MAIN CONTRACTOR – SUBCONTRACTOR RELATIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CONTRACT THEORY
##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.main##
##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.sidebar##
Abstract
How to Cite
##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.details##
contract theory, principal, agent, incentive compatibility, main contractor, subcontractor
Blahun I., Dmytryshyn L. & Leshuk H. (2017). Simulative model for evaluation of investment processes in the regions of Ukraine. Investment Management and Financial Innovations, 14(3), 322-329.
Bolton P. & Dewatripon M. (2005). Contract Theory – Cambridge, Mass & London, England: MIT Press.
Cabrales A. & Charness G. (2000). Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection and Social Preferences: An Experiment. Economics Working Papers 478, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Grossman S. & Hart O. (1982). Implicit Contracts Under Asymmetric Information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1, 110-124.
Grossman S. & Hart O. (1983). An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. Econometrica, 51(1), 7-45.
Laffont J.-J. & Martimort D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives. The Principal – Agent Model – Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Melumad D.N., Mookherjee D. & Reichelstein S. (1995). Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts. The Rand Journal of Economics, 26(4), 654-672.
Nykyforchyn I.V. (2017). Simulation of Active Systems with Dependent Incentives of Agents, Herold of Volyn Institute for Economics and Management, 19, 178-184. (in Ukrainian)