty meticulously identify and analyse a plethora of arguments in favour of a bicameral system. In order to provide substantiation for these arguments, the researchers employed a spatial model, multilateral bargaining theory and incomplete information games. The present study seeks to differentiate the impact of a bicameral system from the effects of concomitant institutional characteristics, including, but not limited to, divergent terms of office and supermajority requirements (Cutrone & McCarty, 2009).

Testa (2010) persuasively contends that a bicameral system enhances the accountability of legislators to voters when one party controls both chambers and party polarisation is high, while the converse is true when different parties control both chambers.

The research by Mariana Llanos and Detlef Nolte merits particular attention, as they have developed a scoring system that can be used to assess the strength of America's bicameral systems. The following twelve cases are considered: nine current bicameral legislatures, two unicameral cases that emerged in the 1990s and finally, the United States, which serves as a benchmark and is the model on which the constitutions of Latin American countries are based (Llanos & Nolte, 2003).

Paolo Passaglia conducts an analysis of the structures of European parliaments, positing that a wide range

of options has developed over the centuries. However, many of these models (including four-chamber, three-chamber and qualified single-chamber parliaments) have not survived, despite their sometimes-extraordinary historical value. The researcher determines that bicameralism is generally used in more populous countries and/or states with strong territorial autonomy. Indeed, among the various forms of bicameralism, the most prevalent is that typified by a "territorial" second chamber (Passaglia, 2018).

Olha Naumenko's research, titled "The Consequences of the Transformation of the Electoral System Regarding Recruitment to the Political-Power Elites of Ukraine", supports this position, proposing several key changes to the electoral system, including the elevation of the electoral threshold, the introduction of ideological-based electoral politics, and the restructuring of the Ukrainian parliament into a bicameral institution. This would contribute to increasing the structure of parliament and normalising the paths to entering the political elite in Ukraine (Naumenko, 2022).

Research conducted by Ukrainian authors has identified a decline in the level of interest among IDPs and volunteers in traditional political parties, while noting their growing participation in civic initiatives (Yakovlev, Trushevych & Diachenko, 2025). Volunteers and internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been shown to act as catalysts for civic mobilisation and economic stability within communities (Yakovlev, Trushevych & Diachenko, 2025). This is achieved through self-organisation and backstage leadership. This could serve as the basis for transforming the system of political representation and incorporating bicameralism in Ukraine.

3. Method

The research was conducted in January and February of 2026. The event saw the participation of over fifty experts, including representatives of political science, constitutionalists, deputies of city and regional councils, civil society activists, and veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Consequently, it was feasible to guarantee multidimensional representation of professional groups, academics and practitioners who possess direct experience of involvement in the legislative process, public policy and civic activity, thereby enhancing the analytical value of the data obtained.

The expert research was conducted individually with each respondent, which minimised the risk of group influence characteristic of collective discussions. This approach facilitates a more objective reflection of the experts' own assessments and judgements regarding the feasibility of incorporating a bicameral parliamentary system and its parameters.

The experts were asked to respond to five closed questions:

1. Do you consider it expedient to introduce a bicameral parliament in Ukraine?

2. How do you assess the proposal to restrict the right to nominate candidates to the upper chamber exclusively to the following entities: community councils and local self-government bodies; associations of cities and territorial communities; veterans' and volunteer organisations; and organisations representing internally displaced persons?

3. In your opinion, is a complete prohibition on political parties participating in the nomination of candidates to the upper chamber justified, provided that party representation remains in the lower chamber of parliament?

4. Do you support the requirement that members of the upper chamber maintain complete political neutrality during their term of office (including a prohibition on party membership, party financing, and participation in election campaigning)?

5. Could bicameralism contribute to a more efficient and transparent distribution of budgetary resources between the central government and territorial communities?

4. The Advisability of Involving a Bicameral Parliament in Ukraine

Respondents answered the question "Do you consider it expedient to introduce a bicameral parliament in Ukraine?" as follows: "yes" – 34.5%; "rather yes" – 17.2%; "rather no" – 34.5%; and "no" – 13.8%. A consolidated analysis of the responses indicates that the combined share of positive attitudes towards the idea of bicameralism amounts to 51.7% (34.5% + 17.2%), whereas 48.3% (34.5% + 13.8%) of respondents express varying degrees of sceptical or negative attitudes. This distribution suggests the presence of a narrow relative majority in favour of introducing a bicameral model; however, the margin is minimal and does not amount to a clear or stable public consensus.

