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**THE EUROPEAN UNION SYSTEM
OF SANCTIONS IN TIMES OF WAR**

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Introduction

It is already a truism that the Union's goals primarily are concentrated on promoting peace, freedom, security and justice, sustainable development based on balanced economic growth and price stability, and combating social exclusion and discrimination. The EU wants to achieve all these goals for the well-being of its citizens, as for those of citizens of the world [1].

By its values and goals, the EU became a different but critical actor at the international level. After the fall of the communist regimes, the need to intervene in conflict situations, starting with the former Yugoslavia, led the EU to improve its instruments and mechanisms for action at the international level [15, p. 63–65]. One of these instruments of action is sanctions applied against specific domestic or international actions, policies or activities of third States to draw attention to and hold accountable the undemocratic or aggressive nature of such decisions or actions. Sanctions, as “restrictive measures,” are a tool of the EU’s foreign policy. Hence, the EU reacts to crises and problems that arise at the international level, sometimes threatening the entire world’s security, following its principles and priorities but in cooperation with many other international states and organisations (candidate states, partner states, international organisations, etc.) [6; 12, p. 54–55]. The EU sanctions are applied to the member or no member states, to the neighbouring as to faraway states, being considered essential from the security perspective. [12, p. 57–58].

Russia is one of the neighbouring countries against which the EU has adopted and applied numerous sanctions; even in 2016, some scholars stated, “Never before has a target of the strategic importance of Russia been sanctioned to this degree” [14, p. 7]. In February 2024, the latest package of sectoral sanctions against Russia, the thirteenth, was voted, with a particular focus on the arms issue, but also targeting new export restrictions on companies supporting Russia’s war industry, as well as individuals and entities in the military or public sector accused of war crimes (supporting the deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied areas or supplying arms and weapons to the aggressor Russia) [3]. Of course, all European Union decisions are taken with great interest and enjoy international support. However, a problem arises when some Member States do not give up their economic activities with Russia’s close partners or neighbouring states in Russia’s direct sphere of influence [17]. This is the case of the Central Asia’ states, members of the Eurasian Economic Union, countries that have played an important role as intermediaries between Western exporters and Russia since the beginning of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and which continue to raise concerns about the application of EU economic sanctions on Russia [13; 4]. This is where the big problems come in for the European Union, which has not always seemed ready to react, even though the problems have been signalled since the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine [13, p. 4–5; 4, p. 9]. More than a year after the start of the war, the European Union has not yet prepared a package of

sanctions against these states, Charles Michel stating that “We do not apply the principle of extraterritoriality, and most importantly, we want to work with all of our partners around the world only through dialogue” [11] and stressing on the role of a “sincere partnership” [8] with these states. However, how sincere have the Central Asian states been in this partnership? Deutsche Welle highlighted in early 2024 the problem of parallel economic relations between EU member states and Russia through them [17], although the EU has tried to control the phenomenon through repeated inspections within these states and even officially noticed a “decreasing re-export” [2]. Where the truth lies is certainly hard to determine, as long as trade figures with countries in the region are on the rise, as even publications in the region point out [2]. The European Union has announced that it will include companies from Central Asian countries on the list of those facing sanctions for aiding Russia through their business activities, [16] but in February 2024 these countries were not on the map of those targeted by European sanctions, not even Kazakhstan, mentioned in the Council’s communication on the new sanctions package [9] and on the EU list with one company and several citizens [7] and several companies were blacklisted by the EU [16]. This is certainly a way to maintain a friendly relationship in the EU and the countries on whose territory economic activities with Russia take place, to keep “open doors” for present and future economic cooperation and political dialogue. We can only hope that this policy, which only respects EU principles on international stability, will make Central Asian countries, despite the behaviour of some economic agents, consider the opportunity offered by the EU. The latest EU strategy considers both the problems and opportunities arising from the geopolitical situation in the region in the context of the war in Ukraine. It underlines that the EU intends to remain in the region and maintain cooperation with the countries concerned at all levels (climate stability, security, economic cooperation, human rights, etc.) [10]. Given the relations between the EU and the Central Asian states, [5] it is clear that the EU is not abandoning its partners, and this should be an essential argument for them in their decisions on tense situations involving Russia.

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GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF JAPAN'S DEFEAT IN WORLD WAR II

ГЕОПОЛІТИЧНІ НАСЛІДКИ ПОРАЗКИ ЯПОНІЇ У ДРУГІЙ СВІТОВІЙ ВІЙНІ

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Поразка Японії у Другій світовій війні започаткувала новий етап розвитку її зовнішньої політики та геополітичного позиціонування. Подальше післявоєнне становище зумовило нові «правила гри» в реаліях нового світового порядку, до якого Японія повинна була пристосовуватись. Саме тому відбулася кардинальна зміна геополітичного