

SOCIAL POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES IN THE TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF UKRAINE IN 2022 (BASED ON MATERIALS FROM THE NEWSPAPER “WYBORCZA.PL”)

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INTRODUCTION

The Russian-Ukrainian war, the full-scale Russian invasion, the military situation on the front line, and socio-humanitarian issues, among others, are actively covered not only by the Ukrainian press but also by global media. Naturally, these topics are also addressed on the pages of the popular Polish daily newspaper Wyborcza.pl. Founded in 1989, Wyborcza.pl quickly became Poland's most popular political print publication. The articles published by Wyborcza.pl journalists contribute to the coverage of socio-political events worldwide. It is evident that Polish journalists actively report on the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war and, among other topics, analyze the socio-humanitarian situation in the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia.

The Russian-Ukrainian war, its periodization, nature, and the international community's response have sparked academic interest among Ukrainian historians, sociologists, and psychologists. The perspectives of Ukrainian historians on the nature of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war are analyzed in the research by M. Haliv and V. Ilnytskyi¹. The views of Ukrainian scholars on the periodization of the Russian-Ukrainian war are examined by V. Ilnytskyi and O. Kunytska². The ideological views of the President of the Russian Federation on the “unity of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples” are characterized by researchers V. Ilnytskyi, M. Hlibishchuk, V. Starka³.

¹ Haliv M., Ilnytskyi V. The Nature of the Modern Russian-Ukrainian War (2014–2023): Domestic Historiographical Discourse. *Problems of the Humanities: Collection of Scientific Papers of Drohobych Ivan Franko State Pedagogical University. Series History*. 2023. Issue 13/55. P. 47–73. DOI: 10.24919/2312-2595.13/55.283164

² Ilnytskyi V., Kutska O. Periodization of the Russian-Ukrainian War (2014–2022) in Ukrainian Scholarly Discourse. *Problems of the Humanities: Collection of Scientific Papers of Drohobych Ivan Franko State Pedagogical University. Series History*, 2023. Issue 13/55. 162–177. DOI: 10.24919/2312-2595.13/55.283087

³ Ilnytskyi V., Hlibishchuk M., Starka V. How the Ideological Foundations of the White Guard Movement Influenced V. Putin's Worldview. *Current Issues of the Humanities*, 2022. Issue 53 (1). P. 12–21.

The influence of Russian propaganda on the preparation for Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine has been examined by researchers V. Ilnytskyi, M. Haliv, and V. Starka⁴. The study of the Russian-Ukrainian war by the Warsaw Center for Eastern Studies has been characterized by V. Telvak and V. Ilnytskyi⁵. Various aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian war are analyzed by Antonina Boichuk, Nataliia Ilnytska, and Nazarii Zadorozhnyi⁶ in the scientific journals *East European Historical Bulletin* and *Military-Scientific Bulletin*.

Polish political analysts actively covered the full-scale invasion of Russian troops into Ukraine. The representation of their views in the Polish press has been studied by Oksana Medvid⁷, Vitalii Masnenko, Bohdan Yanyshyn, and Viktoriia Telvak⁸.

1. Humanitarian Crisis

Halyna Chalimonyk analyzes the situation in occupied Kherson. She points out that “the occupation morning began at 6 a.m. when the

⁴ Ilnytskyi V., Starka V., Haliv M. Russian Propaganda as an Element of Preparation for Armed Aggression Against Ukraine. *Ukrainian Historical Journal*, 2022. Issue 5. P. 43–55. DOI: 10.15407/uhj2022.05.043

⁵ Telvak V., & Ilnytskyi V. A Year of Existential War in Analytical Reflections of the Warsaw Centre for Eastern Studies. *Skhidnoieuropeiskyi Istorychnyi Visnyk [East European Historical Bulletin]*. 2023. Issue 27. P. 249–258. [in English]. DOI: 10.24919/2519-058X.27.281552

⁶ Boichuk A., Ilnytska N. Materials on the History of the Modern Russian-Ukrainian War in the Pages of the “East European Historical Bulletin” (2016 – 2023). *Problems of the Humanities: Collection of Scientific Papers of Drohobych Ivan Franko State Pedagogical University. Series History*. 2023. Issue 13/55. P. 26–46. DOI: 10.24919/2312-2595.13/55.283084; Zadorozhnyi N., Boichuk A. The Issues of the Modern Russian-Ukrainian War in the Pages of the “Military-Scientific Bulletin” (2014 – 2022). *Problems of the Humanities: Collection of Scientific Papers of Drohobych Ivan Franko State Pedagogical University. Series History*. 2023. Issue 13/55. P. 108–140. DOI: 10.24919/2312-2595.13/55.283181

