

THE EU MEMBER STATES AMID THE POLYCRISIS

Svitlana Radziyevska¹

Abstract. The idea of strong, united, sovereign Europe has revived again, but appears to be much harder to implement amid the polycrisis and the growing geopolitical rivalry. *The objective of the paper* is twofold: *first*, to reveal the context for the integration processes development in Europe in the 20th century; *second*, to examine the dynamics of GDP, GDP per capita, and population of the EU member states. *Methodology.* The data, taken from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, the UNCTADstat Data Centre, as well as various publications, served as the information source for using logical-historical and tabular-graphical methods. *The results* demonstrate that over 2015-2024 the EU's share of the global economy in terms of the regional nominal GDP fell from 21,49%, i.e. \$16'067'827 mln (EU-28, with the UK), or 17,69%, i.e. \$13'226'754 mln (EU-27, without the UK) in 2015 to 17,56%, i.e. \$19'381'983 mln in 2024. The key engines of the EU are Germany and France: their combined nominal GDP in 2024 amounted to \$7'820'170 mln, or 40,35% of the bloc, with Germany's indicator being more than 1.47 times higher than that of France. Over 2015-2023, GDP of Germany grew by 37,31%, while that of France – by 27,13%: France's position weakened since its share of the EU-27 dropped from 18,15% in 2015 to 16,42% in 2023. While the EU's average GDP per capita is nearly three times higher than that of the world, significant disparities between member states persist. During 2019-2024, the EU-27's share of the global population (without the UK) fell by 0,22%: from 5,76% to 5,54%. *Practical implications.* The global financial crisis of 2008 reshaped the US–EU–Japan triangle and put the EU in a difficult position while making the PRC more influential globally. *Value/originality.* The post WWII split of Eurasia served as the starting point for dividing the globe into spheres of influence and security thus shaping the development of regional integration processes worldwide. At the age of polycrisis, strengthening the civilizational roots of the European nations will contribute to building, on the one hand, the EU autonomy on the regional level, and, on the other hand, the bridge between the East and the West on the global level.

Keywords: regional economic integration, European Union, United States, Marshall Plan, China, Eurasia, world order, capitalism, nominal GDP, GDP per capita (nominal), population.

JEL Classification: F60, A10, O10, F02, E01, O57

1. Introduction

Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the idea of European unity existed in many variations remarkable in their mutability and how they were bound to the situation in which they were formulated (Andr n, 2023, p. 17).

Indeed, the idea of a federation of European States as a means to banish war from the continent forever has been around a long time (e.g., in Victor Hugo's opening speech on the United States of Europe at the Peace Congress in Paris in 1849). On September 5, 1929, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Aristide Briand, before the General Assembly of the League of Nations, proposed forming "a kind of federal link" between European nations. Without undermining national sovereignty of States under the 1919-2020 treaties, the

plan envisaged the creation of a real common market but was not well received in the UK, Germany, Italy (The European Idea, 2026).

The objective of the paper is twofold: *first*, to reveal the context for the integration processes development in Europe in the 20th century; *second*, to examine the dynamics of GDP, GDP per capita, and population of the EU member states.

2. The Marshall Plan as a Catalyst for Integration Processes Development in Europe in the 20th Century

Nowadays, when the whole world is in a new hybrid reality "peace-war", which is characterized primarily by uncertainty (Grytsenko, 2025), and the world economy is facing multiple crisis interference, it is necessary

¹ State University "Kyiv Aviation Institute", Ukraine
E-mail: svitrad98@ukr.net
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3680-7952>



to mention that modern regional transformations in the global system repeat those natural processes that occurred in history, and that currently existing regional integration blocs may become more integrated, as well as may fall apart or be divided into countries or some parts of those countries in order to further form other regional configurations (Radziyevska, & Us, 2020). Therefore, regional development cannot be understood without logical-historical context. Furthermore, the role of the global powers, which are experiencing turbulence due to the structural shifts in the world order, needs to be taken into account.

Let's glimpse into the history of the EU. The end of World War II (WWII) did not signal a return to normality. On the contrary, it resulted in a new conflict, less bloody, but longer and more insidious: the Cold War. Germany was defeated and divided into four military zones, each controlled by the USSR, USA, Britain, France. Berlin was similarly divided into four parts (The Marshall Plan, 2026). It should also be borne in mind that at the end of WWII, Europe was totally drained of vitality and exhausted. It was now relegated to playing second fiddle on the international stage owing to the increased might of the United States and the Soviet Union and the growing rivalry between those two countries. It was at this point that pro-European movements and supporters of federalism moved into action and vigorously promoted the idea of European unification (The pioneering phase, 2026).

Hence, European nations failed to maintain independence and the continent was split into two spheres of influence and security. It is a well-known fact that the EU's foundations arose alongside the U.S.-led active construction of *the post-WWII world order*. So, it's important to recollect that the Bretton Woods System in 1944, under which the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were created, effectively shifted the center of global finance from London to Washington. Importantly, the US dollar was officially established as the world's primary reserve currency, and at that time still was linked to gold. More importantly, the international institution-building contributed greatly to spreading of the U.S. global influence worldwide.

As Robert Hormats, a senior official in the administrations of five different American presidents, explains, "it was only after the destruction of much of Europe by the end of WWII that the seemingly impossible dreams of European unity were able to take root. While the war provided what some call "the action forcing event," two other essential ingredients were necessary: 1) Europeans with the vision and courage to embark on this experiment; and 2) the financial and political backing of the U.S." (Hormats, 2010).

Close allies Winston S. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt pulled the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) and the

US together to defeat the enemy. Along with Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, they formed *the Big Three*. Then, on 19 September 1946, speaking at the University of Zurich, Switzerland, W. Churchill proposed the creation of "a kind of United States of Europe". In the broadest sense, Churchill's concept aimed to save European civilization, "this noble continent, the home of all the great parent races of the Western world, the foundation of Christian faith and ethics, the origin of most of the culture, arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and modern times." (Garrity, 2016).

In his turn, the French President de Gaulle was very resentful not to have been invited to the Yalta conference in February 1945, although he did meet Stalin in December 1944, and they concluded a Franco-Soviet Treaty. De Gaulle decided to interpret the Yalta conference as an attempt by the "big three" leaders to isolate France from influence on the post-war world order, something that he met with tremendous outrage. De Gaulle's own interpretations and experiences of the 1930s and the 1940s therefore strongly reinforced his determination to assert the strength of the French nation-state both internally and externally. He saw himself as being fully committed to the defence of liberty against the peril of totalitarianism – in the form of both nazism and soviet socialism – but he was also fully aware of the necessity to promote an independent voice for Europe within the West (Warlouzet, 2010, p. 26).

