FEATURES OF RUSSIA’S SOFT IMPACT ON UKRAINE (UNTIL 2014)
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Abstract
The article considers the main features of Russia’s soft impact on Ukraine. The study is based on the application of the soft power concept of the American scientist J. Nye. The term soft power means to the ability of one actor to influence others using attraction (of one’s values, culture, politics, etc.), persuasion and involvement, as opposed to hard coercion and bribery (hard power). The Russian Federation’s soft impact on Ukraine, despite certain achievements, was generally inefficient, inconsistent and unsystematic. The reasons for this were: 1) stereotyped attitudes towards Ukraine as a constantly loyal and close country; 2) the predominance of the pro-Western national project in Ukraine, which is based on the opposition of Russian and Ukrainian development models; 3) the Russian Federation has not had a sufficiently attractive image for Ukrainians, taking into account the specifics of its political (authoritarianism) and economic (raw materials) systems; 4) insufficient institutional support for the soft influence policy, which is especially noticeable against the background of the Western non-governmental organizations’ activity in Ukraine; 5) the delay in implementing a targeted soft power policy at the state level. At the same time, it is worth noting certain successes in this direction of Russian policy related to the church, educational, cultural, information and economic areas. However, these achievements, mostly related to the previous common historical experience of the two countries, were often accumulated inertially, without the systematic and conscious use of soft impact’s tools. Russia’s use of hard power against Ukraine since 2014 has reversed all these gains.
How to Cite
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soft power, Russia, Ukraine, bilateral relations, politics
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