⁷ Medvid O. V. Polish Press on the Outset of the Ukrainian-Russian War: Based on Materials from the Newspaper “Wyborcza.pl” (April–August 2014). *The Russian-Ukrainian war (2014–2022): historical, political, cultural-educational, religious, economic, and legal aspects: Scientific monograph*. Riga, Latvia: “Baltija Publishing”, 2022. P. 599–603.

⁸ Masnenko V., Telvak Vitalii, Yanyshyn B., Telvak Viktoria. Identity transformation of the Ukrainian Donbas: from the “wild field” to Russian occupation. *Analele Universității din Craiova. Istorie*. 2021. Issue 2 (40). P. 101–114.

curfew ended.”⁹ The author emphasizes that food prices increased three to four times. Sugar, which cost 25 hryvnias (4 zlotys) before the war, now costs 120 hryvnias (18 zlotys) in the occupied territories. Eggs, which could be bought for 41 hryvnias (6 zlotys) before the war, now cost 100 hryvnias (15 zlotys). Products for a traditional borscht are impossible to buy, and although Kherson region is based on agriculture, vegetables have disappeared from stores and markets. People mainly eat porridge and pasta. In the first days of the occupation, meat disappeared from stores, but later it returned to the shelves. Breeders had no way to feed livestock, so they began mass slaughter. There was also a problem with payments. Initially, money trucks did arrive in the city, and accompanying personnel could refill ATMs, though people still had to wait in line for at least 4–5 hours to withdraw cash. However, soon after, ATMs stopped working due to a lack of cash.

In occupied Kherson, as in all other temporarily occupied territories, there is a problem with providing medication. The hardest situation is for people with chronic diseases. Before the war, the state provided these medications for free, but now the population has no access to them. There is no baby food in pharmacies and stores at all. This is a tragedy for mothers who cannot breastfeed. Their children are starving.

The Russians have turned the city into a territory of fear. They abduct people from their homes, take them for interrogations, and torture them. No one can feel safe. Many people have fled the city, with the latest information indicating over 400,000 have left.

The journalist notes that despite the terror, in late April, the people of Kherson organized mass protests and peaceful rallies with slogans such as “Kherson is Ukraine” and “Occupants, go home”. The Russians responded by shooting into the air and using tear gas. The most active participants in the protests were taken for interrogations. They are being blackmailed with the threat that their loved ones' lives may be at risk. The Russians use electronic torture. News of the brutal treatment of the protesters effectively discourages other residents from

⁹ Chalimonik H. Ukrainian Women from Kherson Tell About Life Under Russian Occupation. “Every Resident There is a Hostage.” *Wyborcza.pl*, May 25, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

demonstrating. Every peaceful resident of the Kherson region is a Russian hostage.

The occupiers are blocking humanitarian aid from entering the city. Grain and vegetables are being exported to Russia. In Kherson, the military destroyed a help center where food and medicine were stored. Provoking a humanitarian crisis, Russian propagandists are filming videos showing Kherson residents accepting aid from their hands. However, a partisan resistance is beginning to emerge in the city¹⁰.

Wojciech Chuchnowski and Roman Imielski, in the article “Begging for Candles in the Ruined Izium,” describe the humanitarian situation in Izium. They note that along the asphalt road, there are shells and bombs, burned tanks and armored personnel carriers. Three villages have been completely destroyed, with no signs of life. And there are kilometers of simple signs: “Stop. Mines!” The multi-story panel blocks are haunting with their charred window frames, some of them turned into ruins. Two bridges across the Donets River have been blown up, and the northern outskirts are connected to the city center, located along the river's bend, only by an improvised pontoon crossing. The streets have no electricity, and the windows of stores and cafes are boarded up. Young and middle-aged men are almost absent. Mainly women with children and elderly people, whom the Russians were unable to forcibly deport, remain. The journalists were struck by the fact that “people ask about candles, as they are one of the most important things for them today. This is the third decade of the 21st century, 1200 kilometers from the border with Poland. This is where the Kremlin criminal Vladimir Putin decided to show what Russian 'peace' looks like”¹¹.