In a June 5, 1947, speech to the graduating class at Harvard University, U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall issued a call for a comprehensive program to rebuild Europe. Fanned by the fear of Communist expansion and the rapid deterioration of European economies in the winter of 1946–1947, Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act in March 1948, and approved funding that would eventually rise to over \$12 bln (the UK got 26%, France – 18%, Federal Republic of Germany received 11%) for the rebuilding of Western Europe (The Marshall Plan, 2026).

Initially, the Marshall Plan was intended for the whole of Europe and not only its western part. At that time, the USSR used the ruble, a non-convertible currency with a tightly controlled exchange rate; the ruble was linked to gold. The US dollar maintained dominance through international trade. Strategically, US dollar loans to many countries contributed to the US dollar becoming the main currency for international settlements. The reserve liabilities of the U.S. to foreign monetary authorities rose from about \$0.8 bln in 1939 to \$8.7 bln in 1957 and \$12.9 bln in 1962. In spite of the 1949 devaluations, the ratio of gold reserves to money supply for the eleven major countries of the Paris Club, taken as a group, fell from about 39% in 1937 to 19% in 1949 (Triffin, 1964, p. 23).

Logically, the main goal of the Marshall Plan was to enhance U.S. position on the global stage. In addition, the Marshall Plan generated a resurgence of European industrialization and brought extensive investment into the region. According to the Office of the Historian of the U.S. Department of State, it was also a stimulant to the U.S. economy by establishing markets for American goods (Marshall Plan, 1948). Interestingly, Europeans asked for \$22 bln over four years while the US Congress accepted to take into account a basis of \$17 bln over four years. The European Recovery Program aid amounted to \$13 bln, decreasing each year, which corresponds to about \$108.3 bln in 2006 dollars (Bossuat, 2008, p. 13-14). During 1948-1952, the U.S. distributed \$13.3 bln between the non-communist states of Western Europe, including Greece and Turkey. Notable exceptions from this aid were Spain, due to Franco's unpopularity in the U.S. (although this changed with the Pact of Madrid in 1953), and Finland since it did not plan to strain relations with the USSR (Clark, 2025).

Similarly, Europeans admit that the intra-European trade was hindered by a lack of foreign exchange and required an international authority capable of effectively organising trade worldwide. The U.S. wanted to protect American prosperity and stave off the threat of national overproduction. But the U.S.' desire to give Europe massive economic aid was also politically motivated. The fear of Communist expansion in Western Europe during the Cold War was undoubtedly a decisive factor, as important as the conquest of new markets. The Americans therefore decided to fight poverty and hunger in Europe, factors which, they felt, encouraged the spread of Communism. The Marshall Plan formed part of the US policy of containment – as outlined by US President Truman in his speech to the U.S. Congress on 12 March 1947 – of the real or imaginary spread of Communism in Europe (The Marshall Plan, 2026).

Finally, economic historians have debated the precise impact of the Marshall Plan on Western Europe, but these differing opinions do not detract from the fact that the Marshall Plan has been recognized as a great humanitarian effort. Secretary of State Marshall became the only general ever to receive a Nobel Prize for peace. *The Marshall Plan also institutionalized and legitimized the concept of U.S. foreign aid programs, which have become an integral part of the U.S. foreign policy* (Marshall Plan, 1948).

In fact, the Soviet Union retained and consolidated its influence in the countries of Eastern Europe, whereas the USA and its partners in the Marshall Plan had an opportunity to carry out a set of measures to stabilize the socio-political situation in Western Europe and, later, to set up a military-political Western alliance (New Evidence, 1994, p. 51). On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) was established; at that time NATO was an intergovernmental security alliance between the U.S., Canada and 10 Western European countries. By 2020, NATO had been joined by 30 members, including 21 EU countries (History of the EU, 2026). As a response, on May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (also known as the Warsaw Pact) was established as a political and military alliance between the Soviet Union and several Eastern European countries. The Soviet Union formed this alliance as a counterbalance to the NATO. The original signatories to the Warsaw Pact were the Soviet Union, Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and the German Democratic Republic. Although the members pledged to defend each other if one or more of them came under attack, emphasized non-interference in the internal affairs of its members, and supposedly organized itself around collective decision-making, the Soviet Union ultimately controlled most of the Pact's decisions (The Warsaw Treaty Organization, 1955). In September 1990, East Germany left the Pact in preparation for reunification with West Germany. By October, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland had withdrawn from all Warsaw Pact military exercises. The Warsaw Pact officially disbanded in March and July of 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union (The Warsaw Treaty Organization, 1955).

Overall, during the twentieth century, the relationship between capitalism and socialism was given a new dimension with the emergence of real historical "socialist systems", which, by the middle of the century, included almost one third of the world's population. When most socialist systems eventually disappeared at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, a great cycle in modern economic and social history came to an end (The historical conflict, 1999, III).

After the introduction of the petrodollar system, the adoption of market reforms in The People's Republic of China (PRC), the dissolution of the USSR and de-communization of the Eastern Europe, the US dollar, not being linked to gold any longer, expanded geographical influence and became the dominant global currency. The key point here is that in the 20th – beginning of the 21st centuries, the integration processes were launched and shaped primarily by: 1) the end of WWII; 2) the end of the Cold War between the socialist and capitalist camps, followed the victory of the US; and 3) the progress in science & technology, which compressed time and space, contributed to even closer ties among nations and between continents.

After WWII the US also engaged strategically in Asia. Practically, Japan – a former enemy and victim of WWII – became a close ally and a leader in the region. The U.S. provided support, and eventually Japan became the world's second-largest economy in 1968, followed by West Germany. Japan was

surpassed by the PRC after the crisis of 2008-2009. China emerged as a dominant superpower: the PRC began to internationalize the Chinese currency, shifted toward assertive maritime claims in most of the South China Sea, established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, initiated the Belt & Road Initiative, and, importantly, focused on close cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries, thus engaging eleven EU Member States and five Western Balkan countries under the 16+1 cooperation format. China expanded its sphere of influence and altered its security strategy, while viewing the EU simultaneously as a crucial economic partner and a challenging “systemic rival”.

