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MIGRATION LOSSES OF UKRAINE CAUSED BY THE WAR: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR RETURNING

Summary

The study is devoted to the problem of migration losses of Ukraine caused by the Russia's full-scale military invasion. The scope and directions of forced migration from Ukraine are highlighted. The analysis of dynamics of stationary migration is provided. Attention is also drawn to the issue of intellectual losses. Policies of main European countries which hosted the largest number of Ukrainian refugees are studied. Ukrainian refugees' intentions to return and their changes over time are analyzed based on the sociological researches of different institutions. Main measures for migration losses prevention are developed. They aimed at decreasing the amount of migration flows and returning of the majority of our citizens to Ukraine after a just peace is achieved.

Introduction

Russia's full-scale genocidal war against Ukraine, started in February 2022, caused mass human flows from the country. Only for the first month after the beginning of the military invasion, 10% of its population left Ukraine. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, Ukraine is experiencing the fastest migration crisis since the Second World War [19]. Although it is not possible to make an accurate assessment of the human losses caused by military actions now, but it is already clear that, together with migration losses, they will lead to a large-scale demographic crisis. In turn, such a crisis endangers the social and economic development of the state and its existence totally. After all, in order to rebuild the destroyed cities, restore the infrastructure and ensure economic growth, the country will need significant human potential, including all its citizens who moved abroad.

Obviously, significant migration losses are very dangerous threats for demographical, social and economic development of Ukraine. This actualizes the need to monitor forced international migration, to study the most urgent needs of refugees, their interests and intentions, and further to develop effective mechanisms for their voluntary return. Developing of a comprehensive return

migration policy can minimize negative effects of international migration for both origin and host countries, as well as for migrants themselves and for their families. The comprehensive analysis of existing instruments of return migration policies in more than ten countries was conducted by the experts of the International Center for Migration Policy Development [3]. Evaluation of return and reintegration policies in eight OECD European countries was carried out by researchers of this organization [13]. At the same time, there is a shortage of researches related to forced migration issues in Ukraine. It requires further researches and exacerbates the need for finding new solutions and development loss reduction, prevention measures.

The aim of the study is to highlight scope and directions of international movements of Ukrainian citizens, estimate perspectives for return based on sociological surveys and to present measures for migration losses prevention. It is based on the statistical data provided by the United Nations and on the results of several sociological researches conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Razumkov centre, the Polish agency EWL and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Chapter 1. Scope and directions of international movements of Ukrainian citizens

Due to the total Russian military invasion of Ukraine (24 February 2022) nearly one-third of Ukrainian population was forced to leave their homes in the search of safety, protection and assistance. According to the data of UN Refugee Agency, more than 11 million border crossing from Ukraine have been recorded for the first months of the full scale war. At the same time over 4.7 million movements was recorded back into the country [24]. As of September 2024, 6.7 million refugees from Ukraine were recorded globally. At the same time, estimated number of internally displaced by the war in the middle of 2024 was 3.7 million people [26].

Mostly the countries Ukraine has borders with were the major recipients of displaced persons from Ukraine. Generally, 3,8 million of Ukrainian refugees were recorded in countries neighbouring Ukraine [22]. In the first days of the war, these countries simplified the border crossing procedure. In the first period, Poland accepted the largest number of our citizens (2.9 million), which accounted for about 60% of all refugees. In 2024 amount of refugees recorded in the neighboring countries decreased to 2.7 million. As of September 2024, there were 1.2 million refugees from Ukraine recorded in the Russian Federation, and almost 1 million – in Poland [23]. The main problem is that people were forcibly taken to the aggressor state from the areas of hostilities, as repeatedly testified from Mariupol and other cities suffering consistent Russian attacks. Much fewer people from Ukraine have moved to

Romania (162 170), Moldova (123 185) and other neighbors, which makes less than 6% of all refugees recorded in neighboring countries (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Refugees from Ukraine recorded in countries neighbouring Ukraine, 2022 and 2024, % to all recorded in 7 neighbouring countries

Source: calculated and built by the author based on the UNHCR data [23]. UNHCR uses the term refugees generically, referring to all individuals having left Ukraine due to the war

Among other countries, most refugees from Ukraine in 2022 were recorded in Germany (971 000), the Czech Republic (413 121), Italy (159 968), Turkey (145 000), Spain (133 913) and United Kingdom (111 900) [22]. In 2024 the amount of Ukrainian refugees in other (not neighboring) European countries changed in different way. So, in Germany it increased to 1.2 million, doubled in United Kingdom (248 360) and decreased in Czech Republic to 380 375 recorded refugees (Table 1).

