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Література:

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THE HORIZON OF THE GLOBAL LIBERAL ORDER EVENTS: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS BALANCING BETWEEN IMITATION OF EFFICIENCY AND LOSS OF MEANING

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An outstanding ancient Chinese military theorist and commander Sun Tzu, whose views on war significantly influenced the development of the theory and practice of military art and warcraft, notes that “war is an

important thing for the state”, and what is of great importance “it is the path of existence and death”, and therefore he calls for treating it with maximum care [1, p.5]. This wise appeal acquires particular relevance and persuasiveness in the context of Russian military aggression against Ukraine and the way the world is jointly trying to cope with it.

The modern system of international relations is largely based on an extensive network of institutions originally designed to promote global stability and, at the same time, deter states from the use of military force and aggression. Such intentions and expectations derive from the concept defining the institutions as a well-structured system of rules and norms that normalize and regulate forms of cooperation or rivalry between states, determine acceptable models of international interaction. Moreover, supporters of institutionalism insist that “international institutions do not just reflect temporary interests of states but also shape those interests and the practices of states”, and “can continue to promote international cooperation even when the state interests which led to their initial creation no longer exist” [2, p.6].

An acknowledged leading adept of political realism, a contemporary American researcher John J. Mearsheimer concludes that “no other region of the world has institutions as extensive and as well-developed as those in Europe” [3, p.6]. Despite this, Europe could not avoid war which has convincingly demonstrated the vulnerability, a certain helplessness and even decorativeness of the European security system demonstrating systematic internal fragility and weakness behind its external strength. Relying on the persuasive “illusion of security” and the idea of “replacing power with rules” resulted in a trap of a “strategic confusion” for the European countries. Postponing the development of effective mechanisms to prevent and counter the growing challenges and threats, after the beginning of a full-scale war the European Union «reflexively turned to the idea of accession – that is, its traditional approach to its neighborhood – but then found itself unable to offer Ukraine an accelerated track to EU membership for strategic reasons, because to do so would be to undermine the depoliticized application of rules» [4]. According to the nomenclature of European reactions to Russian invasion to Ukraine, granting Ukraine the status of candidate for EU membership means the most symbolic political act aimed at negating the narratives of Russian propaganda about Ukraine as a part of Russia and confirming that «Ukraine deserves a European perspective» [5]. At the same time it's worth mentioning that although the acquisition of candidate status changes the format of financial and institutional support for Ukraine, anyway "a fundamental condition for Ukraine's accession to the EU is the end of the war and the achievement of a viable and lasting peace... Western decision-makers largely assumed that the war would end in the foreseeable future and that, with Western support, Ukraine would preferably either drive its aggressor out of

the country or at least end the conflict with some kind of compromise peace" [6, p.6].

Meanwhile since the declaration on granting Ukraine the EU membership candidate status more than three extremely difficult years have passed with no progress and shown the urgent need of changes in the paradigm of European security and its institutional keystones, otherwise the European integrative processes and aspirations of Ukraine cannot be considered as a full-fledged investment into European collective security. The security crisis Europe has faced because of Russian war of aggression and provocative cross-border acts devalues the idea of European unification and integration in framework of an exclusively "pacific project", thus European authorities should finally dare to amend the norms and adopt changes in security and defense fields to be able to respond appropriately to the demands of time and to follow the appeal of the former High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission of the European Union J. Borrell that Europe "must learn quickly to speak the language of power", and not only rely on soft power as we used to do" [7] and to abandon the primacy of "creative diplomacy and economic sanctions" to military force when dealing with an aggressor state" [3, p.32]. Instead, the European Union emphasizes repeatedly the peaceful purposes for which it was created and which should be followed in the future and declares its traditional commitment to the rules-based world order, although it recognizes the substantial changes and the need to accept the reality that the "old era" will not return and that "the only way we can ensure peace is to have the readiness to deter those who would do us harm" [8]. Thus, it remains unclear whether the Europe's commitment to the idea of the institutionalizing the world order and the dependence on institutional decisions will not lead to even more disastrous consequences. Nonetheless, the EU member-states statement that "the future of Ukraine is fundamental to the future of Europe as a whole" [8] undoubtedly indicates the forthcoming shifts, at least in mentality.

Once, the Italian philosopher and revolutionary A. Gramsci aptly noted that "the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born" [9, p.89]. Europe is currently in a kind of "security off-season", in which the old security system has lost its effectiveness, and the new security architecture has not yet been formed, and this very state causes the greatest risks regarding the time of serious latent threats to civilizational development, increased militarism, hybrid systemic and extra-systemic challenges.

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