THE STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AFTER THE SECOND KARABAKH WAR: AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. STRATEGY AGAINST THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF CHINA AND IRAN
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Abstract
The Second Karabakh War in 2020 significantly reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus, triggering a shift in the balance of power and creating new dynamics among regional and global actors. This article examines the evolving influence of major powers in the post-war period, with a particular focus on the United States’ strategic response to the growing presence of China and Iran. The South Caucasus, serving as a critical bridge between Europe and Asia, has become a focal point of geopolitical competition due to its strategic location, energy resources, and key transit routes, such as the Zangezur Corridor. China’s interest in the region is primarily driven by its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aiming to establish secure, diversified trade routes to reduce dependence on traditional maritime pathways. Concurrently, Iran seeks to maintain its regional influence through economic and political channels, opposing infrastructure projects like the Zangezur Corridor that could marginalize its role in transcontinental trade. The United States has adopted a dual strategy to counter these influences, conceptualized as the "Geoeconomic Disruption Strategy" targeting China’s economic expansion, and the "Military Containment Strategy" aimed at limiting both Iranian and Chinese geopolitical maneuverability. Through strategic partnerships, particularly with Armenia, and military presence in the region, the U.S. seeks to disrupt China’s economic ambitions while enhancing surveillance capabilities over Iran. The article highlights how Washington leverages these strategies to maintain its influence, prevent the consolidation of Sino-Iranian cooperation, and mitigate Russia’s traditional dominance, which has been weakened post-war.
How to Cite
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South Caucasus, U.S., China, Iran, Geopolitics, Regional Influence
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