Table 1

Top 10 other European countries by recorded refugees from Ukraine, mid 2024

№	Country	Number of people
1	Germany	1 200 435
2	Czech Republic	380 375
3	United Kingdom	248 360
4	Spain	211 305
5	Italy	172 820
6	Netherlands	117 840
7	Ireland	110 060
8	Belgium	82 725
9	Austria	81 385
10	Norway	75 010

Source: compiled by the author based on UNHCR data [23]

To sum up, the most significant human outflow from Ukraine was recorded in February-April 2022. In May-September 2022 movements back to Ukraine were slightly higher than movements out, which could be partially explained by voluntary returns which occurred at that period. As usually, it was increase in movements in both directions during summer holidays. After that cross-border movements from and to western borders of Ukraine have tended to stabilize. Thus, during 2023 one million monthly movements were recorded from and to Ukraine [27].

Analysis of the dynamics of international permanent migration of Ukrainian citizens over the last years shows that the number of people who received permission to leave Ukraine has tendencies for decreasing first. But starting from the 2014 (a year of occupation of part territory of Ukraine by Russia) the number of such migrant began to increase again and in 2016 was the highest for the analyzed period and was 13,6 thousand people (Figure 2). It is worth mentioning that at the official site of the State migration service of Ukraine statistical data were provided about amount of Ukrainian citizens which receive permission for movement abroad for permanent residence. Since 2017 p. relevant indicator is named as “documents issued for the departure of Ukrainian citizens abroad for permanent residence”. No explanation or comments were provided about some changes in methodology on the site. So, it is no confidence if it is the same indicator or not, but in 2017 the number halved in comparison with 2016. In 2020 also significant decrease of permanent migrants is observed. Additional more detailed study is needed for clarifying reasons for those changes.




Figure 2. Dynamics of international permanent migration of the population of Ukraine, 2011-2024 (first 6 months)

Source: compiled by the author based on the data of State migration service of Ukraine [17]

The highest number of returnees was in 2013 (3.7 thousand people) and was decreasing for all the analysed period. The lowest number of those who returned to Ukraine was during two years of full scaled war – 2022 and 2023 (data for 2024 are for half year that's why cannot be compared with other). But during all analysed period (2011-2024) the number of those who returned was much more lower than those who received permission for emigration. Besides, it is important to note that there is a significant number of citizens of Ukraine who permanently live abroad and acquired the citizenship of another state without official appeals to the Ukrainian authorities and without holding relevant procedures, so they are not reflected in the official statistic. That's why it is difficult to know the exact number of permanent migrant. In any way the available data make it possible to trace the general trends in the development of processes of international stationary migration of citizens of Ukraine.

Rapid war related human flows from Ukraine involve also a big problem of intellectual losses. Based on sociological studies, it is estimated that 62-69% of refugees from Ukraine have higher level of education (including doctorate) [28]. In comparison, the share of high educated individuals in the total Ukrainian workforce is 29% and in European-33%. [1]. One of the most popular indicator for measuring emigration of highly educated or highly skilled

individuals is Human Flight and Brain Drain Index. It measures the economic impact of "human capital flight", commonly referred to as "brain drain," within a country. This index ranges from 0 to 10, where a higher score indicates a greater degree of human capital flight. Data for last 8 years show the lowest value of the index for Ukraine in 2018 and it was slightly increasing over the next years until 2023 (Figure 3). In 2023 brain drain index increased for 3 points (comparing to previous year) and was 8.9. The world average is 4.98 index points, based on data from 176 countries [5].