Eva Wilczyńska, in her article “Donetsk Basement,” reveals the horrific conditions Ukrainians face in shelters in the Donetsk region. She notes that by the third or possibly fourth day in the basement, the electricity disappears. People also have no water. The internet is only available between the first and second floors. Previously, they would go to an apartment during the day to cook. Now, the men are building a stove outside from a metal box, logs, and planks. It can hold two pots. They search for water in the area. Nearby, there is a construction site

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Czuchnowski, W., Imielski, R. Begging for a Candle in the Ruined Izium. We Were with Humanitarian Aid in Eastern Ukraine. *Wyborcza.pl*, October 21, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

where generators are still running. When the sounds of the fight quiet down, one of the men collects everyone's phones to charge them there. He also fills bottles with water¹².

2. Deportation of the Population

The issue of the deportation of Ukrainians and the humanitarian problems they face in filtration camps is raised by journalist Michał Kokot in his publication "Over a Million Ukrainians Deported to Russia. Some of Them Were to be Sent to the Far East." He points out that the Russians often do not give Ukrainians a choice regarding these evacuations and force them to go to Russia. This has become essentially the only way to leave Mariupol, as leaving the city independently is either risky or almost impossible.

The residents first go to filtration camps that the Russians set up in three towns about 20 km west of the besieged Mariupol: in Nikolske, Mangush, and Yalta (a small town near Mariupol). The worst conditions are reported in the filtration camp in Nikolske. "Around a thousand people were brought to a village school building. Elderly people often lie on the bare ground in the corridors, sometimes with only a blanket. Each person was allowed just one toilet and one sink. By the second day, soap and disinfectants ran out. Soon after, toilet paper was exhausted. Dysentery began to spread in the camp"¹³.

Using eyewitness accounts, Polish journalist Michał Kokot points out that during interrogations, the Russians reviewed the history of phone conversations and inquired about connections with public and political figures, as well as attitudes toward Russian and Ukrainian politics. Those suspected by the investigators of being "Ukrainian Nazis" were taken to Donetsk, where they faced torture and prolonged interrogations.

In this publication, Kokot also cites an interview with Russian General Mizintev, given to the TASS agency. Specifically, the general confirmed that since the start of the war, more than a million Ukrainians, including 183,000 children, had been transferred from Ukraine to Russia. These Ukrainians passed through Russian filtration

¹² Wilczyńska, E. Donetsk Basement. *Wyborcza.pl*, October 7, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

¹³ Kokot M. Over a million Ukrainians deported to Russia. Some of them were supposed to be sent to the Far East. *Wyborcza.pl*. April 30, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

camps. He boasted that the Russians had conducted “seven humanitarian operations” in Ukraine, and on Tuesday alone, they “evacuated” 16,400 people from Donbas to Russia, including more than 3,300 children¹⁴.

Victoria Belyashyn in her article “Mariupol. Russia in Ukraine: War Crimes” points out that residents of the left-bank part of the city, which is occupied by the Russians, are now being deported to the territories of the separatist republics. Some of them are sent to Donetsk, others to cities in the Russian Federation. Friends of my family have been in Novoazovsk for ten days, where they are undergoing so-called filtration, i.e., they are being interrogated by, among others, FSB officers, who are trying to find out what Ukrainian intelligence services are planning.

Even in the filtration camp, the Russians encouraged Ukrainians to evacuate to Russia. They said that everyone who crosses the border would receive 10,000 rubles (approximately 600 zlotys) and guaranteed employment. In particular, Belyashyn cites the memories of a resident of Kherson region: “When Dmitry was allowed to leave the camp, he went to Donetsk, and from there – with his entire family – to the border with Russia. He says that after crossing the border, he saw leaflets: ‘The Russian Far East is waiting for you.’ 10,000 rubles and a promise of a job”¹⁵.

