THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR AS A NEW TYPE OF POSTMODERN WAR AND A FACTOR IN GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE

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Published: Oct 17, 2024

  Oleksii Buriachenko

Abstract

The article is devoted to the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian war as a new type of postmodern warfare that has become a factor in global transformations of the geopolitical landscape. For an objective understanding of this statement, the author aims to thoroughly investigate this issue. The author also aims to analyse the Russian-Ukrainian war in the context of its impact on the international security system. The study allows the author to conclude that the problem and danger of postmodern warfare is that it is difficult to predict due to its complexity, as it covers and targets the political, military, economic, social, information space, etc. But, the irony of postmodern warfare is that measures aimed at managing and reducing risks can lead to the opposite: more destruction and longer conflicts. The author also notes that in the era of postmodern warfare, which has undergone a major transformation in the twenty-first century, there is an understanding that due to the expansion of the «grey zones» of postmodern warfare, we cannot predict the outbreak of war, which affects the adoption of preventive measures. The uncertainty of the outbreak of war also blurs the responsibility of the aggressor. The article analyses the components of the Russian-Ukrainian war, including military and political (methods of «hybrid warfare», technological, network, etc.; full use of traditional methods of warfare of the twentieth century (shifting front lines, tanks and troops, urban attacks, struggle for air dominance and supply lines, mobilisation of troops, production of weapons, etc;) confrontation of regimes (democratic – autocratic); the factor of the aggressor as a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council), all this set of factors allows the author to confirm his hypothesis that the Russian-Ukrainian war is a new type of war of the postmodern era. The analysis of the reports, strategic positions of countries, military doctrines, military strategies, national security strategies, etc. allows us to note that the Russian-Ukrainian war has become a factor in global transformations of the geopolitical landscape and destabilisation of the international security system. In the author's opinion, the world community needs to come to the realisation that the current international security system cannot provide answers to the conflicts that arise in the world. It cannot protect the world from war, as this requires new goals and new meanings that would correspond to rapid geopolitical processes. The geopolitical structure of the world is becoming more complex and new centres of power are emerging on the political map. The world needs a new architecture of the global security system that would truly protect the world from the global war that world leaders, international institutions and opinion leaders are talking about.

How to Cite

Buriachenko, O. (2024). THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR AS A NEW TYPE OF POSTMODERN WAR AND A FACTOR IN GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE. Baltic Journal of Legal and Social Sciences, (3), 192-202. https://doi.org/10.30525/2592-8813-2024-3-20
Article views: 26 | PDF Downloads: 17

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Keywords

postmodernity, postmodern war, Russian-Ukrainian war, geopolitical landscape, international security, architecture of the world security system

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