Figure 3. Human flight and brain drain index, Ukraine, 2017–2024

Source: compiled by the author based on the data of Fund for Peace [5]

Chapter 2. European countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees

Poland, which at the beginning of the war hosted the largest number of Ukrainian citizens, had taken a range of measures to make their movement and stay in the country comfortable. In particular, the entry procedure was simplified as much as possible (they could cross the border even with internal passports), and free travel was introduced for all types of public transport. They don't have to contact assistance centers, they just show their Ukrainian passports with border crossing stamps after 24 February 2022 directly in place of service. It is worth mentioning that almost half of EU countries started to gradually introduce free travel for Ukrainian refugees (Slovak Republic, Austria, Romania, Germany, Hungary, etc.). Other countries provide free travel

for Ukrainians for some types of transport (e.g., only railway), transport operators, or in some big cities.

Displaced persons that have found temporary protection in Poland are assigned an identification number PESEL [16] that grants access to medical care, employment, and education and stipulates a one-time payment of PLN300 (about UAH2,100) per adult and PLN500 (UAH3,500) per child. Additional one-time financial assistance (PLN 700) Ukrainians can receive under the UN program. Moreover, Poland grants social payments under various programs for support of families with children, including the purchase of school supplies and co-funding the nursery, kids club, or guardianship fees. So even mothers with small children can find employment. Children from Ukraine get an opportunity to study for free in public schools, not even knowing the language (school organizes additional language lessons for them), and students continue their studies. Although Poland has unfolded a broad network of volunteer support to Ukrainians, Poles are also additionally encouraged by the Government. Individuals or organizations providing housing and catering to Ukrainians receive PLN1,200 a month (UAH8,500) but only for 60 days.

The President of Poland Andrzej Duda signed three bills to facilitate the stay of refugees from Ukraine. According to Rzeczpospolita [15], the first one is the so-called special act on assistance to Ukraine that provides that the refugees arriving from other countries after 24 February can apply for assistance same as those coming directly from Ukraine. The second law outlines the procedure of registration of minor Ukrainians, including those arriving in Poland without legal guardians. The register is designated to secure an opportunity for the Polish Government to give the Ukrainian party information about the fate of children in the country's territory. The third adopted law regulates the validity of the Ukrainian driver's license in Poland and transport registration. In particular, it suspends the requirement for mandatory replacement of a Ukrainian driver's license with a Polish document for 6 days from the receipt of a permanent or temporary residence permit till late 2022.

Romania was the second country by the number of hosted forcibly displaced people from Ukraine. Asylum seekers in Romania had a chance for free accommodation and catering in one of six regional centers managed by the General Immigration Inspection. Ukrainians, same as other foreigners, have the right to work on the same terms as Romanian citizens in three months since applying for temporary protection. The Government and civil society developed the *Dopomoha* platform that simplifies the asylum procedure and the search for accommodation and job. Ukrainian citizens entering Romania with biometric passport have the right to free medical care and examination for 90 days.

According to the UN, about 570,000 refugees arrived in *Hungary* from the beginning of the war till May 8 [18]. It is a significant number, although the

Hungarian Government had previously named an even higher figure. Hungarian policy has also announced the number of Ukrainians entering the country from Romania. According to their information, Hungary has welcomed more than a million Ukrainian refugees already.

On May 6, Hungarian National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing published the data showing that 20,275 Ukrainians have applied for the so-called “asylum status” since the beginning of the war [7]. It is the meager number of arrivals from Ukraine. This status gives the right to medical care, attending school, accommodation, catering, free language courses, and HUF22,000 (€58) of financial assistance a month.

The Hungarian National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing has announced that 10,251 Ukrainians had refugee status as of May 6. The lack of information and proper communication is the reason why so many Ukrainian refugees have applied for this status. Traditionally, Ukrainians stay in Hungary for several days and go further to the countries of Western Europe. According to the police, the number of fleeing from Ukraine in the country was from 15,000 to 20,000. Later on this figure stabilized within 4,000-6,000 [7].

