PARADOXES OF MONETARY POLICY PROVIDED BY THE NATIONAL BANK OF UKRAINE (OR, FOLLOWING HONORE DE BALZAC “SHINE AND POVERTY OF COURTESANS”)

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Published: Jun 20, 2024

Abstract

The qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the monetary policy of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) have been analyzed. It has been proved that this policy, as a part of general regulatory policy of the state, is a set of measures in the area of money’s circulation to be implemented in order to ensure the stability of the monetary and banking system of Ukraine. The crisis in the country's economy, provoked by the war, became a serious challenge for the NBU that requires improvement of the state monetary policy and searching for effective mechanisms needed to be implemented. In this situation, the NBU has to ensure not only the achievement of the national financial system relatively high level of stability, but also move in its regulatory banking policy, which main purpose is consisting now in supporting the value of money, to a comprehensive assessment of the money’s functions in general.

How to Cite

Mantsurov, I. G., Barvinok, A. S., & Stoletova, I. G. (2024). PARADOXES OF MONETARY POLICY PROVIDED BY THE NATIONAL BANK OF UKRAINE (OR, FOLLOWING HONORE DE BALZAC “SHINE AND POVERTY OF COURTESANS”). Baltic Journal of Legal and Social Sciences, 8-29. https://doi.org/10.30525/2592-8813-2024-spec-1
Article views: 84 | PDF Downloads: 69

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Keywords

approaches, management, monetary and banking system of Ukraine, tools, monetary policy, National Bank, stability of the methodology

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