Mateusz Lachowski in the article “Where the Russians Enter, Normal Life Will No Longer Exist” addresses the problem of the deportation of Ukrainian children to remote areas of Russia. He states that the filtration camps in the Luhansk Republic resemble concentration camps more than anything. The article also describes: “A mother had her child taken, suspected of pro-Ukrainian connections. The woman was taken to the camp, and the child was deported. In another case, a woman who managed to leave had her child taken by the pro-Russian authorities, leaving her under the care of relatives. She returned, wanting to find them, and was placed in a filtration camp. What will happen to the child is unknown. She was told that the child is in some orphanage where they will teach him to believe in Great Russia. I know this all sounds abstract to us, it did to me at first too,

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Bielaszyn W. Mariupol. Russia in Ukraine: War Crimes. *Wyborcza.pl*. April 1, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

but we are talking about thousands, hundreds of children deported with their parents, and often alone”¹⁶.

Marta Urzędowska, in her article “Where are the residents of Mariupol?”, highlights the issue of the deportation of families with children from the occupied Mariupol. For the first few weeks, they hid from the bombs in the basements of their homes. In mid-March, Moscow-backed separatists arrived and ordered everyone to disperse. Under fire, they were taken to a location where they met residents who were being led out of other areas. Women and children were packed into buses, while the men went further. The women were allowed into a mother-and-child room, where many of the children were sick, suffering from diarrhea, dysentery, and vomiting. Vitaliy remained in the main hall, where hundreds of men tried to nap in chairs. They were given almost no food – tea for breakfast, cookies, and hot water for lunch¹⁷.

After this, the families were sent by bus to the Russian border, where after another interrogation, they spent the night in a camp on the Russian side. The next morning, another bus took them to the train station in the city of Taganrog on the Azov Sea, where only one train awaited them – to Saransk, a city several hundred kilometers east of Moscow. During the filtration procedure, Mariupol residents had been told that they would receive money for a new life anywhere in Russia.

Women who did not have passports and could not travel independently were put on a train with their children and sent to Moscow, and from there to the city of Vladimir, which is a thousand kilometers north of Mariupol. There, they were met by Russian journalists who showed how the Russian authorities were “helping” Ukrainians.

The local authorities allocated each family an amount equivalent to \$150. Mothers were forced to enroll their children in local schools. However, the Ukrainian children were mocked at school, and the teachers were hostile towards them.

The bad reputation of filtration camps has remained since World War II, when soldiers returning from the Western Front were

¹⁶ Łachowski M. Where the Russians Come, There Will Be No Normal Life Anymore. *Wyborcza.pl*. July 19, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

¹⁷ Marta Urzędowska. Where are the residents of Mariupol? *Wyborcza.pl*. May 30, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

interrogated there. Russia decided to recreate them in the 1990s during the Chechen wars. Theoretically, they were meant to separate civilians from militants. In practice, the Russians committed horrific torture and rape against anyone they wished.

3. Plundering of Territories

Polish journalists highlight the issue of theft of agricultural products and machinery. Rafał Bolanowski, in his article “The Rise in Wheat Prices Is Inevitable. Russian Mines on Ukrainian Fields,” points out that “almost 30 percent of the global wheat supply still came from Russia and Ukraine. Additionally, nearly 20 percent of global corn exports and 80 percent of global sunflower oil exports came from these countries. Currently, there is no reason to talk about a potential famine in our country, but if we have another year of poor harvests, a problem may arise”¹⁸. He also emphasizes that Russian soldiers are confiscating grain, bombing grain storage facilities, stealing agricultural machinery, and people are not working in the fields because they are afraid of bombs and fires. Ukrainians warn that Russia, after nearly a hundred years, is trying to starve Ukraine again. There are numerous reports of bombing of grain storage facilities across the country. Near Kyiv, the Russians destroyed distribution centers and warehouses, trying to deliberately disrupt the delivery of food to the capital.

In April, the Russians bombed a large complex in the Luhansk region, destroying buildings, equipment, and several thousand tons of wheat, enough to feed 300,000 people for a year. Bolanowski stated that Moscow is trying to “create a Holodomor in Luhansk, there is no doubt about that”¹⁹.

Bombing and confiscation of grain in areas controlled by Russian forces bring back somber memories of the 1930s, when Soviet authorities, under the forced collectivization of agriculture, confiscated grain and harvests, leading to the deaths of millions of Ukrainians from hunger.