The obvious fact is that most refugees go further to Hungary – mostly to Western Europe. However, the Hungarian Government keeps insisting on a significant number of Ukrainians being welcomed by Hungary.

On April 21 2022, the Speaker of the National Assembly Gergely Gulyás announced at the press conference that 625,000 Ukrainian refugees had arrived in Hungary since the beginning of the war, although the UN reports a much lower figure. The difference can be in the fact that the Government also includes in the statistics those arriving from Romania.

The experience shows that the procedure of application for asylum in Hungary goes far from smoothly. For instance, 52 times more people have submitted similar applications in Poland by late April and 19 times more in the Czech Republic. Even in Spain, 2.5 times more people have applied for this legal status than in Hungary [18].

With regard to the *Slovak Republic*, 56,800 people that have crossed the Ukrainian-Slovakian border have applied for one-year residence, but only 142 people have applied for refugee status. These figures were announced by the Ukrainian Ambassador to Slovakia Yuri Mushka [21]. These people can count on medical care, although not entire scope of medical assistance but only emergency care, and they can use transport and motorways for free. Any person that is provided with temporary asylum has the right to free movement in the Slovak Republic, travel to another EU country, and even travel to Ukraine and return to the territory of the Slovak Republic anytime. If you decide to return to Ukraine not planning to return to the Slovak Republic as a refugee, you must reject temporary asylum in writing, addressing it to the Migration Office of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic [20].

According to Ambassador, 56,800 are legally staying in Slovakia and not going to leave the country. Other forcibly displaced either cross the country to move further to the Czech Republic or the countries of Western Europe or haven't registered yet. Commentating on the intentions of forcibly displaced, Mushka informs that our compatriots mostly want to return to Ukraine, and some are already going back as the situation slightly stabilizes [21].

Germany received the largest number of Ukrainian citizens among the countries not bordering Ukraine (since the beginning of the large-scale war). The Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community informs that 266,000 refugees from Ukraine were registered in the country as of late March 2022 [9]. Ukrainians can get here for free from Poland, Hungary, Austria, and the Czech Republic. The temporary protection application procedure is simplified as much as possible for Ukrainian citizens in some German regions (they just have to send the scanned passport and completed questionnaires by e-mail to the Office on Foreigners). Temporary protection includes a limited list of medical services. Full medical insurance is granted only to employed refugees. For that matter, Ukrainians have to receive a permit. If people are not accommodated in a dormitory provided by social service agencies and are not getting material assistance (clothes, food, furniture), they have the right to the financial assistance of the state in the amount of €367 per month per an adult. The size of the child allowance depends on age (under 6 years – €249, from 6 to 17 – €326, adults under 25 living with parents – €294) [2]. Free German courses are organized for Ukrainians. Pupils and students have a chance to continue their studies in Germany. The main problems here are the deficit of accommodation, especially in large cities, and far too high rent. Obviously, temporary stay facilities (e.g., school gyms) do not have needed conveniences. Therefore, the Wunderflats platform offering free accommodation or discounts for Ukrainians was created. Moreover, there is an opportunity to get social housing compensated by the state.

EU provides financial and logistical assistance to Poland and Romania, which host the largest number of Ukrainians, same as to Moldova. Several EU countries and Norway previously offered to welcome 14,500 Ukrainian refugees from Moldova. Other countries will prepare additional sites they can move to [4].

A particular burden parameter formed based on the data on displaced persons from Ukraine, the total number of refugees, and the ratio of these parameters to the population is planned for introduction [12]. Meanwhile, Poland and Germany call for a more distinct solidarity scheme, in particular for allocation of a fixed amount of funds from the EU to the hosting country for each accommodated refugee.

The system of quotas for the redistribution of refugees between the EU countries will not work since Ukrainians have the right to stay 90 days in the

EU under a visa-free regime, and they can choose any country they want to stay in. Experts' calculations confirmed by the data of mobile operators allow arguing that the third part of Ukrainians having crossed the Polish border do not stay in the country but head to other states [11]. To facilitate their movement, a decision was made to reinforce the coordination of transport connections and cooperation with Great Britain, the USA, and Canada.

