ANTI-CORRUPTION SAFEGUARDS IN COMMUNES. CONCLUSIONS FROM A SURVEY OF POLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
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Abstract
The establishment of effective anti-corruption systems has been demonstrated to be a means of limiting the deleterious economic and social effects of corruption. These systems have also been demonstrated to foster public trust and contribute to increasing management efficiency. A well-designed anti-corruption policy should include not only formal codes of conduct, but above all mechanisms that raise awareness of the risk of illegal behaviour and actively encourage whistleblowing. The ultimate success of anti-corruption efforts is contingent upon the trust employees have in the coherence and credibility of anti-corruption systems, particularly within the context of public administration. The present study explores how the implementation of an anti-corruption security system in local government affects officials' perceptions of the effectiveness of internal anti-corruption procedures. The present study was conducted among local government officials in Poland responsible for anti-corruption safeguards. Participants were randomly selected from a comprehensive list of rural, rural-urban, and urban communes (N=314). The investigation focused on two aspects: the officials' confidence in employees' competence to implement anti-corruption policy and the degree of support provided by superiors in counteracting corruption. The analysis indicates a substantial discrepancy between the existence of formal anti-corruption safeguards and the confidence of officials in their effectiveness. The vast majority of communes (86%) have not introduced an integrated anti-corruption system. It is evident that local governments in Poland are not adequately prepared to address the systemic risk of fraud and corruption. This is a matter of particular concern, given that communes, as the fundamental administrative entities, bear direct responsibility for the provision of numerous services to local residents. These include permits, concessions and infrastructure, such as roads, schools and cultural institutions. In local government units where formal anti-corruption safeguards were implemented, officials expressed greater trust in internal protective procedures and the competence of their colleagues. Furthermore, it was believed that the office was capable of providing adequate support to employees in their efforts to combat corruption. A notable finding was that officials working in larger communes and those with managerial experience exhibited a heightened level of distrust regarding the efficacy of the prevailing mechanisms.
How to Cite
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corruption, anti-corruption, anti-corruption safeguards, anti-corruption policy, public administration, local government
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