¹⁸ Bolanowski R. The Rise in Wheat Prices Is Inevitable. Russian Mines on Ukrainian Fields. URL: *Wyborcza.pl*. May 25, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

¹⁹ Bolanowski R. Wheat price hikes inevitable. Russian mines in Ukrainian fields. *Wyborcza.pl*. May 25, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+-Ukrainie&str=21>

In recent weeks, there have been increasing reports of Russian soldiers stealing not only household appliances but also agricultural machinery, crops, and building materials.

Maciej Czarnecki, in his article 'Russians stole \$5 million worth of agricultural machinery in Ukraine, but can't start it,' writes that Russian forces, who occupied Melitopol, seized equipment from a dealer of the American brand John Deere. Some of it was taken to Chechnya, where it turned out that it couldn't be used²⁰.

Czarnecki notes: "It seems that different departments competed for them. Some came in the morning, others in the evening. As observations showed, one of the vehicles used for looting had the symbol "Z" painted on it in white paint – a symbol of the Russian invasion. Probably, this was a military vehicle"²¹.

Part of the equipment was transported by land all the way to Chechnya. It's easy to track, as it is equipped with GPS systems. Modern technology allows it to be controlled remotely.

"When the invaders brought the stolen combines to Chechnya, they found that they couldn't even start them because they had been remotely locked," says a source from an American station.

It is noted that the machines can always be sold for parts, which can also bring in some money. However, "it seems the thieves have found consultants in Russia who are trying to bypass the security." Currently, the machines are sitting on a farm near Grozny.

4. Information Vacuum

In Russian-occupied Ukraine, restrictions on internet access began with key infrastructure built many years ago. In 2014, after Russia's annexation of Crimea, a strategic peninsula in southern Ukraine, the state telecommunications company laid an underwater cable across the Kerch Strait to reroute internet traffic from Crimea to Russia.

Researchers claim that data from Ukrainian networks is now being rerouted south through Crimea via these cables. Adam Satarian in his article "Russia's Information War" illustrates methods of informational occupation. In particular, he notes that on occupied territories, Russians reroute telecommunications and internet traffic to Russia,

²⁰ Czarnecki M. Russians stole agricultural machinery worth 5 million dollars from Ukraine, but they cannot start it. *Wyborcza.pl*. May 2, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

²¹ Ibid.

which allows them to control, censor, and monitor Ukrainians. The residents are subjected to Russian propaganda and are completely cut off from world news²².

A few weeks after the capture of Kherson, Russian military forces entered the offices of local internet providers and ordered them to relinquish control over their networks. Then, the Russians redirected mobile and internet data from Kherson to Russian networks. They blocked access to Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, as well as to Ukrainian news websites and other independent sources of information. Subsequently, they shut down Ukrainian mobile networks, forcing the residents of Kherson and its surrounding areas to use services provided by Russian mobile operators²³.

On May 30, 2022, internet traffic in Kherson networks such as “Skynet” and “Status Telecom” suddenly disappeared. Over the next few days, internet connectivity was restored, but it was already routed through the Russian telecommunications company “Miranda Media” in Crimea, according to Doug Madory, Director of Internet Analysis at Kentik, a company specializing in internet performance measurement²⁴.

The author noted that what happened in Kherson is occurring in every corner of Russian-occupied Ukraine. After six months of war, Russia controls significant parts of the country’s eastern and southern regions. Bombing has destroyed cities and villages, civilians are being tortured and killed, and supplies of food and medicine are running out. Meanwhile, Ukrainians in these regions have access only to Russian state television and radio²⁵.

In some Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, digital censorship is even worse than in Russia itself. In Kherson and Donetsk regions, Russian forces have even blocked Google, YouTube, and the messaging app Viber.

²² Satarianin A. Russia's Information War. *Wyborcza.pl*. May 26, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

²³ Łachowski M. Where the Russians come, there will be no normal life anymore. *Wyborcza.pl*. July 19, 2022. <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

²⁴ Bielaszyn W. Mariupol. Russia in Ukraine: War Crimes. *Wyborcza.pl*, April 1, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

²⁵ Satarianin A. Russia's Information War. *Wyborcza.pl*, May 26, 2022. URL: <https://wyborcza.pl/0,128956.html?tag=wojna+w+Ukrainie&str=21>

To further influence Ukrainians, Russia has also begun occupying cyberspace. As a result, residents of occupied Kherson, Melitopol, and Mariupol have been cut off from the rest of the country—they lost access to information about the war's progress and communication with loved ones. In some areas, the internet and mobile networks were completely shut down. Restricting internet access is part of Russia's strategy.