Moreover, European Union has already launched the solidarity platform where each country provides information on how many refugees from Ukraine it can take. Namely, the information includes accommodation for a longer stay of Ukrainians in the EU. EU home affairs ministers agreed to create an index that would help unload the countries hosting most people. The index should contain the following data: how many displaced from Ukraine are in each EU country, how many refugees are in total from all over the world, and how these figures correlate with the population there. The information on the state of affairs should be updated regularly [4].

European Union is also developing an action plan to prevent the exploitation of Ukrainian refugees by criminal groups. It is of utmost importance since most of them are women and children. Moreover, the ministers agreed to attract Europol and activate the European Interdisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT). In such a way, the EU is trying to prevent criminals or people from terrorism databases from entering its territory.

Chapter 3. Perspectives for returning

The massive fleeing of the population, in addition to military losses and substantial losses of civilians poses a threat to demographic, economic, and social security of the country. Therefore, the issue of returning our citizens to their Motherland will be of utmost importance after the end of the war. The solution depends on many factors. Naturally, Ukraine's victory, creation of a safe and peaceful environment, and quick restoration of destroyed cities and settlements are the first and necessary conditions. It is important to note that not only the cessation of the active phase of war, but also the conditions for its achievement are of fundamental importance. That is, a temporary truce not only will not lead to the return of temporarily displaced persons, but may cause a new wave of external migration. This statement may be confirmed by the results of a sociological survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in May 2022. Thus, the majority of Ukrainians (85%) plan the future of their children and grandchildren in Ukraine in the event of the war ending due to the capitulation of Russia and its complete disarmament or Ukraine receiving significant security guarantees (for example, joining NATO). On the other hand, in the case of signing a truce, the share of such persons is only 55%.

The scale and speed of return largely depends on the motives and previous intentions of the displaced persons themselves. At first glance, the results of research of the Razumkov Center Sociology Service conducted in March 2022 at border checkpoints in Zakarpatska oblast seem to be quite optimistic. They show that most people leaving abroad due to hostilities were planning to return to Ukraine after the end of the war (79 %) [14]. Only each tenth respondent expressed the determination to remain abroad, and the rest (11 %) hesitated to answer. A little more than half of the respondents are residents of the East and South of the country, 45% are residents of the central regions, and only 4% are residents of the western regions of Ukraine. That is, the participants of the survey were mostly from settlements where hostilities took place directly, or those that were located near the contact line, or their settlement was subjected to shelling and airstrikes. Since the same research wasn't conducted at border checkpoints in Lvivska oblast, based on our own observations, we can assume that the percentage of those eager to return might have turned out to be much lower. Because a substantial share of people (mostly from western regions of Ukraine) used simplified entry terms to take children abroad (without a notarized parental consent) or realize their intentions to arrange their lives abroad. Yet, this issue needs detailed research.

It would be interesting to interview the same respondents, but already in the countries where they settled, after a certain period of time. There is a reason to believe that the percentage of those eager to return will be much lower. For example., the survey of displaced people from Ukraine in Poland conducted by the Polish agency EWL revealed only 58% of those willing to return home [11]. In addition, the results of a study conducted in mid-May-June 2022 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also serve as confirmation of the abovementioned hypothesis. 4 900 Ukrainians who moved to Poland, the Czech Republic, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary were interviewed. Despite the fact that the majority of respondents dream of returning to their homeland, 65% still plan to stay in their current country in the near future, and another 9% plan to move to another one. For a third part of people intending to move further, the desired destination country is Germany. Only 16% of respondents declared their plans to return to Ukraine, while most of them (60%) have not yet decided when exactly they will do so. The main motive for returning was the awareness of the improvement of the situation in Ukraine, as well as the desire to return home and reunite with family members.

How quickly the refugees from Ukraine come back depends on the mode of their legal stay abroad (status of “forced” tourist, refugee, or temporary protection). Regarding the first option, it can be used by all holders of biometric passports that allow them to stay in the EU countries for 90 days. If they are provided with housing (stay with relatives or acquaintances), they do not need financial assistance and are not obliged to register in the host country.