The above ratio of results suggests that there is ambivalence in the expert and public perception of the institutional transformation of parliament. Indeed, the prevailing sentiment appears to be one of almost symmetrical division of opinion, suggesting a robust and multifaceted discourse surrounding the issue. Concurrently, it is imperative to examine the structure of negative responses, wherein a mere 13.8% of respondents selected the categorical option "no", while a significantly larger proportion (34.5%) opted for the formulation "rather no". This configuration of responses indicates not so much a fundamental rejection of bicameralism as doubts about its appropriateness in the specific Ukrainian context.

In summary, the critical position may be considered conditional rather than radical. This may be attributable to a number of factors, including a lack of awareness regarding the functional intricacies of bicameral parliaments, concerns about the potential to impede the legislative process, the possibility of increased budgetary expenditures, or the risk of duplication of powers. Consequently, the scepticism expressed by a considerable proportion of respondents is not inherently directed towards the concept of institutional separation of parliament, but rather reflects a degree of uncertainty regarding its practical efficacy.

Concurrently, the fact that 34.5% of respondents unequivocally support the incorporation of a bicameral system, and an additional 17.2% are inclined to support it, indicates a clear demand for new mechanisms to enhance the parliamentary system. In the context of bicameralism theory, this can be interpreted as a desire to strengthen the system of checks and balances, institutional balance and representation of territorial or social interests. This is especially the case in the context of martial law and post-conflict transformation of the state, where the issue of the stabilising role of parliament is becoming increasingly relevant.

From a theoretical perspective, bicameralism is traditionally regarded as a mechanism for preventing excessive concentration of power in a single representative body. It is also considered to improve the quality of the legislative process through a mechanism of reconsideration and to ensure broader or differentiated representation (territorial, professional, social). Nevertheless, the efficacy of this model is contingent upon the methodology employed in the formation of the upper chamber, the extent of its powers, and the clarity of the division of powers between the chambers. It is reasonable to hypothesise that these aspects will give rise to respondents' latent reservations.

Consequently, the data obtained permit the following conclusions to be drawn. Firstly, the concept of a bicameral parliament is not marginal among experts in the field. The notion of incorporating bicameralism is endorsed by a significant proportion of the experts involved in this research. Secondly, the level of support for bicameralism is insufficient to interpret it unequivocally as a social consensus, which requires further scientific and public discussion. Thirdly, the nature of the distribution of experts' responses indicates the need for a proper conceptual justification of the bicameral model, its functional logic and expected benefits.

It is evident that the findings of empirical research directly reflect the current state of the concept of bicameralism. While it is already recognised as a valid option for institutional development, it has not yet attained the status of an indisputable social

necessity. The quality of further argumentation, the concretisation of institutional design and the demonstration of its applied effectiveness will determine the prospects for its support in Ukrainian political and scientific discourse.

5. Restricting the Right of Non-Partisan Entities to Nominate Candidates to the Upper Chamber

Respondents were asked to rate the idea of restricting the right to nominate candidates to the upper chamber of parliament to entities such as community councils, local self-government bodies, associations of cities and communities, veteran and volunteer organisations, and organisations of internally displaced persons. They were asked to rate their level of support for the initiative on a five-point scale, where 1 meant no support and 5 meant full support. The results were distributed as follows: 1 – 34.5%; 2 – 10.3%; 3 – 24.1%; 4 – 6.9%; 5 – 24.2%.

The responses can be categorised into three conditional groups. A negative attitude (ratings 1 and 2) was demonstrated by 44.8% of respondents. A positive attitude (ratings 4 and 5) was recorded in 31.1% of respondents. A neutral or ambivalent position (rating 3) was selected by 24.1% of respondents. Consequently, a critical or restrained perception of the proposed model for forming the upper chamber prevails. It is noteworthy that the largest proportion of responses expressed extreme negative sentiment, with 34.5% of respondents selecting option 1. This finding suggests not only a degree of scepticism, but also a fundamental rejection of the model, which entails an institutional narrowing of the circle of nominating entities. This reaction can be interpreted as concern about the potential monopolisation of the process of forming the upper chamber by individual corporate or quasi-social structures. In principle, such a model is analogous to elements of functional or corporate representation, which is historically associated with alternative forms of political organisation that differ from classical party-competitive parliamentarism.