3. The Birth of the EU Currency and the Enlargement of the Bloc

In the 1950s, six nations, all located in Western Europe, created the cradle of European integration. The foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) was followed by the Treaty of Rome (1957) – establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) that marked a new era of ever-closer cooperation in Europe (History of the EU, 2026).

With the economic stagnation of Europe in the mid-1970's, European visionaries, such as French statesman Jacques Delors, took another gamble in proposing European monetary union as a way to push Europe to compete globally against the rising economic power of Japan and the U.S. *The signing of the Maastricht treaty* in 1992 was the embodiment of this era and gave birth to the EU (Hormats, 2010). Consequently, 1999 saw the birth of the euro as the official EU currency and as a potential competitor in global finance with the prospect to challenge the role of the US dollar. On January 1, 1999, the euro became the official currency for 11 nations.

However, the 2008 Great Recession weakened the position of the EU. Furthermore, the crisis forced the European Central Bank to take drastic actions to save the EU currency from collapsing. The recession affected most of the countries and regions of the global system, but no bloc experienced so strong negative consequences as the EU. Practically, China and India emerged from the 2008 financial crisis in better shape than most Western economies. Finally, the EU has been amidst severe polycrisis since then. Prof. Volodymyr Sidenko, Corresponding Member of the NAS of Ukraine, indicates that the EU crisis is deeply rooted in the structural asymmetry of its economic system, which creates divergent outcomes for core versus periphery Member States: the institutional setup limits the ability of individual countries to confront challenges in a timely manner (Sidenko, 2014).

It's vital to recollect that at the Lisbon summit in March 2000, EU government leaders agreed on

a new strategic goal for the EU: to make it the most competitive economy in the world by 2010 (The Lisbon strategy, 2004). The idea behind the strategy was to make Europe not only more independent from the US, but economically stronger than the U.S. The OECD has suggested that one of the tasks for the revised Lisbon strategy should be *to reduce the disparities between member states*.

Noteworthy, Jacques Delors, a devout Roman Catholic whose faith shaped his socialist ideals and dedication to European unity, expressed deep concern over 2004 enlargement of the bloc. In his interview, published by “The Economist”, Jacques Delors argued that if the EU could not find a realistic way to function with a larger membership, “the three big countries – perhaps tomorrow, four or five – will remove their cards from the table and choose to play alone. And that will be the end of the dream of the fathers of Europe” (The return, 2004). Americans, in their turn, welcomed the EU enlargement: in 2004 the Athens Treaty welcomed 10 new members, including nations to the east that had been part of the former Soviet sphere. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty further advanced integration process on the political side, with the establishment of a permanent President of the European Council, as well as a High Representative for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy (Hormats, 2010).

China established diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community in 1975. Recently, President Xi Jinping indicated that “China has always regarded Europe as an important pole in a multipolar world, firmly supported European integration, and backed the EU's pursuit of strategic autonomy” (Xi Jinping, 2025). The PRC admits that, given the differences in historical background, cultural heritage, political system, economic development level, it is natural that the two sides have different views or even disagree on some issues. China-EU relations of mutual trust and mutual benefit cannot and will not be affected if the two sides address their disagreements in a spirit of equality and mutual respect (China's EU policy paper, 2003).

Nowadays, the EU, though geographically representing less than half of the territory of Europe, managed to extend its membership across Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern Europe, expanded beyond the Eurasian continent; however, the economic indicators leave much to be desired (Figure 1, Figure 2). Unfortunately, as it is mentioned in the U.S. National Security Strategy 2025, Continental Europe has been losing share of global GDP – down from 25% in 1990 to 14% today. But this economic decline is eclipsed by the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure. ... The continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less. As such, it is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries

strong enough to remain reliable allies (U.S. National Security Strategy, 2025, p. 25).

Referring to W. Churchill's concept of the European civilization, and the classic definition of civilization as the highest level of cultural identity, shaped by language, history, tradition, and, most importantly, religion (given by Prof. Samuel P. Huntington), it's important to admit that the EU is indeed overwhelmed by multiple internal and external challenges in the conditions of the shifting global landscape (Radziyevska, 2018). Global modifications in the energy supply chains have had negative impact on the EU economy (Radziyevska, & Us, 2023). The problem for Europe is that there is a strong tendency towards rapid secularization. Moreover, the EU needs to strengthen its sovereignty, when, on the one hand, some member states (e.g., the U.K., which left the bloc) favor Atlanticism to leverage U.S. power for security against Russia, and, on the other hand, some nations push for Continentalism.

Obviously, the core problem is that the capitalistic system due to an inherent "growth imperative" that collides with planetary limits, creates environmental & social instability. The capitalistic global system is inherently self-destructive, as its drive for constant growth, profit maximization, and short-term gain undermine its own foundations, leading to environmental destruction, extreme inequality, economic instability. This "cannibalistic" nature means it consumes the social & ecological resources it needs to survive. By prioritizing profit maximization, the system drives its own collapse from within (Kalchenko, 2024). Thus, the ethical principle of justice in the promotion of the concept of human development should play the key role, and not only in Europe, but worldwide (Novikov, 2023). Ukraine may serve as the example not to follow: after obtaining independence it enshrined the model of socially oriented economy

in its constitution; however, in reality the reforms were carried out not in the interests of the majority of the Ukrainian population, to put it mildly (Zveryakov, 2023). The EU model should also be improved in this regard.

On the one hand, in the official documents, Americans state that "Managing European relations with Russia will require significant U.S. diplomatic engagement, both to reestablish conditions of strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass, and to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states" (U.S. National Security Strategy, 2025, p. 25). On the other hand, just weeks before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chinese leader Xi Jinping declared a "no limits" partnership with Moscow and since then political and economic ties have strengthened. In addition, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the EU's top diplomat that Beijing can't accept Russia losing its war against Ukraine as this could allow the U.S. to turn its full attention to China (Walsh, 2025).

