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**INTERMARIUM ASPIRES TO BECOME AN INTEGRATIVE  
SOLUTION FOR THE WHOLE AREA SURROUNDED  
BY THE ADRIATIC SEA, THE BLACK SEA  
AND THE BALTIC SEA**

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The overall purpose of this paper is to explore the dynamic character of the Eastern Partnership concept, which evolved from the old *Intermarium* to the new *Intermarium* (the Three Seas Initiative). It also aims to identify the roles undertaken by this system of security in Central and South-Eastern Europe. In addition, we shall refer to the method of circumscribing political communities and to the exchanges and relations that are established within borders as a result of the development of the above-mentioned defence plan. We shall also look at the means whereby the Eastern European countries fend off Russian aggression, thus forming a buffer zone, a bridgehead.

The association of states that form the *Intermarium* can be interpreted from the perspective of institutionalist neo-liberalism. Theorists belonging to this current focused their research on analysing elements of political economy. The *Intermarium* states identified a common economic source –

the *sea*—which might ensure, for their populations, at least economic support in the context of instability caused by political transition. For the specialists of institutionalist neo-liberalism, the international system is anarchic, countries are rational actors, as in the case of realism or neo-realism, but gains are understood in complex rather than approximate terms, as in the case of neo-realists. This distinction is very important because it influences the behaviour of states. If a particular state X is not broadly similar to state Y and does not understand its development as a threat to its own security and does not compare its gains against others, while its power does not decrease or increase with the development of others [1, p. 65], the chances for the security dilemma [2, p. 66] to arise are quite small.

Even today, researchers continue to analyse and express advantages and disadvantages regarding the reasons for anxiety generated by the issue of security in Ukraine and Central and Eastern Europe. They also hope that things will improve and that the alliance under discussion will clear up the numerous issues encountered in the region [3].

Given its prospects for alliance in Central and Eastern Europe, the Polish government should prioritize its support for Ukraine; for a brief while, this was the most widely reported event in Europe. All along, the French and Germans talk about "European values" and categorically discredit not only Ukraine and its eastern partners, but ultimately themselves. However, the Ukrainians lose their lives every day in defense of such ideals [3].

It is in Poland's direct economic interest to ensure that reforms in Ukraine are made public and that Ukraine promotes its image as a strong trading partner. Poland presents itself as a supporter for a thriving Ukraine, able to purchase Polish goods (i.e., acting as a market for its products) and actively participating in cooperative projects, such as projects involving the production and procurement of defense equipment. At the moment, production costs in Ukraine are significantly lower than in other regions of Europe due to the depreciation of the Polish national currency [3].

The *Intermarium* project was originally a pan-Eastern European regional control plan against the Russian state, essentially a notion of *fear*, in which Poland wanted to play the leading role. Changes in recent years have altered the original project, requiring it to be adapted to ultra-contemporary realities, resulting in what we now call the *Three Seas Initiative*. The new concept of the alliance aims at achieving twinning and unity in Eastern and Central Europe. The idea of the competition for the best regional *power*, the driving force behind the original *Intermarium* project, is now forgotten [4, pp. 193–199].

Neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe also perceive a security threat. History has taught us what might happen if Russian power returns in force. So as to be valid in relation to today's security expectations, the Intermarium of the 21st century will have to bring together the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to rival them against the stability of Russia's regional power, as well as to help each other both politically and environmentally. However, the Intermarium will not have a chance to succeed until all the former Soviet countries work together and face a common global threat that mobilizes them in a joint effort. Moreover, the Intermarium, as a united front, would still need help from the US military to confront Moscow. If Intermarium in the 21st century succeeded as an organization, it would create the strongest union in Eastern Europe since the national revolutions that put an end to communism in 1989 [5, p. 101].

As for the defence policy of grey zone states such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, they have all become subordinate states of whichever side they choose to cooperate with. This pattern of oscillation between East and West has proven to be highly fluctuating, as it has provided no help in solving the Transnistrian problem in eastern Moldova or the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in southwestern Azerbaijan, and was shaken by the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 [5, p. 101].

If all the nations in the region cooperated in this common goal, there would be no need to expand NATO further east or to add members to the European Union. Intermarium in the 21st century would function as an independent project and, in time, would prove to be a leader on the international stage.

Piłsudski's Intermarium project is originally known in Polish as *Miedzymorze* and later gained its Latin cognate known today as Intermarium. Both definitions translate as 'between the seas'. This is because the alliance was to spread from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic and the Black Sea. Originally the Intermarium project was to include Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, "thereby partially recreating the medieval Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth" [5, p. 101].

If an Intermarium were created today, Ukraine would take precedence because it has no protection from NATO or other security organisations outside its country. Then Poland, the original founder of this union, would be on the list. Poland faces the threat of Kaliningrad in the north and would dislike the presence of Russia on its southern border in the event of an occupation of Ukraine [6].

A 21st century Intermarium would be committed to protecting every nation threatened by Russia. However, the most important factor to consider

in a 21st century Intermarium would be the avoidance of mistakes associated with its first draft. This means forbidding the domination of domestic issues and hoping that these states will be united in the face of a common and shared global threat. Intermarium cannot succeed until the concept of solidarity in the post-Soviet sphere in Europe is accepted [6].

Intermarium is a plan that is part of 20th century geopolitics, gaining more momentum with each passing year. Russian politicians, diplomats, and thinkers are still debating the specifics of how Intermarium would operate politically in the twenty-first century [7].

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