Concurrently, the proportion of respondents who expressed complete endorsement of this concept (24.2%) approximates one-quarter of the sample. This finding suggests the existence of a demand for the institutional reinforcement of the role of local communities and organised civil society. In this particular context, the formation of an upper chamber can be considered as a body that represents not party interests, but local communities, veterans, the volunteer sector and internally displaced persons. These groups have gained particular social significance in the context of war and post-war transformation.

A substantial proportion of neutral responses (24.1%) also possess analytical significance. This may

be indicative of uncertainty regarding the optimal balance between party and non-party representation, or a lack of clarity concerning the mechanism for the practical implementation of the proposed model. It can be hypothesised that the principle of community and socially significant organisation participation is appealing to some respondents. However, the exclusion of other nominating entities (particularly political parties or individual self-nomination) may raise concerns regarding the risk of narrowing democratic competition.

In a broader theoretical context, the results demonstrate tension between two models of representation: party-political and functional-territorial. The first of these is predicated on the notion of competition between political programmes and party platforms, while the second is based on the institutional consolidation of representation for specific social or territorial groups. The preponderance of critical appraisals may signify that for a considerable proportion of respondents, the democratic legitimacy of parliament is predominantly associated with open political competition, as opposed to the delegation of representatives through structured civil society frameworks.

This finding underscores the absence of a prevailing public consensus surrounding the notion of a restricted candidate pool for the upper chamber. The preponderance of negative appraisals signifies apprehensions regarding the institution's potential to become insular or to be influenced by corporate interests. Concurrently, the presence of approximately one-third of participants signifies the pertinence of the discourse surrounding alternative mechanisms for establishing the upper chamber, with the objective of fortifying the role of local communities and socially engaged groups. Further conceptual development of this model should take into account the need to ensure a balance between inclusiveness, democratic competition and functional specialisation of the upper chamber of parliament.

6. Complete Ban on Political Parties Participating in Nominations to the Upper Chamber

When asked whether a complete prohibition on political parties participating in the nomination of candidates to the upper chamber of parliament would be justified (while maintaining party representation in the lower chamber), respondents answered as follows: "yes" – 27.6%; "rather yes" – 31%; "rather no" – 31%; and "no" – 10.3%. The combined level of support for the depoliticisation of the upper chamber therefore amounts to 58.6%, whereas 41.3% of respondents express varying degrees of opposition. Consequently, the prevailing sentiment is one of

support for the notion of institutional separation of party influence between the chambers of parliament. However, this advantage is not without contention, as a considerable proportion of respondents express a degree of scepticism.

The structure of the responses is indicative of a number of factors. The proportion of respondents selecting the category of "categorical support" (27.6%) is noteworthy, though not predominant. Concurrently, the majority of respondents are concentrated in the intermediate categories of 'rather yes' (31%) and 'rather no' (31%). This finding suggests that the assessment is of an ambivalent nature, and that there is a high level of debate surrounding the issue. It is evident that respondents are cognisant of the potential benefits of a depoliticised upper chamber model; however, they are also mindful of the potential drawbacks of constraining political competition.

From a theoretical standpoint, the prohibition of participation in the formation of the upper chamber can be regarded as an endeavour to differentiate the chambers' functions institutionally. In accordance with the principles of classical bicameralism, the upper chamber is frequently regarded as a body that exercises restraint, review and stabilisation, whilst the lower chamber is considered to reflect dynamic political competition and party representation. Therefore, the de-politicization of the upper chamber can be regarded as a mechanism for reducing confrontation, enhancing professionalism, social equality and ensuring a more balanced legislative process.