With the above-mentioned points in mind, it's essential to refer to the works of Sir Halford Mackinder, who in the very beginning of the 20th century served as the director of London School of Economics and Political Science. World-famous political geographer argued in his "Heartland Theory" that controlling the central Eurasian landmass (Eastern Europe is part of the Heartland) provides the ultimate base for global domination: "Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island" (the World-Island refers to the interconnected continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa). Studying prerequisites for a stable peace settlement during WWI, Sir Halford Mackinder argued that interior Asia and Eastern Europe had become the strategic centre of the "World Island" as a result of the relative decline of sea power as against land power. The role of Britain and the U.S., he considered, was to




Figure 1. The GDP dynamics of the USA, the EU, and China of the world's total GDP, %

Source: UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics. Available at: <https://unctadstat.unctad.org>; author's own calculations




Figure 2. The dynamics of inward foreign direct investment flows, 1990-2024, % of the world

Source: UNCTAD Data Hub, *Empowering development through data and statistics*. Available at: <https://unctadstat.unctad.org>; author's own calculations

* Excluding the offshore financial centres in the Caribbean: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Curaçao, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten (Dutch part) and Turks and Caicos Islands.

** Percentage of total world. Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual. Last updated 01 Sept. 2025.

preserve a balance between the powers contending for control of the heartland. As a further stabilizing factor, he urged the creation of a tier of independent states to separate Germany and Russia (Crone, 2026).

As specified in the U.S. National Security Strategy 2025, over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European. As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the U.S., in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter (National Security Strategy, 2025, p. 27).

Interestingly, Prof. Leonid Kistersky, Prof. Vasylyl Marmazov, and Prof. Igor Piliaiev explain that the dichotomy of values, civilizational and cultural aspirations is inherent in Eurasia both by definition (in fact, its very name implies the duality of the continent's two different wings) and historically, especially since the Mongol invasion. Moreover, such a dichotomy of classic Europe (that is Europe of the historical space of the Carolingian Empire) and classic Asia, as a zone of active civilization influence of the "Celestial Empire" ("Great China"), is a universal property of the whole post-Soviet space at the macro-regional, national, regional, subregional and local levels (Kistersky, Marmazov, & Piliaiev, 2021, p. 195).

The Ukrainian scholars have shown that this dichotomy has a fractal nature, i.e., in practically every society, at each of its structural levels, there is potential of both the East and the West. The question is in their dynamic proportions. Specifically, scientists focus on the phenomenon of traditional Confucian

democracy – from the ontological foundations to the case study of its historical and cultural specifics, socio-economic and political dynamics in the Republic of Korea – in the context of realizing prospects for bridging the historically and axiologically conditioned dichotomy of East and West (Kistersky, Marmazov, & Piliaiev, 2021).

4. Nominal GDP of the EU Member States

The calculations, made in the previous publication, based on *the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2016* (Table 1), illustrate that in 2015, the regional GDP of the EU-28, in nominal terms, amounted to \$16'068 bln, or 21,49% of the world. The highest GDP, among the EU-28, was recorded for *the Federal Republic of Germany* (\$3'296 bln, or 20,51% of the EU). *The UK* ranked second (\$2'841 bln, or 17,68%); *France* – third (\$2'401 bln, or 14,94%); *Italy* – fourth (\$1'804 bln, or 11,23%); *Spain* – fifth (\$1'186 bln, or 7,38%). Thus, the combined GDP of the top-5 EU-28 member states accounted for 71,74% of the regional GDP of the EU-28 in 2015 (Radziyevska, 2018). Professor Olena Dovgal indicates that Poland made more impressive progress in comparison with its Visegrad Group partners. Poland aims to catch up with European leaders (Dovgal, 2025).

It is important to mention that the Treaty of Lisbon amended the Treaty on European Union (TEU), adding an explicit clause enabling the voluntary withdrawal of a Member State from the EU (UK withdrawal, 2017). Following the UK's referendum in 2016, Theresa May, then the UK Prime Minister, in March 2017, triggered

Article 50 of the TEU, which states that “Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”. In 2017, Donald Trump praised Britain as “smart” for opting out of EU that he believes is dominated by Germany and on the brink of collapse. D.Trump stressed his fondness for the UK and said other countries could follow its lead and leave the EU (US president-elect, 2017). Finally, the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020 after 47 years.

Consequently, according to *the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2016*, in 2015, the regional GDP of the EU-27 (without the UK), amounted to \$13'227 bln or 17,69% of the world. The highest GDP, among the EU-27, was recorded for *Germany* (\$3'296 bln, or 24,92% of the regional nominal GDP of the EU-27). *France* came second (\$2'401 bln, or 18,15%); *Italy* – third (\$1'804 bln, or 13,64%); *Spain* – fourth (\$1'186 bln, or 8,97%); *Netherlands* – fifth (\$754 bln, or 5,7% GDP of the EU-27). Thus, the combined GDP of the top-5 EU-27 economies accounted for 71,38% of the regional GDP of the EU-27 in 2015.

While the deepest phase ended around 2014-2015, the official end of the EU major crisis is often seen in 2018 when Greece exited its final bailout program, marking the formal conclusion for the most affected nation. Clearly, between 2015 and 2023, the EU nations, which suffered most, rose with different speeds: the GDP of *Italy* – by 27,53%; that of *Spain* – by 36,62%; *Ireland* – 144,66%; *Portugal* – 47,41%; *Greece* – only 26,12%.

Over 2015-2023, GDP of *Germany*, the largest economy in the EU, grew by 37,31%, or \$1'229'696 mln: from \$3'296'008 mln in 2015 to \$4'525'704 mln in 2023; while that of *France* – by only 27,13%, or \$651'332 mln: from \$2'400'500 mln to \$3'051'832 mln; the *Netherlands* – by 53,06%, and *Poland* – by 72,66%. At the same time, the GDP of the UK rose by merely 19%, or \$539'782 mln: from \$2'841'073 to \$3'380'855 mln over 2015-2023. Impressively, over 2015-2023, the GDP of *Malta* rocketed by 133,49%, or \$12'699 mln: from \$9'513 mln to \$22'212 mln; *Bulgaria* – by \$110,07%, or 53'652 mln: from \$48'745 mln to \$102'397 mln; *Romania* – by 104,37%, or \$179'137 mln: from \$171'639 mln to \$350'776 mln; *Lithuania* – by 96,04%, or \$39'089 mln: from \$40'701 mln to \$79'790 mln.

