LEGITIMACY ON THE FRONTLINE. PUBLIC POLICY IN UKRAINE BETWEEN PUBLIC GOOD AND PRIVATE INTERESTS

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Published: Sep 30, 2022

  Liliya Yakovleva

  Oleg Dubinskiy

  Yaroslav Kotenko

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to determine the legitimacy of public authorities under martial law in Ukraine. The oscillation of public policy in Ukraine between the private interests of representatives of oligarchic groups and the public good is noted. The need to direct public policy toward the realization of the public good was noted. Methodology. The study is based on the provisions of the theory of public choice concerning the two levels of interaction in the process of political exchange – constitutional and institutional. The dependence of the legitimacy of public power on constitutional conditions (which are a reflection of the social contract) and institutional interaction, designed to reduce the transaction costs of society, is defined. Rational choice institutionalism allows us to look at the legitimacy of public power as a result of the effectiveness of institutions for realizing the public good, reducing transaction costs and overcoming opportunistic behavior. Results. The emphasis is placed on the need to choose between democracy and dictatorship and to overcome oligarchy as a regime of political corruption. The limitation of electoral legitimacy, which in conditions of oligarchy entails a change in the personal composition of power, rather than its choice in favor of democracy, is noted. The innovative term "Institutes of Legitimacy" is proposed. It is defined that the institutions of legitimacy include the media, political parties and NGOs, which in a democracy provide and further support the legitimacy of public authority. Institutions of legitimacy evaluate the actions of public authorities and form public opinion. It is substantiated that for the post-Soviet ruling class, given the rutting effect, there remains a danger of following private interests rather than the public good. This is an oligarchic system of relations, identified as a system of political corruption. This applies in full measure to the Institutes of Legitimacy, which are now partially dependent on the oligarchs. Under martial law, public policy in Ukraine is aimed at protecting the country from large-scale armed aggression and attracting maximum international military and financial support. These are the main markers of legitimacy. The results of sociological research testify to the high level of legitimacy of the authorities in Ukraine: a growth of trust in individual political institutions and in the course of the state as a whole is being recorded. According to Sociological Group Rating in May 2022 the level of support for the actions of the Ukrainian government was 79%, and 54% of citizens recognized the actions of the state as quite effective. Practical implications. The legitimacy of the Ukrainian government depends on its effectiveness in two areas: winning the war and overcoming the oligarchy. It should take advantage of unprecedented international support for this. This will significantly reduce transaction costs and increase the efficiency of both individual institutions and institutional interaction, opening the way for Ukraine's European integration. Value/originality. This study of public policy in Ukraine as a balancing act between private and public interests allows for a better understanding of the economic factors of legitimacy formation under martial law and the impact of international support on the provision of legitimacy.

How to Cite

Yakovleva, L., Dubinskiy, O., & Kotenko, Y. (2022). LEGITIMACY ON THE FRONTLINE. PUBLIC POLICY IN UKRAINE BETWEEN PUBLIC GOOD AND PRIVATE INTERESTS. Baltic Journal of Economic Studies, 8(3), 228-234. https://doi.org/10.30525/2256-0742/2022-8-3-228-234
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Keywords

economic theory, public policy, public good, transaction costs, rational choice institutionalism, legitimacy of public power, institutions of legitimacy

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