The preponderance of affirmative responses (58.6%) may also signify a crisis of confidence in the party system or a weariness with the excessive politicisation of institutions. In this particular context, the notion of imposing limitations on party participation can be seen as a reflection of a segment of society's aspiration to establish an institution that would operate on the tenets of non-partisanship, professionalism and stability. Concurrently, a substantial proportion of sceptics (41.3%), of whom 31% selected the option "rather no" and 10.3% chose "no", demonstrate the existence of well-founded fears. This is primarily concerned with the risk of reducing the democratic legitimacy of the upper chamber if parties are removed as key actors in political mobilisation and representation. It is customary for political parties to serve the role of aggregating interests and establishing programmatic positions. Their complete exclusion from the nomination process may be interpreted as a constriction of the channels of political accountability.

The results indicate a relative majority of supporters for the model of functional separation of party influence between the chambers of parliament. However, they simultaneously confirm the absence of a clear consensus on the complete de-politicization of the upper chamber. The public's perception of this initiative

is characterised by a balance between the desire for institutional stability and the awareness of the need to preserve the principles of political pluralism. In order to achieve further legitimisation of such a model, it is necessary to provide a clear justification of the mechanisms of formation, responsibility and interaction of the chambers. This will ensure that the parliamentary system is not subjected to excessive politicisation or technocratisation.

7. Requirement for Complete Political Neutrality of Members of the Upper Chamber

Regarding the requirement that members of the upper chamber maintain complete political neutrality during their term of office (including a prohibition on party membership, party financing, and participation in election campaigning), respondents answered as follows: "fully support" – 41.4%; "somewhat support" – 27.6%; "somewhat do not support" – 13.8%; and "do not support" – 17.2%. The aggregate proportion of respondents expressing support for the initiative stands at 69% (41.4% + 27.6%), while 31% of respondents articulate varying degrees of opposition. This represents the highest level of consolidated support among all the proposed institutional parameters of the bicameral model, suggesting a demand for the upper chamber to be non-partisan.

The high percentage of categorical support – 41.4% – is particularly telling. This indicates approval of the idea itself and a normative expectation that members of the upper chamber should distance themselves from party competition. This distribution of responses may reflect the public's desire for an institution that functions as a stabilising and arbitrating mechanism within the system of checks and balances rather than as another arena for political conflict.

Theoretically, the requirement for political neutrality is linked to the idea of the upper chamber as a "dissenting" body, which is intended to provide a balanced review of legislative decisions, minimise the likelihood of the lower chamber making situational or populist decisions, and ensure the long-term stability of public policy. In this model, non-partisanship is considered essential for institutional impartiality and professionalism. Nevertheless, 31% of respondents expressed scepticism or disagreement with the idea of complete political neutrality. Of these, 17.2% categorically do not support such a requirement. This may signify an acknowledgement of the challenges associated with the complete de-politicisation of any representative body within a democratic system, given its inherent political nature. Furthermore, political neutrality may be perceived as a potential restriction on the right to political participation or as the establishment of a "closed" elitist institution with inadequate accountability to voters.

The results demonstrate the dominance of support for the idea of institutional non-partisanship in the upper chamber, reflecting the desire to reduce confrontation in the parliamentary system and strengthen its stabilising function. Concurrently, the presence of a notable proportion of respondents who adopt a critical stance indicates the necessity for a precise normative definition of the limits of political neutrality, mechanisms for monitoring compliance, and guarantees for preserving the democratic legitimacy of such a body.

The requirement of complete political neutrality is regarded by the majority as an appropriate element of the institutional design of the upper chamber. However, its practical implementation requires careful legal and constitutional consideration, taking into account the balance between the stabilising function and the principles of political pluralism.

8. Bicameralism as a Tool for the Effective Distribution of Budget Resources

When asked, "Could bicameralism contribute to a more efficient and transparent distribution of budgetary resources between the central government and territorial communities?" respondents' answers were distributed as follows: "yes" – 34.5%, "rather yes" – 37.9%, "rather no" – 20.7%, "no" – 6.9%.

A summary of the results indicates that 72.4% of respondents expressed support, to a certain extent, for the hypothesis that a bicameral model exerts a favourable influence on the budget process, while 27.6% did not concur with this optimism. This finding is consistent with the institutional model of bicameralism, suggesting that rational and pragmatic arguments predominate in the perception of parliamentary reform.

It is important to note that the proportion of outright rejection is minimal at 6.9%. The majority of sceptical respondents chose the option "rather no", reflecting doubt about the practical implementation of the mechanism rather than fundamental rejection of the idea. Conversely, the prevalence of "yes" and "rather yes" responses indicates confidence in the potential of institutional separation of powers to improve financial management.