Thus, according to the UNCTADstat Data Centre (Table 1), in 2023, the regional GDP of the EU-27 (without the UK), in nominal terms, amounted to \$18'591 bln. In 2023, the highest GDP, in nominal terms, among the EU-27, was recorded for *Germany* (\$4'526 bln, or 24,34% of the regional GDP of the EU-27), *France* came second (\$3'052 bln, or 16,42%), *Italy* – third (\$2'301 bln, or 12,38%), *Spain* – fourth (\$1'620 bln, or 8,71%), the *Netherlands* – fifth (\$1'154 bln, or 6,21% of the GDP of the EU-27). Hence, in 2023, the combined GDP of the top-5

EU-27 accounted for 68,06% of the GDP of the EU-27.

As Figure 3 shows, in 2019, regional GDP of the EU-27 amounted to \$15'810'316, or 17,96% of the global GDP; in 2020 – to \$15'505'587 mln, or 18,07%; in 2021 – \$17'497'821, or 17,87%; in 2022 – \$16'995'753, or 16,72%; in 2023 – \$18'590'858, or 17,55%; in 2024 – \$19'381'983 mln, or 17,56% of the world GDP.

Specifically, the calculations reveal that during 2015-2023 regional GDP of the EU-27 increased by 40,56%, or \$5'364 bln: from \$13'226'754 mln to \$18'590'858 mln; while the GDP of the world – by 41,72%, or \$31'190 bln: from \$74'753'058 mln to \$105'943'460 mln.

5. Population of the EU Economies

According to the UNCTADstat Data Centre (Table 2), in 2024, among the EU countries, by population, *Germany* topped the list (84,6 mln, or 18,69% of the bloc's population); *France* ranked second (66,5 mln, or 14,71%); *Italy* – third (59,3 mln, or 13,11%); *Spain* – fourth (47,9 mln, or 10,59%); *Poland* – fifth (38,5 mln, or 8,52%). The indicated above five most populous EU nations jointly comprise more than 65% of the total EU population.

Table 2 indicates that during 2019-2024, on the one hand, *the population of Luxembourg* increased by 8,55%, or 53 thsd: from 620 to 673 thsd; that of *Malta* – by 7,14%, or 36 thsd: from 504 to 540 thsd; *Ireland* – by 6,53%, or 322 thsd: from 4'933 to 5'255 thsd; *Cyprus* – by 5,52%, or 71 thsd: from 1'287 to 1'358 thsd; *Netherlands* – by 3,94%, or 691 thsd: from 17'538 to 18'229 thsd, etc.; *Sweden* – by 3,19%; *Denmark* – by 2,79%; *Austria* – by 2,7%; *Estonia* – by 2,56%; *Lithuania* – by 2,29%; *Belgium* – by 2,16%; *Slovenia* – by 1,73%; *Finland* – by 1,72%; *Czechia* – by 1,71%; *France* – by 1,25%, or 820 thsd: from 65'729 to 66'549 thsd; *Germany* – by 1,19%, or 993 thsd: from 83'559 to 84'552 thsd; *Slovakia* – by 1,03%; *Spain* – by 1,0%, or 476 thsd: from 47'435 to 47'911 thsd; *Poland* – by 0,82%; *Portugal* – by 0,79%, or 82 thsd: from 10'343 thsd in 2019 to 10'425 thsd in 2024.

Nevertheless, on the other hand, *the population of Greece* declined by 6,26%, or 671 thsd: from 10'719 thsd in 2019 to 10'048 thsd in 2024; *Bulgaria* – by 3,11%, or 217 thsd: from 6'975 to 6'758 thsd; *Croatia* – by 2,78%, or 111 thsd: from 3'986 to 3'875 thsd; *Romania* – by 2,5%, or 487 thsd: from 19'502 to 19'015 thsd; *Latvia* – by 2,19%, or 42 thsd: from 1'914 to 1'872 thsd; ***Italy* – by 1,31%, or 787 thsd:** from 60'130 to 59'343 thsd; *Hungary* – by 0,96%, or 94 thsd: from 9'770 thsd in 2019 to 9'676 thsd in 2024.

The calculations reveal that during 2019-2024, without the UK, the population of the EU-27 grew by 0,65%, or 2,9 mln: from 449'557 thsd in 2019 to 452'491 thsd in 2024; while that of the world –

Table 1

The dynamics of the nominal GDP* of the EU Member States, 2015–2024, mln, USD**

	Federal Republic of Germany	France	Italy	Spain	Netherlands	Poland
2015	3'296'008	2'400'500	1'804'181	1'185'819	754'184	468'663
2019	3'957'208	2'722'794	2'019'607	1'403'496	928'903	602'684
2020	3'940'143	2'647'926	1'907'481	1'289'784	932'561	605'914
2021	4'348'297	2'966'434	2'179'208	1'461'245	1'054'472	689'170
2022	4'163'596	2'796'302	2'102'996	1'446'498	1'046'541	695'607
2023	4'525'704	3'051'832	2'300'941	1'620'091	1'154'361	809'201
2024	4'658'977	3'161'193	2'369'933	1'721'000	1'225'087	909'008

	Belgium	Sweden	Ireland	Austria	Denmark	Romania	Czechia
2015	452'964	483'289	225'374	371'756	293'463	171'639	181'089
2019	536'726	532'169	407'125	442'984	345'401	251'677	256'794
2020	529'694	545'148	436'556	434'398	355'631	252'034	251'110
2021	598'494	637'187	531'307	480'467	408'378	286'578	290'973
2022	593'439	579'896	548'570	471'774	401'946	296'354	301'831
2023	644'783	584'960	551'395	511'685	407'092	350'776	343'208
2024	665'901	606'366	563'288	523'329	425'687	384'610	344'552

	Portugal	Finland	Greece	Hungary	Slovakia	Bulgaria
2015	196'124	228'334	193'062	118'516	86'536	48'745
2019	240'116	267'015	207'306	164'937	105'843	68'634
2020	229'619	270'000	191'363	158'468	107'733	70'551
2021	256'056	294'223	218'304	183'271	120'592	84'414
2022	256'899	280'242	218'881	177'580	115'929	90'509
2023	289'114	295'532	243'498	212'657	132'908	102'397
2024	307'045	299'043	256'580	221'454	140'873	111'545

	Croatia	Luxembourg	Lithuania	Slovenia	Latvia	Estonia
2015	48'448	57'131	40'701	42'342	26'916	22'267
2019	62'467	69'891	55'122	53'910	33'100	31'874
2020	57'809	73'699	57'412	53'385	33'380	31'821
2021	69'121	85'584	67'037	61'529	38'185	37'205
2022	71'154	81'642	71'034	59'928	38'019	38'376
2023	84'391	85'755	79'790	69'148	42'248	41'291
2024	92'400	90'660	84'905	72'468	43'238	42'476