It is obvious that the category of displaced people will return first, and the percentage of returns in this group will be the highest.

However, most of those fleeing war formalize their refugee status or ask for temporary protection. Under these statuses, a person gets more or less similar rights (accommodation, right to employment, access to housing, medical and social assistance, access to education for children and teenagers), but the ways they get or lose them and regulations are different.

It is worth mentioning that the temporary protection period is one year with an opportunity to prolong it to three years. However, if the war ends and the situation in Ukraine stabilizes, the temporary protection period will cease earlier.

The refugee status guarantees the right to permanent residence in the respective country. Meanwhile, the refugee status application procedure has some peculiarities in different EU countries (passport retention for application processing period that can last for 6-9 months, a ban to leave the country, and impossibility of employment during this period) [6]. Taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of each status, the choice of a displaced person depends on the motives mentioned above. So those eager to return home right after the hostilities end choose temporary protection.

Naturally that decision to stay or to return home also depends of the life conditions from both sides. So, the results of the survey of Ukrainian refugees, conducted by Ukrainian Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in April 2024, show that most of them (66%) are satisfied with their life conditions in host countries (801 refugees who left Ukraine after beginning of full scale war and currently lived in Germany, Poland and Czech Republic, took part in the online interview) [9]. Most of respondents would like to obtain citizenship of the host country or have already submitted documents for it. Only third part of all interviewed refugees have not submitted documents and were not planning to obtain citizenship of another country. Generally it is estimated that the shares of those who are more likely to return and those who are not are approximately equal: 50% [10]. The most important factors influencing decision to return are: working critical infrastructure, security of the settlement, availability of dwelling (if existing is not damaged or can be repaired) and finishing of the full scale war.

As for now, there is no precise information on amount of refugees who returned to Ukraine. As of August 2024, estimated number of returnees from abroad was more than 1 million people, 88% of which returned from EU countries [8].

Conclusions and recommendations

To sum up, the following factors pose a threat to Ukraine's demographic and socio-economic security:

- mass emigration of children and highly educated working-age people abroad;
- measures of other countries regarding the assimilation of our citizens, which contribute to the transformation of the temporary nature of migration into permanent;
- protracted nature of the war in Ukraine, its genocidal character, massive destruction of housing, civilian infrastructure, damage to property, which serve as additional pushing factors.

Obviously, the longer the war lasts, the more people will leave. In addition, for many Ukrainian temporary protection seekers such a period of time may be enough to settle into life abroad. Then, after the martial law termination, they may join other family members and men who currently do not have the right to travel outside of Ukraine. That is, according to a pessimistic scenario, the end of the war may lead to a new powerful wave of international migration of Ukrainian population. It may occur at the expense of relatives of those who moved abroad during the war, as well as those who will be driven by the fear of poverty (which is often a consequence of the post-war economic crisis).

The implementation of the optimistic scenario (the return of the majority of our citizens to Ukraine) depends on the promptness and comprehensiveness of the state and local authorities' actions. For this purpose, it is necessary to implement the following measures:

1. Establishment and support of social and cultural ties with forced migrants abroad.

For this, it is necessary to establish a system of legal and social assistance to those migrants who need it; support the creation and operation of Ukrainian-language weekend schools or online educational projects (including providing the opportunity for refugee children to receive Ukrainian education abroad remotely); to intensify informational, educational, and educational activities; provide assistance in organizing the cultural life of Ukrainians abroad; ensure the opportunity for displaced persons to realize their civil rights. Informational, psychological and advisory support for migrants is also important, which will also make it possible to make an informed decision about the possibilities for returning to Ukraine. World practice shows that the presence of strong social contacts of migrants with the Motherland is one of the most important prerequisites for their return. It is obvious that in the conditions while the hot phase of the war is still going on and the threat of air attacks from the aggressor remains constant for the entire territory of Ukraine, it is inappropriate to talk about stimulating the return of refugees. However, it is extremely important at this stage not to lose ties with them, not to let them lose their sense of belonging and feeling that their country needs them.

