

## **POLITICAL SCIENCES**

### **EU-US RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CSDP**

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After signing the Maastricht Treaty relations between Western Europe and the United States, that is transatlantism factor, were considered by the western politicians in the light of its impact on the development of the CSDP. US policy has also evolved to reflect the desire of the European Union to create its own foreign policy and defense. At first, Americans were skeptical of the idea of forming a European system of politics and defense. Former US Secretary of State H. Kissinger ironically asked which phone number is the person responsible for the declared Common Security and Defense Policies [1, p. 36]. However, at the moment, the concept of European identity in the field of security and defense is perceived by the United States not as a remote and uncertain political landmark, but as a task of practical policy.

In examining the problem in this context, it is worth noting the US attitude to Western Europe's aspirations not only to strengthen its responsibility for the implementation of European security policy within NATO, but also to create its own defense policy. The real question for official Washington is the following questions: To what extent does the development of European autonomy in the field of security and defense not affect America's national interests? How to avoid unnecessary duplication of functions of NATO structures by the European Union?

It is worth noting that the desire of the EU to create a separate European security system has been widely viewed by many US researchers and politicians. Some perceived Western Europeans' desire for autonomy in security and defense as undermining the US position in Europe. In particular, John Bolton believed that "the EU's intention to unify defense and security policy is motivated by a partial desire to weaken the influence of the United States and partly by openly anti-American intentions" [2]. He argued that "when the United States is defeated..., there is a probability that within 10 years NATO will lose its military sense and, American political support" [3]. Commenting on the European defense problem, Peter Rodman noted that "...the Atlantic

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allies have created a new mechanism by which Europeans have been able to act on their own discretion, using NATO's resources, but a new European initiative may, on the contrary, give Europe the opportunity to break free. Americans if they wish." [4] On this depends, says Rodman, "the way in which it will be done... the European project, which will be a new European security structure and how it will coordinate with the Atlantic Alliance" [4]. The American politician emphasizes that throughout the history of the EU, the United States itself has called on the European Allies to "take part of the NATO defense burden and to encourage them to coordinate their efforts to maximize the effectiveness of their efforts" [4].

Official Western European political circles, for their part, have also carefully examined Washington's position on the identified issues. In particular, former French Defense Minister Alan Richard noted that the European defense and security project "responds to the old American proposals to the Europeans to develop their national forces in order to obtain greater efficiency and better self-sufficiency, resulting in a European failure will be a common Atlantic failure, as a European success will be a common Atlantic success." [5]

Thus, over the last decade, dialogue between the United States and Western Europe on military security and defense has evolved quite difficult and ambiguous.

On the one hand, Washington painfully refers to attempts of increasing its European allies degree of autonomy in the military field by establishing the CSDP.

American leadership fears that the Common Security and Defense Policies EU can lead to dispersion of resources (if Western Europeans spend their funds for expansion of defense capabilities, that has been already enough in the US and NATO), the creation of new bureaucratic structures, not backed by real growth of the defense potential to misunderstandings between the institutions created within the framework of the CSDP, and the NATO structures and, ultimately, to the mismatch in military in planning carried out simultaneously under the auspices of CSDP and the North Atlantic Alliance [6]. The United States, as supporters of strengthening the European pillar of NATO, more preferably European Security and Defense System than the CSDP, which, in their opinion, was not sufficiently integrated into NATO.

On the other hand, the US is not enjoy with the situation in which Western Europe has been completely unprepared for contemporary local conflicts.

American researcher I. Daalder rightly noted that the problem of CSDP functioning in US-West European relations "...is not in its potential future strength... but in its real political weakness" [7]. As a result, in order to overcome military-political inequalities within the Alliance, NATO endorsed the European Union's decision "to have the capacity to act independently and to adopt military action when the Alliance is not involved" [8]. NATO leaders also expressed their willingness to identify the mechanisms needed to give

European countries access to much of the Alliance's military resources and capabilities to respond to the EU-led crisis within NATO [9, p. 7].

While welcoming European defense initiatives as a whole, the United States at the same time emphasizes that America welcomes European defense plans to the extent that they will help strengthen NATO and the United States as a whole, and opposes the development of separate defense structures that are incompatible with NATO structures. This basic setup as Washington kept formula sounded M. Albright: European Union during construction CSDP should avoid the three «D» – duplication, decoupling, discrimination, are invested in the following sense. The first "D" (duplication) means that the EU, while developing its military and political mechanisms, must refrain from duplicating NATO's actions and efforts. The second "D" (decoupling) does not allow the US to remove itself from the solution of European security problems. The third "D" (discrimination) requires the exclusion of "discrimination" against non-EU and NATO members [10, p. 21].

In principle, Washington is ready for consensus if it does not directly affect its national interests.

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