	Cyprus	Matla	UK	EU	World	UK	Ukraine***
2015	19'190	9'513	2'841'073	16'067'827	74'753'058	-----	96'000
2019	26'197	16'338	-----	15'810'316	88'007'381	2'851'407	153'883
2020	25'555	16'413	-----	15'505'587	85'789'779	2'696'778	156'618
2021	30'373	19'717	-----	17'497'821	97'917'487	3'143'323	199'766
2022	30'976	19'235	-----	16'995'753	101'629'391	3'114'042	161'990
2023	33'887	22'212	-----	18'590'858	105'943'460	3'380'855	178'757
2024	36'296	24'071	-----	19'381'983	110'353'834	3'654'962	191'380

*Gross domestic product: US\$ at current prices. Last updated 14 Jul. 2025

** The EU data for 2015 includes the UK. On 23 June 2016 UK citizens voted in a referendum to leave the European Union.

***The Government of Ukraine has advised the United Nations that it is not in a position to provide statistical data concerning the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol from 2010 onwards.

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2016; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics. Available at: <https://unctadstat.unctad.org>




Figure 3. The EU's* regional GDP of the world's total GDP, %**

*The EU data for 2015 includes the UK. On 23 June 2016 UK citizens voted in a referendum to leave the European Union.

**Gross domestic product: US\$ at current prices. Last updated 14 Jul. 2025.

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2016; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics. Available at: <https://unctadstat.unctad.org>; author's own calculations.




Figure 4. The EU's share* of the global population, %**

* The data for 2015 includes the UK. On 23 June 2016 UK citizens voted in a referendum to leave the European Union.

**Population refers to de facto population in a country, area or region as of 1 July of the indicated year. Last updated 11 Sept. 2024.

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2016; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics. Available at: <https://unctadstat.unctad.org>; author's own calculations.

by 4,49%, or 350,7 mln: from 7'811'294 thsd in 2019 to 8'161'973 thsd in 2024.

As Figure 4 illustrates, over 2019-2024, the EU-27's share of the global population (even without the UK) fell by 0,22%: from 5,76% to 5,54%. The breakdown of norms and social institutions has undoubtedly led to depopulation. The decline in labor force in the developed world is taking place against impressive migration from the Third World (Kalchenko, 2024). Human beings, predominantly representing Islamic, Confucian, Hindu civilizations, do not assimilate or adopt the value systems of the host countries; on the contrary, their own cultural norms, which are sometimes considered to be of a lower level of socio-cultural development, are becoming dominant, serving to unite and mobilize them, whilst at the same time acting as a counterweight to native population of the receiving member state. As a result, the world is witnessing global enclave formation of diaspora communities. Indeed, the number of Christians – which are divided into Catholic,

Protestants, Orthodox, as well as the representatives of various Christian denominations – has been declining or nearly diminishing not only in some EU member states, but also in many European countries.

6. GDP Per Capita of the EU Economies

The issue of the balanced growth and a more integrated bloc turns into an existential challenge for the EU. So, let's have a closer look at the dynamics of the ratio of the GDP per capita of the EU members to the average GDP per capita in the EU. As Figure 5 shows, between 2019 and 2024, the regional nominal GDP per capita in the EU rose by 21,8%, or \$7'705 (from \$35'341 to \$43'046) while the GDP per capita in the world increased by 20%, or \$2'254 (from \$11'272 to \$13'526). The significant disparities between member states persist: in 2024, the highest GDP per capita was recorded for Luxembourg (\$134'702), while the lowest – for Bulgaria (\$16'506).

Table 2

The dynamics of the EU* Member States' population, 2015-2024, thousand**

	Federal Republic of Germany	France	Italy	Spain	Poland	Romania	Netherlands	Belgium
2015	80'689	66'668	59'798	46'122	38'612	19'511	16'925	11'299
2019	83'559	65'729	60'130	47'435	38'226	19'502	17'538	11'491
2020	83'629	65'905	59'913	47'679	38'171	19'392	17'637	11'540
2021	83'697	66'084	59'729	47'736	38'040	19'248	17'731	11'571
2022	84'086	66'277	59'619	47'828	38'386	19'167	17'904	11'642
2023	84'548	66'439	59'499	47'912	38'763	19'118	18'093	11'713
2024	84'552	66'549	59'343	47'911	38'539	19'015	18'229	11'739

	Czechia	Sweden	Portugal	Greece	Hungary	Austria	Bulgaria	Denmark
2015	10'543	9'779	10'350	10'955	9'855	8'545	7'150	5'669
2019	10'555	10'279	10'343	10'719	9'770	8'881	6'975	5'815
2020	10'550	10'354	10'371	10'699	9'749	8'921	6'934	5'832
2021	10'531	10'416	10'391	10'580	9'708	8'967	6'877	5'857
2022	10'673	10'487	10'417	10'412	9'684	9'065	6'826	5'903
2023	10'810	10'551	10'431	10'243	9'686	9'130	6'796	5'948
2024	10'736	10'607	10'425	10'048	9'676	9'121	6'758	5'977

	Finland	Slovakia	Ireland	Croatia	Lithuania	Slovenia	Latvia	Estonia
2015	5'503	5'426	4'688	4'240	2'878	2'068	1'971	1'313
2019	5'522	5'451	4'933	3'986	2'795	2'083	1'914	1'327
2020	5'530	5'455	4'983	3'954	2'796	2'102	1'901	1'330
2021	5'541	5'443	5'028	3'925	2'794	2'113	1'886	1'332
2022	5'569	5'473	5'110	3'907	2'817	2'115	1'881	1'350
2023	5'601	5'518	5'197	3'896	2'854	2'118	1'882	1'367
2024	5'617	5'507	5'255	3'875	2'859	2'119	1'872	1'361

	Cyprus	Luxem-bourg	Matla	UK **	EU**	World	UK **	Ukraine ***
2015	875	567	419	64'667	507'085	7'349'472	-----	44'824
2019	1'287	620	504	-----	449'557	7'811'294	67'111	44'957
2020	1'302	631	518	-----	449'976	7'887'001	67'352	44'680
2021	1'317	640	524	-----	449'914	7'954'448	67'669	44'299
2022	1'331	653	528	-----	451'323	8'021'407	68'179	41'049
2023	1'345	665	533	-----	452'874	8'091'735	68'683	37'733
2024	1'358	673	540	-----	452'491	8'161'973	69'138	37'860

*The EU data for 2015 includes the UK. On 23 June 2016 UK citizens voted in a referendum to leave the European Union.