2. Preservation and development of labor, social and economic relations.

The introduction of quarantine restrictions in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic (2020) prompted educational, research, etc. institutions and organizations to introduce online learning and remote work. The use of this experience became extremely useful in the conditions of the war, which made it possible to ensure the continuity of the educational process, continue work and support the country's economy. However, the government's ban on remote job of public sector workers abroad (CMU Resolution No. 481 dated 04.26.2022) may cause their mass dismissal. It especially concerns the research field, where the need to make an immediate choice between a small salary, a dangerous existence in Ukraine, and possible better prospects in a foreign, but safe, peaceful country can prompt displaced persons to release and finally emigrate. Therefore, the government should introduce measures to preserve the jobs of employees of the public sector of the economy, as well as to make wider use of the investment and intellectual potential of Ukrainian migrants.

3. Restoration of the social infrastructure of Ukraine.

According to the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories, 800,000 Ukrainian citizens have lost their homes or need to repair them. At the same time, studies show that the most important conditions for the return of foreign migrants are security and the availability of housing. Since housing problems require an immediate solution, simultaneously with the gradual restoration, reconstruction and renovation of the housing stock, it is necessary to expand the network of specialized houses for temporary residence of citizens. Along with this, other objects of social infrastructure (roads, transport connections, schools, kindergartens, etc.) need to be restored and modernized as soon as possible. Measures to return citizens to Ukraine can be effective only after solving these urgent problems.

4. Implementation of monitoring studies of current problems, needs and intentions of Ukrainian refugees.

The information basis for the development of the program for the return of our citizens after the war should be the results of regular sociological surveys of the displaced persons in order to monitor their current problems, interests and intentions. Such monitoring should also identify the main factors of return, as well as determine the relevance and possibilities of forming a circular migration model. Along with this, it is necessary to carry out an active information and campaign policy, which should form citizens' understanding and awareness of their importance, the significance of their contribution to the recovery processes of their Motherland.

5. Strengthening of cooperation with the countries that hosted the largest number of Ukrainian citizens.

Close cooperation with the countries that have become the main recipients of refugees from Ukraine (Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Turkey, Italy, Spain, Moldova, Romania and Slovakia) is important for the joint

organization of the necessary assistance to our citizens and the possibility of maintaining contacts with them in the future. Here, it is also advisable to activate the negotiation and contractual process regarding the settlement of issues of social support, employment and pension provision of displaced persons. The development and implementation of joint programs of circular migration, as well as targeted programs of voluntary return, is relevant. Special assistance is needed for persons who, under certain circumstances, appeared on the territory of the Russian Federation. With the support of authoritative international organizations, the government of Ukraine should facilitate the voluntary return of Ukrainians home.

6. Russian rocket terror counteraction.

During the five months of the war, Russia launched more than 3,000 missiles on the territory of Ukraine. The aggressor's use of old-style (X-type) missiles in urban settlements and cynical targeted bombing of civilian objects and places of crowding make the entire territory of Ukraine unsafe for habitation. Such a situation pushes abroad not only people from occupied territories or places of hostilities, but also residents of settlements far from the front line. It is obvious that Ukraine's path to victory and peace is a long and difficult process, but only the reduction of missile terror would be able not only to reduce the scale of population migration abroad, but also to encourage a certain part of refugees to return to their Motherland. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to intensify the work on obtaining additional means of air defense protection, to increase international political and economic pressure, to find levers of influence on the leadership of Russia to ensure compliance with at least the rules of warfare or to achieve its recognition as a terrorist state.

7. Development of mechanisms for the voluntary return of Ukrainian refugees from abroad after the end of the war.

In the strategy of Ukraine reconstruction in the post-war period, which is being developed now, programs to stimulate the voluntary return and reintegration of refugees has also to be included. Such programs should contain not only guarantees of receiving basic assistance (in particular, for the restoration of destroyed or damaged housing), but also a number of measures to stimulate the employment of these persons, support the start-up of a private business, provide professional training and retraining services, psychological and medical assistance, etc.

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