This strategy will likely continue in any newly captured territory. It traps occupied areas in the grip of Russian censorship and surveillance: Russia can monitor internet traffic and digital communications in occupied regions, spread propaganda, and limit the information that reaches people.

Russia's redirection and censorship of Ukraine's internet is an unprecedented phenomenon. Even after Beijing took control of Hong Kong in 2019, its residents had more internet freedom than those in mainland China.

And while Russian censorship can be bypassed using virtual private networks (VPNs), which conceal a user's location and identity, the strategy of cutting people off from the internet may continue to be implemented.

CONCLUSIONS

A review of articles on the pages of Wyborcza.pl shows that the Polish press has paid significant attention to the Russian-Ukrainian war from its very beginning, especially after the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022.

In numerous publications, journalists strive to objectively present not only the chronology of events on the battlefield but also to analyze the socio-humanitarian crisis in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories. Wyborcza.pl has covered the humanitarian situation in occupied Mariupol, Kherson, Izium, and other Ukrainian cities. The authors report that food prices have risen three to four times, vegetables have disappeared from stores and markets, and people primarily survive on porridge and pasta.

Polish political analysts have devoted considerable attention to the deportation of Ukrainians, including children, to Russia, highlighting the conditions in so-called filtration camps. Polish journalists and political commentators have addressed not only the looting in

Ukrainian cities but also the theft of agricultural products and machinery, as well as the destruction of grain storage facilities.

Publications in Wyborcza.pl also report that in occupied territories, Russian forces have rerouted telecommunications and internet traffic through Russia, allowing them to control, censor, and monitor Ukrainians, who are completely cut off from global news.

ABSTRACT

A review of the articles on the pages of the newspaper “Wyborcza.pl” showed that the Polish press paid considerable attention to the Russian-Ukrainian war from the first days of its outbreak, and especially with the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022. In numerous publications, journalists try to objectively present not only the chronology of events on the battlefield, but also analyze the social and humanitarian problem in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories. The pages of the newspaper “Wyborcza.pl” covered the humanitarian situation in the temporarily occupied Mariupol, Kherson, Izyum and other Ukrainian cities. The authors of the publications claim that food prices have increased 3-4 times, vegetables have disappeared from stores and markets, and people eat mainly cereals and pasta. Polish political commentators pay considerable attention to the problem of the deportation of the Ukrainian population, including children, to Russia, showing the conditions of detention in the so-called filtration camps. Polish journalists and political scientists raised questions not only about looting in Ukrainian cities, but also the problem of theft of agricultural products and equipment, destruction of granaries. In the publications of the newspaper “Wyborcza.pl” it is indicated that in the occupied territories, the Russians redirect telecommunication and Internet traffic to Russia, which allows them to control, censor and monitor Ukrainians, who are completely cut off from world news.

АНОТАЦІЯ

Огляд статей на сторінках газети «Wyborcza.pl» показав, що польська преса приділяла значну увагу російсько-українській війні з перших днів її початку, а особливо після повномасштабного російського вторгнення 24 лютого 2022 року. У численних публікаціях журналісти намагаються об’єктивно представити не лише хронологію подій на полі бою, а й проаналізувати соціальну та

гуманітарну проблему в країні, на тимчасово окупованих українських територіях. На сторінках газети «Wyborcza.pl» висвітлювалася гуманітарна ситуація в тимчасово окупованих Маріуполі, Херсоні, Ізюмі та інших містах України. Автори публікацій стверджують, що вартість продуктів харчування зросли в 3–4 рази, овочі зникли з магазинів і ринків, а люди харчуються переважно крупами і макаронами. Польські політичні оглядачі приділяють значну увагу проблемі депортації українського населення, зокрема дітей, до Росії, показуючи умови утримання у так званих фільтраційних таборах. Польські журналісти та політологи розглядали питання не лише про мародерство в українських містах, а й проблему розкрадання сільськогосподарської продукції та техніки, руйнування зерносховищ. У публікаціях газети «Wyborcza.pl» вказується, що на окупованих територіях росіяни перенаправляють телекомунікаційний та інтернет-трафік на Росію, що дозволяє їм контролювати, цензурувати та стежити за українцями, які повністю відрізані від світових новин.

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