** Population, absolute value in thousands. Population refers to de facto population in a country, area or region as of 1 July of the indicated year. Last updated 11 Sept. 2024.

***Including Crimea.

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2016; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics. Available at: <https://unctadstat.unctad.org>.

It's easy to notice (Table 3) that in 2024, 11 out of 27 countries produced **an output per person greater than \$43'046**: Luxembourg (\$134'702), Ireland (\$107'190), Denmark (\$71'216), Kingdom of the Netherlands (\$67'206), Austria (\$57'377), Sweden (\$57'167), Belgium (\$56'727), Germany (\$55'102), Finland (\$53'235), France (\$45'961), Malta (\$44'607). Only Malta made considerable progress.

By contrast, 6 out of 27 member states recorded a **per capita output of less than \$25'000**: Bulgaria (\$16'506), Romania (\$20'227), Hungary (\$22'887), Latvia (\$23'099), Poland (\$23'587), Croatia (\$23'843).

Noteworthy, Prof. Viktor Chuzhykov and Prof. Oleksandr Fedirko identify the features of the European local-regional taxonomy. Ukrainian researchers illustrate that Poland is the largest beneficiary of European Structural and Investment Funds, and is usually followed by Italy and Spain (Chuzhykov & Fedirko, 2021).

Over 2015-2024, GDP per capita rose with different speeds throughout the EU: on the one hand, it increased in Bulgaria by 142,09%, or \$9'688; in Romania – by 129,93%, or \$11'430; in Ireland by 122,99%, or \$59'120; in Lithuania – by 110,01%, or \$15'556; in




Figure 5. The dynamics of the GDP per capita*, Ukraine**, World, EU***, USD

*Gross domestic product per capita, current prices, U.S. dollars. Last updated 14 Jul. 2025.

**The Government of Ukraine has advised the United Nations that it is not in a position to provide statistical data concerning the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol from 2010 onwards.

*** The EU calculations for 2015 and 2018 include the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2016, 2019; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics (2025). Available at: <https://unctadstat.unctad.org>; author's own calculations.

Table 3

The Dynamics of the Ratio of the GDP per capita of the EU Member States* to the Average GDP per capita in the EU

	Luxem-bourg	Ireland	Denmark	Netherlands	Austria	Sweden	Belgium
2015	3,18	1,52	1,63	1,41	1,37	1,56	1,27
2018	2,94	2,01	1,59	1,39	1,34	1,44	1,21
2020	3,38	2,53	1,76	1,53	1,41	1,52	1,33
2022	3,3	2,84	1,80	1,54	1,38	1,46	1,35
2024	3,13	2,49	1,65	1,56	1,33	1,33	1,32

	Germany	Finland	France	Matla	Italy	Cyprus	Spain
2015	1,28	1,31	1,14	0,72	0,95	0,69	0,81
2018	1,25	1,29	1,08	0,85	0,89	0,73	0,79
2020	1,36	1,41	1,12	0,91	0,92	0,77	0,78
2022	1,31	1,33	1,08	0,96	0,93	0,83	0,80
2024	1,28	1,24	1,07	1,04	0,93	0,84	0,83

	Slovenia	Czechia	Estonia	Lithuania	Portugal	Slovakia	Greece
2015	0,65	0,54	0,54	0,45	0,60	0,50	0,56
2018	0,68	0,59	0,58	0,49	0,54	0,51	0,54
2020	0,73	0,69	0,69	0,59	0,64	0,57	0,52
2022	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,67	0,65	0,56	0,56
2024	0,79	0,75	0,73	0,69	0,68	0,59	0,59

	Croatia	Poland	Latvia	Hungary	Romania	Bulgaria	UK
2015	0,36	0,38	0,43	0,38	0,28	0,22	1,38
2018	0,38	0,40	0,47	0,42	0,32	0,24	1,09
2020	0,42	0,46	0,51	0,47	0,38	0,29	---
2022	0,48	0,48	0,53	0,48	0,41	0,35	---
2024	0,55	0,55	0,54	0,53	0,47	0,38	---

*Gross domestic product per capita, current prices, U.S. dollars. Last updated 14 Jul. 2025.

Source: author's calculations based on the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2016, 2019; UNCTAD Data Hub, Empowering development through data and statistics (2025). Available at: <https://unctadstat.unctad.org>; author's own calculations.

Croatia – by 108,67%, or \$12'417; on the other hand, GDP per capita increased in Sweden – by 15,68%, or \$7'748; in France – by 27,64%, or \$9'954; in Finland – 28,31%, or \$11'747; in Austria – by 31,88%, or \$13'869; in Italy – by 32,37%, or \$9'765.

7. Conclusions

While solving the problem of increasing demand for American products abroad, The Marshall Plan united some European countries and strengthened trade ties in the US interests between the US and Western Europe. Since the 2008 Great Recession, and especially

since Brexit, the EU has been not only under pressure from both superpowers, but primarily has faced many internal existential challenges. Though historically related to the Marshall Plan and geographically located in Eurasia, the EU is to learn how to maneuver carefully in the conditions of intensifying US–China confrontation. At the age of polycrisis, strengthening the civilizational roots of the European nations will contribute to building, on the one hand, the EU autonomy on the regional level, and, on the other hand, the bridge between the East and the West on the global level.