Conceptually, these results can be explained by the perception of the upper chamber as a means of territorial representation, offering an additional layer of oversight over budgetary decisions. In systems where the second chamber represents regional or community interests, it often acts as a guarantor of balance between the central government and subnational levels of government, particularly with regard to intergovernmental transfers and fiscal equalisation. This functional perspective is likely key to the positive perception of bicameralism in the Ukrainian context.

In light of the ongoing decentralisation processes and the necessity for post-war reconstruction, the issue of fair and transparent resource allocation is becoming a matter of strategic importance. The notion of a bicameral system in this context may be indicative of a desire to establish supplementary institutional safeguards that would serve to minimise the risks of financial flow centralisation or politically motivated distribution of funds. In this particular instance, bicameralism is regarded as a mechanism for enhancing accountability, transparency and the quality of budgetary decisions.

The fact that more than a quarter of respondents are not convinced of such effectiveness underscores the awareness that structural change in parliament alone is not an automatic guarantee of results. The actual impact will be contingent on the precise configuration of powers, the procedures for interaction between chambers, the mechanisms for accountability, and the level of professional competence of the representatives of the upper chamber.

The economic and financial dimension is perceived by respondents as the most compelling argument in favour of bicameralism. The bicameral model is perceived primarily as a potential tool for strengthening budgetary discipline, ensuring inter-level balance and increasing the transparency of public finances, which may become a key factor in its public legitimacy.

9. Conclusions

The results of the study indicate that respondents' attitudes towards the concept of incorporating bicameralism in Ukraine are characterised by multidimensionality, internal differentiation and dependence on the functional content of the proposed model. A cursory review of extant literature indicates that, in general, there is a moderately positive trend in the perception of a bicameral parliament. While a slight relative majority supports the very idea of its involvement, the level of support is not sufficient to establish a public consensus. This observation underscores the contentious character of the issue, thereby highlighting the necessity for additional conceptual and normative substantiation to underpin the pertinent reform.

It is particularly noteworthy that the highest level of support is associated not with abstract institutional transformation, but with specific expected functional results, primarily in the area of budgetary regulation and ensuring the fair distribution of financial resources between the centre and local communities. Consequently, bicameralism is regarded as having the potential to enhance the efficiency of public

administration, financial transparency and territorial balance, rather than merely representing a formal change in the structure of parliament.

The findings of the research substantiate the existence of a persistent demand for the de-politicization of the upper chamber. The majority of respondents expressed support for the concept of imposing restrictions, or even a complete prohibition, on political parties with regard to their participation in the formation and activities of the aforementioned institution. Furthermore, there was a consensus for the requirement of political neutrality on the part of members during the period of their office. This may be indicative of a desire to reduce political confrontation and establish an institution that would perform stabilising, arbitration and review functions in the system of checks and balances. Concurrently, a substantial proportion of respondents who are sceptical of the proposed changes highlight the potential risks associated with excessive de-politicization, particularly the possibility of narrowing democratic pluralism and competitiveness.

The issue of restricting the circle of entities permitted to nominate candidates for the upper chamber exclusively to local self-government bodies and certain civil society institutions proved controversial. The preponderance of critical appraisals signifies apprehensions regarding the institution's potential for closure or corporatisation. Therefore, respondents expressed support for the concept of non-partisanship, yet did not fully endorse a model of limited representation, which could potentially restrict the avenues through which democratic participation occurs.

In summary, it can be stated that bicameralism, as perceived by respondents, has the potential for legitimacy provided that the upper chamber has clear functional specialisation, transparent mechanisms for its formation and guarantees of democratic accountability. The extent to which the proposed reforms will be endorsed is contingent upon the extent to which the practical feasibility of the reforms can be demonstrated in terms of ensuring financial balance, representing territorial interests and enhancing the quality of the legislative process.

The empirical data obtained thus far suggest the existence of potential, albeit not fully consolidated, support for a bicameral model of parliament in Ukraine. The viability of its implementation will be determined not so much by a formal constitutional decision as by the capacity of the proposed model to respond to the prevailing challenges of state development, particularly in the domains of decentralisation, post-war reconstruction and institutional stabilisation.

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