References:

- Andr n, M. (2023). *Thinking Europe. A History of the European Idea since 1800*. N.Y., Berghahn Books. 354 p.
- Bossuat, G. (2008). *The Marshall Plan: history and legacy. The Marshall Plan. Lessons learned for the 21st century. Sixtieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan 1947-2007*. Ed. by E. Sorel, P.C. Padoan. OECD publishing. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2008/09/the-marshall-plan_g1gh8e35/9789264044258-en.pdf
- China's EU policy paper (2003). PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjzg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/202406/t20240606_11390070.html
- Chuzhykov, V. I., & Fedirko, O. A. (2021). Localism versus globalism (European methodological case-study). *Regional economy*, 4, 44–56.
- Clark, D. (2025). Distribution of Marshall Plan payments 1948-1952, per country. November 28, 2025. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1227834/distribution-marshall-plan-by-country>
- Crone, R. C., (2026). Halford Mackinder. British political geographer. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Halford-Mackinder>
- Doygal, O. (2025). Effects of the transformation of the economy of the Republic of Poland in the process of European integration: foreign economic aspect. *Modern Economics*, 54, 54–58.
- Garrity, P. (2016). Churchill, Britain, and European Unity. March 9, 2016. The Churchill Project. Hillsdale College. <https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/churchill-britain-and-european-unity/>
- Grytsenko, A. A. (2025). Formation of the foundations of nationally rooted resilience and security of economic development of Ukraine in a new hybrid reality “peace-war” (transcript of scientific report at the meeting of the Presidium of NAS of Ukraine, March 19, 2025). *Bulletin of NASU*, 5, 61–68. <https://doi.org/10.15407/vsn2025.05.061>
- History of the EU (2026). History of the EU 1945-59. Peace in Europe and the beginnings of cooperation. An official website of the EU. https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59_en
- Hormats, R.D. (2010). The U.S.-European relationship: past perspectives and future prospects. U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/20092013/2010/150032.htm>
- Kalchenko, T. (2024). Socio-economic consequences of the global systemic crisis. *Kyiv Economic Science Journal*, (4), 93–97. <https://doi.org/10.32782/2786-765X/2024-4-13>
- Kistersky, L., Marmazov, V., & Piliaiev, I. (2021). Prospects for the East-West civilizational convergence: Confucian tradition democracy in the Republic of Korea. Prague, Coretex CZ SE. 246 p.
- Marshall Plan, 1948. *Milestones 1945-1952*. Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/marshall-plan>
- New Evidence (1994) on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports. S.D. Parrish, & M.M. Narinsky. WP №9. March 1994. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Washington, D.C., 53 p. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/ACFB73.pdf>
- Novikov, V. (2023). The ethical principle of justice in the promotion of the concept of human development. *Demography and Social Economy*, 1 (51), 3–22. <https://doi.org/10.15407/dse2023.01.003>
- Radziyevska, S. (2018). Regionalization and globalization: interrelationships and prospects for non-confrontational development. Kyiv, 376 p.
- Radziyevska, S., & Us, I. (2020). Regionalization of the world as the key to sustainable future. *E3S Web of Conferences*. Vol. 166. https://www.e3s-conferences.org/articles/e3sconf/pdf/2020/26/e3sconf_icsf2020_13016.pdf
- Radziyevska, S., & Us, I. (2023). The impact of security issues related to the war in Ukraine on world trade transformations. *Przegląd Strategiczny*, 16, 89–101.
- Sidenko, V. R. (2014). The policy of completion of the formation of the European economic and currency union: main tendencies and possible consequences for Ukraine. *Economy of Ukraine*, 10, 51–66.

- The European Idea (2026). *Documents from the French Diplomatic Archives*. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-and-its-network/the-diplomatic-archives/documents-from-the-diplomatic-archives/the-birth-of-europe-the-treaty-establishing-the-european-coal-and-steel/i-the-european-idea/>
- The historical conflict of socialism and capitalism, and the post-socialist transformation (1999). Paper prepared by B. Chavace, University of Paris, 13 Dec. 1999. UNCTAD X. High-level Round Table on Trade and Development: Directions for the 21st century. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ux_tdxrt1d3.en.pdf
- The Lisbon strategy (2004): a more competitive Europe, with more and better jobs. *European Parliament in action. Highlights 1999-2004*. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/highlights/en/1001.html>
- The Marshall Plan and the establishment of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (2026). *Historical events in the European integration process (1945-2009)*. Université du Luxembourg. Luxembourg center for contemporary and digital history. <http://www.cvce.eu>
- The pioneering phase (2026). *Historical events in the European integration process (1945-2009)*. Université du Luxembourg. Luxembourg center for contemporary and digital history. <http://www.cvce.eu>
- The return of Jacques Delors (2004). *The Economist*. 12 February 2004. <https://www.economist.com/europe/2004/02/12/the-return-of-jacques-delors>
- The Warsaw Treaty Organization (1955). *Milestones 1953-1960*. Office of the Historian. U. S. Department of State. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/warsaw-treaty>
- Triffin, R. (1964). The evolution of the international monetary system: historical reappraisal and future perspectives. *Princeton Studies in International Finance* №12. International Finance Section. Department of Economics. Princeton University. 87 p. <https://ies.princeton.edu/pdf/S12.pdf>
- UK withdrawal from the EU – Legal and procedural issues (2017). In-depth analysis. March 2017. European Parliamentary Research Service. 36 p. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/599352/EPRS_IDA\(2017\)599352_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/599352/EPRS_IDA(2017)599352_EN.pdf)
- UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics 2016-2020. <https://unctad.org/publications>
- UNCTAD Data Hub (2025). Empowering development through data and statistics. <https://unctadstat.unctad.org>
- U.S. National Security Strategy (2025). November 2025. Washington. The White House. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf>
- US president-elect (2017) tells Michael Gove that Britain voted to leave EU because people ‘want their own identity’. Donald Trump’s first UK post-election interview: Brexit a ‘great thing’. January 16, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/15/trumps-first-uk-post-election-interview-brexit-a-great-thing>
- Walsh, N.P. (2025). China tells EU it can’t accept Russia losing war against Ukraine, official says. July 4, 2025. CNN World. <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/04/europe/china-ukraine-eu-war-intl>
- Warlouzet, L. (2010). Charles de Gaulle’s idea of Europe. The lasting legacy. *Kontur*, № 19. P. 21–31. https://kontur.au.dk/fileadmin/www.kontur.au.dk/kontur_19/04_Warlouzet.pdf
- Xi Jinping (2025). Xi says China supports European integration, EU strategic autonomy. January 14, 2025. PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202501/14/content_WS67866a71c6d0868f4e8eed0f.html
- Zveryakov, M. (2023). Concept of social market economy in the post-war recovery of Ukraine. *Economy of Ukraine*, 3, 3–23. <https://doi.org/10.15407/economyukr.2023.03.003>

Received on: 28th of February, 2026

Accepted on: 13th of May, 2026

Published on: 3rd of July, 2026